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Entertainment Law
Jon M. Garon"
ThisAricle focuses on the influence the enten'ainmentindustryandits business pmctices
have had on copydgh4 privacy, and the FstAmendment TheArticle demonstrates that much
of the modem development in the areas of privacy and copjrght flow from the practical
demands of the entertainment indust, and that the slow accession of free speech ights to
traditional entertainment media has served to inhibit the tolerance for certin forms of
expressive conduct At each stage in the recogaition and expansion ofprivacy law, the primary
case law stemmed from performers and athletes attempting to controland to market theirimage.
These cases, in turn, supportedprivate indiiduals from claims of inrusion into seclusion, false
ligh andgovemrmentalintrusionsintoprivacy. The copynightpromotion ofprogress ofscience
and the useful arts has tracked each state ofgrowth in popular entertainmen4 revising the statute
and social norms to promote the enterainment industries as they growand mature. Finally in
the area of the FirstAmendmen4 the narrow but nearly inviolate protection ofpoli'ical speech
has been eroded as other forms of speech and communication, primarily those of popular
entertainmeni7 have been added to the range ofprotected acivities. As the breadth of fee
speech has eypande4 so has the regulation of that speech. Modem regulaton of television,
rado, and advertising are not limited to select categories of speech, however, but allow
govemment regulaon andrestraint ofeven the most highlyprized corepol'tical speech. At the
same time, free speech concerns have encouraged the voluntay censorshp ofmedi&, creaing a
far more pervasive but unregulated tier of censorshi. Although generally considered a
sideshow in the legal arena, entertainment law has deeply shaped the political, legal, and
economic realitythatsupports the development ofthe law.
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"The hand that rules the press, the mdo, the screen and the far-spread
magazine, rules the country.... "
-Learned Hand, Memorial service for Justice Brandeis,
December 21, 1942'
'All that I desire to point out is the general principle that Life imitates
Art farmore than Art imitates Life .... "
-Oscar Wilde, The Decay ofLying, 18912
I. NTRODUCTION
Each semester, hundreds of law students and thousands of would-
be artists in dozens of media ask a simple question: "What is
entertainment law?" My simple answer has been that it is nothing, it
1. LEARNED HAND, Mi. Justice Brndeis, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 127, 132 (Irving Dillard ed., 1959).
2. OSCAR WILDE, The Decay of Lying, in THE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE 597, 613
(Walter J. Black, Inc. 1927).
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does not exist. Instead, I teach copyright, trademark, privacy, First
Amendment, professional responsibility, contracts, business
associations, telecommunications, labor, and antitrust law through the
lens of the entertainment industries. After ten years of reflection, I
have finally changed my mind. Perhaps my answer has been too
simple.
The first place to look for entertainment law is in regulations
designed specifically to regulate the entertainment industries. While
these may make up only a small portion of the entertainment practice,
they certainly reflect laws created because of the entertainment
industries. The New York Theatrical Syndication Financing Act that
regulates the financing of Broadway productions,3 the Jackie Coogan
laws that protect child performers from the unscrupulous or wasteful
actions of their parents,' talent agency licensing statutes,' film permit
ordinances,6 and obscenity laws' are all entertainment laws. They
share, however, the distinction of protecting society from the evils of
the entertainment industry. These statutes reflect what society has said
it will and will not tolerate about the entertainment industry. Does this
body of financing, production, and distribution limitations embody the
true entertainment law? Certainly they color legal tapestry, but
something richer embodies the central pattern. Entertainment law has
provided more than mere color for significant constitutional, statutory,
3. N.Y. ARTs & CULT. AFF. LAW § 23.01 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2001).
4. Thom Hardin, Note, The Regzlation of Minors' Entertainment Contracts:
Effective California Law or Hollywood Grandeurg 19 J. Juv. L. 376, 379-81 (1998); Erica
Siegel, Note, When Parental interference Goes Too Far: The Need forAdequate Protection of
Child Entertainers and Athletes, 18 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 427, 428 (2000). See
generally Shayne J. Heller, Legislative Update, The Price of Celebriy,: When a Child. Star-
Studded CareerAmounts to Nothing, 10 DEPAU-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 161, 165-72 (1999)
(discussing the outdated and modem versions of the Coogan laws).
5. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (Deering 1999). See generally Donald E.
Biederman, Agents v Managers Revisited, 1 VAN. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 5 (1999) (discussing
the regulation of agents); William A. Birdthistle, A ContestedAscendancy: Problems with
Personal Managers Acting as Producers, 20 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 493 (2000) (discussing
the effect of the Talent Agency Act on personal managers); Edwin E McPherson, The Talent
AgenciesAct: Time fora Change, 19 HASTNGS COMMi. & ENT. L.J. 899 (1997) (same).
6. See, e.g., CAL. MODEL FILM ORDINANCE § H(A); NEWPORT BEACH, CAL. MUN.
ORDINANCE ch. 5.46, § 10 (1988); ROBERT G. MAIER, LOCATION SCOUTING AND
MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 156-57 (1994).
7. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 972-74 (1978); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendmen4 79 HARv L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1965); Kent
Greenawalt, Free Speech Justiicatons, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 145 (1989) ("A liberal
democracy rests ultimately on the choices of its citizens"); Michael Wingfield Walker,
Recent Development, Ar tstc Freedom v Censorsh'p: The Aflermath of the NEA New
FundingRestrictons, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 937 (1993).
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and common law changes, it has drawn the forms and set the figures in
motion.
To suggest that entertainment law exists and has shaped laws of
more general applicability, we must come to grip with the troubling
truth that mere entertainment has the power to shape our culture and
our laws. If entertainment law exists as more than a collection of
industry regulations, it does so because entertainment often leads the
public debate on fundamental notions of economic and moral justice.
At this point, I must separate those areas in which entertainment
products have shaped our popular culture and the legal institutions
within it. Shakespeare was said to have been forced to modify his
popular character, Falstaff, because of its unflattering resemblance to
public figures., D.W Griffith's epic Birth of a Naton was lauded for
its cinematic genius, but was also notorious for reinvigorating
segregation wherever it was shown.' The music of the Beatles, Bob
Dylan, and the Rolling Stones provided the soundtrack for President
Johnson's Great Society and the protest movement against the Vietnam
War. Whether the music reflected the times or led the revolution can
be debated, but never resolved. Ultimately, such studies are best left to
sociologists and social historians than to lawyers.
8. The Encyclopedia Brtanmica states:
Shakespeare had originally called this character Sir John Oldcastle in the first
version of Henry IV, Part 1, but had changed the name before the play was
registered, doubtless because descendants of the historical Oldcastle-who were
then prominent at court-protested .... The historical Sir John Fastolf was a
career soldier who in the second phase of the Hundred Years' War had something
of a reputation as a coward; however, Shakespeare's presentation of his character
was libelous.
Britannica Encyclopedia, Falstat, Sir Jom, available at http:/Avwwv.britannica.com/eb/
article?eu=342668tocrd=O&qieru=sor%20john%20fastdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
9. The Film Encyclopeaa describes the film as,
the single most important film in the development of cinema as an art .... But The
Birth ofa Nation also generated criticism and stirred up a rage of controversy over
the Ku Klux Klan and its anti-Negro bias. Some black groups and white liberal
groups condemned it as "a flagrant incitement to racial antagonism" and urged
authorities in various states to ban its exhibition.
EPHRAIM KATZ, THE FILM ENCYCLOPEDIA 510 (G.R Putnam's Sons 1979); see Margaret A.
Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to
Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741,
781 (1992); see also D.W. GRIFFITH, THE RiSE AND FALL OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (1916)
(promoting film as a form of pictorial press so that films like his own Birth of a Nation
should be entitled to First Amendment protections); MICHAEL PAUL ROGN, RONALD REAGAN,
THE MovIE AND OrHER EPISODEs IN POLmCAL DEMONOLOGY 10 (1987) (discussing the
movie's connection to the Ku Klux Klan).
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Instead, this Article suggests that entertainment law has
transformed fundamental legal doctrine. Where laws of general
applicability and entertainment intersect, entertainment law has
reshaped the jurisprudence. This Article focuses on three areas where
the impact has been most profound: privacy, copyright, and free
expression. In each of these areas, the interests of the entertainment
industry have changed the cultural and legal norms, conforming them
to the needs of the industry. Other areas have also been affected.
Telecommunications law, contract law," and antitrust law'2 also show
the impact of entertainment law's influence. This Article, however,
will focus on the three areas of law that most closely regulate the
communications we make in our daily lives.
If this thesis that entertainment law has reshaped many of the
more widely recognized legal doctrines is correct, then the impact of
the entertainment industry should be a measurable force governing the
development of emerging technological markets. Indeed, the shape
and magnitude of the entertainment force may offer a tool for
predicting public policy as the traditional entertainment industries
converge with the Internet and consumer electronic industries. Once
unmasked, this hidden, sequin-gloved hand may be observed as it
shapes our future. To understand the potential impact, this review
tracks historical development of common law, statutory construction,
and constitutional jurisprudence through the three areas of the law
selected.
Part II of this Article will review the impact the entertainment
industry has had on general laws of privacy, serving as its basis and
propelling its growth. Part 11 will focus on copyright, illustrating the
transformation of copyright from its historical origins to its current
status as a congressionally adopted form of collective bargaining
among the entertainment industry. Part IV reviews the elevation of
entertainment from a sinister commodity that required heavy
censorship to a vaunted form of expression protected by the near-
sacred First Amendment. It details the rise of constitutional protection
at the expense of a diluted form of free expression jurisprudence.
Finally, Part V will offer some limited assessments on the development
of these laws in the context of the rapidly changing entertainment
marketplace.
10. E.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. V 1999).
11. E.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214,214-15 (N.Y. 1917).
12. E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917).
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II. PRIVACYAND PUBLICrrY
A. Warren andBrandeis, The Right to Privacy
The law of privacy traces its origins to the groundbrealdng law
review article The Right to Pivacy by Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren. 3 In the article, they articulated a fundamental "right to be let
alone?' They reviewed a wide range of litigated cases, developing a
comprehensive theory that many cases previously decided were, in
fact, based on an implied protection of the plaintiff's privacy. The
authors called for the explicit recognition of privacy rights because
they were concerned about dropping morality, rampant gossip, and the
growth of intrusive technologies such as instantaneous photography
and the "newspaper enterprise"' 5
Law professors, if they return to the original text of the article
(rather than Dean Prosser's updated summary), tend to focus on its
discussion of the right to seclusion and the right to have no material
about oneself published without permission, subject only to limited
common law privilege such as fair comment.'6 Yet, much of the
analytical jurisprudence is based not on Roman tort law or libel law,
but on common law copyright. As Warren and Brandeis tried to shape
the limits of the privacy right, they explain that "[tihe right to privacy
ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his
consent. This is but another application of the rule which has become
familiar in the law of literary and artistic property."'7
Warren and Brandeis based much of the now-familiar privacy law
on the common law copyright protection that existed in England as
13. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv 193 (1890).
14. Id at 193.
15. Id. at 195-96. Compare the authors' attitude toward burgeoning technology with
that of the ancient wrong of gossip:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten
to make good the prediction that what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops ....
... Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as vell as effrontery. To satisfy a
prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
Id (quotations omitted); see Oliver R. Goodenough, Go Fish: Evaluating the Restatement
Formulation oftheLaw ofPublicity, 47 S.C. L. REV. 709, 752-53 (1996).
16. SeeWarren & Brandeis, supmrnote 13, at 218-19.
17. Id. at 218.
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early as the sixteenth century." Under prior copyright regimes in the
United States and England, the statutory rights of an author were
protected upon publication of the work.9 Absent publication, the work
remained protected by state common law copyright indefinitely and
could not be published without the author's consent."0 Warren and
Brandeis explained:
In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that
which is his shall be given to the public. No other has the right to
publish his productions in any form, without his consent. This right is
wholly independent of the material on which, or the means by which,
the thought, sentiment, or emotion is expressed. It may exist
independently of any corporeal being, as in words spoken, a song sung,
a drama acted. Or if expressed on any material, as a poem in writing,
the author may have parted with the paper, without forfeiting any
proprietary right in the composition itself. The right is lost only when
the author himself communicates his production to the public,--in
other words, publishes it."
By basing much of the extension of privacy rights to those
embodied in common law copyright, Warren and Brandeis extended
the property rights of an author in his work to "that which is his'" the
author himself.' In essence, common law copyright is extending a
common law right in one's identity when used in another party's
expression. Common law copyright applies to publicity rights much
more directly than to the protections from intrusion that the remaining
privacy doctrines attempt to protect. As such, publicity rights are the
smallest extension of existing law, not the most extreme.
The Warren and Brandeis approach sidestepped the more
difficult conceptual barriers created when privacy is viewed as an
extension of defamation law. First, the article explained in the first
paragraph that "the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form
of possession-intangible, as well as tangible."' In doing so, the
article implied the possibility of a regime that would allow for transfers
of the property rights, as well as postmortem enforcement. Second, by
18. See id. at 195. The authors suggest that English copyright can be first attributed
as a"species of private property in England in 1558." Id. at 195 n.1. The Statute ofAnne, the
predecessor of the modem copyright statute, promulgated in 1710, was held to preempt
common law rights upon publication of a work. See3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTrrtrrON OFTHEUNI TED STATES § 1147, at 48 (DaCapo Press 1970) (1891).
19. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMER & DAVIDNIMMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.03 (2001).
20. See id.
21. Warren & Brandeis, supm note 13, at 199-200 (footnote omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 193.
2002] 565
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relying on copyright concepts of publication rather than libel concepts,
the approach provided a practical distinction between published and
unpublished works, works widely disseminated and therefore
potentially harmful because of the general publication, rather than
injury caused by the immoral gossip that is best left to religious
authorities for recourse.24 Only those works that had received a general
publication, i.e., made generally available to the public, would be
published for purposes of privacy rights and would be actionable only
if published without consent. Private communications and restricted
circulation would not result in any invasion of privacy.
This approach also helps explain why the article suggested that
oral publication would not be actionable, at least not without special
damages."s Because Warren and Brandeis were contemplating a
copyright-like claim, albeit for expression about, rather than merely by,
the "author," oral infringements were rare in the nineteenth century. 6
Dramatic performing rights, although protected since 1856,'7 were
essentially limited to dramatizations of the work, rather than the mere
public performance of the work.2 ' The exclusive performing right in
music was of even more recent origin, January 6, 1897.9 Perhaps it is
too much to read into the authors' reluctance regarding oral
infringement, because slander similarly requires special damages while
libel often does not. Still, the novelty of public performance rights and
the reluctance of the law to afford redress for oral conduct is consistent
with the copyright approach applied by the article.
B. Early CourtAdoption ofPrivacy Laws
The Warren and Brandeis article started a debate on the scope
and nature of privacy that continues to this day. Over the fifteen years
following the Warren and Brandeis article, the high courts of first New
York and then Georgia reviewed each state's common law for evidence
of this ancient doctrine, newly rediscovered by the two privacy
advocates.
24. See id. at 218 (applying the copyright definition of publication to state that "the
important principle in this connection being that a private communication of circulation for a
restricted purpose is not a publication within the meaning of the law" and therefore not
subject to privacy liability).
25. Seeid. at217.
26. See id
27. Act ofAug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 138-39.
28. See E.J. MACGILLwRAY, A TREATISE UPON THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT 286 (1902).
29. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481,481-82.
566 [Vol. 76:559
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The Supreme Court of Georgia, the first state to adopt the explicit
right of privacy as part of the common law, characterized the Warren
and Brandeis article:
It was conceded by the authors that there was no decided case in which
the right of privacy was distinctly asserted and recognized, but it was
asserted that there were many cases from which it would appear that
this right really existed, although the judgment in each case was put
upon other grounds when the plaintiff was granted the relief prayed."
New York courts had been dealing directly with privacy and
publicity issues at the time of the Warren and Brandeis article. Just
prior to the article's publication, the well-known comic opera singer
Marion Manola took issue with a proposed show poster, refusing to
appear in the poster in a pair of unflattering tights.3' The producer
procured a photograph without her permission and used it for his
advertising of the opera Castles in the Air, only to have Ms. Manola
successfully enjoin his use of the poster.32 Because Ms. Manola
continued to perform in the opera, there was no question regarding
deceptive advertising or some other legal theory. She was a star
controlling her image to her public.3 This incident gave strong
impetus to the trends identified by Warren and Brandeis and was
featured in the article as an example of the trend in the law.'
Two years later, New York was the first state high court to review
the privacy laws. The high court was not particularly deferential to
Warren and Brandeis or to its lower courts. The case, Roberson v
Rochester Folding Box Co., involved a dispute between the young
Abigail M. Roberson and the Franklin Mills Company, which used a
likeness of the comely Ms. Roberson on the flour package."
Approximately 25,000 packages of flour with Ms. Roberson's likeness
were manufactured. The flour was then distributed, such that "those
25,000 likenesses of the plaintiff thus ornamented have been
30. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68,74 (Ga. 1905).
31. See Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 401,
413-15 (1990).
32. SeeXWarren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 195 n.7; see also Glancy, supranote 3 1,
at 402-19 (comparing the lawsuits of Marion Manola and Bette Midler to find that the right
of publicity is based on the right of privacy); Manola Gets an Injunctdon, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18,
1890, at 3; Miss Manola Seeks an Injunction, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1890, at 2; Photographed
in Tights: Marion Manola Caught on the Stage by a Camera, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,1890, at 2.
33. SeeGlancy, supranote 31, at416.
34. SeeNVarren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 195-96.
35. 64 N.E. 442,442 (N.Y. 1902).
36. Id
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conspicuously posted and displayed in stores, warehouses, saloons,
and other public places."'
The facts in Roberson are also interesting because the plaintiff
alleged an actual and emotional injury as a result of the use of her
picture on the flour.38 The Court of Appeals of New York explained,
somewhat unsympathetically, that
plaintiff has been greatly humiliated by the scoffs and jeers of persons
who have recognized her face and picture on this advertisement, and
her good name has been attacked, causing her great distress and
suffering, both in body and mind; that she was made sick, and suffered
a severe nervous shock, was confined to her bed and compelled to
employ a physician. 9
Whether the allegation is true is unclear. The case was decided
on demurrer, so the court accepted the allegations as facts for the
purposes of the opinion." The allegation may have been true, but it is
equally likely that the allegations were framed to overcome any
requirement of damages and more closely approximate the case to a
form of libel. In fact, the Roberson court pointed out that no claim of
libel is brought because the picture is a good likeness of Ms.
Roberson."
Having identified the privacy right as an inchoate right available
to protect oneself from unwanted intrusions that give rise to emotional
pain, the court quickly dismissed the claim as an unwanted extension
of New York common law that would do great mischief to the public
and the courts.42 The court suggested that no right existed outside the
Warren and Brandeis article, and that such a doctrine would open the
37. Id.
38. See id
39. Id. at 442-43.
40. Id at 442.
41. Chief Justice Parker explained:
Such publicity, which some find agreeable, is to plaintiff very distastefifl, and thus,
because of defendants' impertinence in using her picture, without her consent, for
their own business purposes, she has been caused to suffer mental distress where
others would have appreciated the compliment to their beauty implied in the
selection of the picture for such purposes; but, as it is distasteful to her, she seeks
the aid of the courts to enjoin a further circulation of the lithographic prints
containing her portrait made as alleged in the complaint, and, as an incident
thereto, to reimburse her for the damages to her feelings, which the complaint f ixes
at the sum of $15,000.
Id at 443.
42. See id.
[Vol. 76:559
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courts to "the vast field of litigation which would necessarily be
opened up should this court hold that privacy exists:'
Perhaps, had the plaintiff asserted her claims as more analogous
to property rights than to a right to be free from defamation, the New
York Court of Appeals might have been more sympathetic. This is at
least suggested, because the court grudgingly mentioned that a
publicity right could be created by the legislature:
The legislative body could very well interfere and arbitrarily provide
that no one should be permitted for his own selfish purpose to use the
picture or the name of another for advertising purposes without his
consent. In such event no embarrassment would result to the general
body of the law, for the rule would be applicable only to cases provided
for by the statute.'
The English case law relied upon by Warren and Brandeis, but
dismissed by the Roberson court, recognized that courts have extended
property rights to publicity cases through implied contracts, common
law copyright, and trust principles."5
Unfortunately, the use of property rights was a double-edged
sword. It may be that the historical distinction between law and equity
explains some of the difficulty early courts had with the developing
privacy and publicity doctrine. In many publicity cases, the measure
of damages is speculative. The true relief comes in the form of
injunctions, an equitable remedy. But as the Supreme Court had
explicitly reminded the country in In re Sawyer, "[t]he office and
jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are
limited to the protection of rights of property."6 The New York Court
of Appeals said essentially the same thing: no expansion of the
publicity or privacy doctrine without legislative action.47
The United States Supreme Court ultimately repudiated this
interpretation, but two decades after the Roberson decision. The Court
finally addressed the need for characterizing intellectual property as
property in Internatonal News Service v Associated Press." In that
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 444-45 (citing Prince Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (V.C. 1849);
Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888); Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch.
1818); Abemathy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch. 209 (1825); Mayall v. Higbey, 158 Eng. Rep. 837
(Ex. Ch. 1862); Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, 28 Eng. Rep. 924 (Ch. 1758)).
46. 124 U.S. 200,210 (1888).
47. See Roberson, 64 N.E. at 447.
48. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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case, the property was the "hot news" of the day. The Court explained
its position as follows:
In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the controversy, we
need not affirm any general and absolute property in the news as such.
The rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of
property rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property
right; and the right to acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of
a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard
property already acquired.49
By citing Sawyer, the Court seemed to suggest that this was not a
change in the relationship between law and equity, but rather a
continuation of the equity court's ongoing power. Nonetheless, courts
trying to determine the powers over publicity rights were limited by
Sawyer until the Supreme Court refined its decision. For example,
Vassar College found a court unable to exercise equity jurisdiction over
the alleged misuse of its name as well as the name of its founder,
Matthew Vassar, as a result of the Sawyerreasoning
In his dissent to the Roberson decision, Justice Gray endorsed the
Warren and Brandeis article, supporting the concept of privacy rights
as extensions of natural law, personal liberty, and property rights." He
identified the modem camera as "a species of aggression" that might
have to be tolerated, but not when used for commercial purposes
against the wishes of the subject of the photograph. 2 By drawing this
distinction, he pointed out the implicit line between privacy rights in
general and publicity rights, which is the commercial advantage taken
by the defendant.
Justice Gray's dissent was endorsed by the next high court to take
up the issue of privacy. Four years later, in 1905, the Georgia Supreme
Court endorsed the opinion of Justice Gray by finding that privacy
49. Id. at 236 (citations omitted)(citing h7 re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 593 (1895); In re
Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888)).
50. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982,986 (Vw.D. Mo. 1912).
51. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 449 (Gray, J., dissenting).
52. Justice Gray argued:
Instantaneous photography is a modem invention, and affords the means of
securing a portraiture of an individual's face and form in invitum their owner.
While, so far forth as it merely does that, although a species of aggression, I
concede it to be an irremediable and irrepressible feature of the social evolution.
But if it is to be permitted that the portraiture may be put to commercial or other
uses for gain by the publication of prints therefrom, then an act of invasion of the
individual's privacy results, possibly more formidable and more painful in its
consequences than an actual bodily assault might be.
Id. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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rights continued to exist at common law, notwithstanding a long hiatus
from the doctrinal literature. 3 In the Georgia case, it was again the
commercial use of a likeness that was at issue.' In Pavesich v New
England Life Insurance Co., a life insurance company used the
photograph of Mr. Pavesich, an artist, to illustrate its newspaper ad."
His picture was used with the caption, "In my healthy and productive
period of life I bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life
Insurance Co., of Boston, Mass., and to-day my family is protected
and I am drawing an annual dividend on my paid-up policies."'6
Pavesich sued for both libel and invasion of his rights of privacy and
publicity."
The Georgia Supreme Court had none of the concerns identified
by the New York Court of Appeals. Instead, the Georgia court looked
to the Roman tradition of protecting privacy as a form of "immutable"
personal liberty." The court viewed the right of privacy as a natural
extension of natural law that could not be abolished by time or
overlooked because of disuse. Starting from the perspective of
immutable natural rights, it is perhaps surprising that the court was so
willing to extend the interests of the plaintiff to the right to control the
commercial use or publicity rights in his name and likeness. The
court, however, made the extension from privacy to publicity quite
easily:
The right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in
all proper places, and in a proper manner is embraced within the right
of personal liberty. The right to withdraw from the public gaze at such
times as a person may see fit, when his presence in public is not
demanded by any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of
personal liberty. Publicity in one instance, and privacy in the other, are
each guaranteed. If personal liberty embraces the right of publicity, it
53. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78-79 (Ga. 1905).
54. See id. at 68-69.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 69.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 70.
59. The court explained:
A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law
.... It may be said to arise out of those laws sometimes characterized as
"immutable" because they are natural, and so just at all times and in all places that
no authority can either change or abolish them. It is one of those rights referred to
by some lav writers as "absolute"-such as would belong to their persons merely
in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society
or in it.
Id. (citations & quotations omitted).
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no less embraces the correlative right of privacy, and this is no new idea
in Georgia law.0
As a result of the Georgia decision, publicity rights were immediately
rooted in the fabric of general privacy rights in one state.
More to the point of this analysis, the two seminal high court
decisions that framed the debate on the right to privacy stemmed
directly from publicity rights. The commercial exploitation essential
for the entertainer or athlete is embodied in this right.
The cases continued to develop, and following Justice Gray's
dissent and the Georgia court's opinion in Pavesich, additional courts
continued to find that the commercial rights to privacy ought to be
protected. In Flake v Greensboro News Co., the dispute arose over a
commercial for Melts Bakery's rye bread as a cross-promotional
advertisement." The ad was supposed to use the photograph of the star
from the Folies de Paree, a traveling burlesque or vaudeville show, but
instead featured Nancy Flake from a publicity photograph of her
modeling a bathing suit. 2
Despite the lack of a libel claim and a quick apology from the
newspaper for the error, the court found a cause of action. The Flake
Court endorsed the Pavesich opinion, recognizing the evolving
commercial marketplace.
One of the accepted and popular methods of advertising in the present
day is to procure and publish the indorsement of the article being
advertised by some well-known person whose name supposedly will
lend force to the advertisement. If it be conceded that the name of a
person is a valuable asset in connection with an advertising enterprise,
then it must likewise be conceded that his face or features are likewise
of value. Neither can be used for such a purpose without the consent of
the owner without giving rise to a cause of action.
Although the publicity doctrine was developing slowly, it was
receiving generally positive judicial reaction.
Similarly, the importance of the publicity right was not lost on
New York. In fact, the legislative reaction was rather swift. By 1903,
the New York legislature statutorily overturned the Roberson decision
60. Id
61. 195 S.E. 55, 58 (N.C. 1938).
62. See id. The court could not find a claim for libel, despite the potential ill repute
of the Folies de Paree, at least in part because Ms. Flake had posed for the bathing suit
photograph as a publicity photograph for CBS. See id at 61.
63. Id
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of the New York Court of Appeals, adopting instead the position of
Justice Gray's dissent.' The statute was simply drafted:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a
minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Section 51 of the statute extended a private right of action for invasion
of this form of privacy."
The New York courts were not keen on being overturned,
however, and tended to interpret sections 50 and 51 narrowly. The
rights at stake in the initial New York review of the statute were
focused on baseball cards and the ability of professional athletes to
license their likenesses, but the New York courts did not find a
commercially exploitable property right under the statute.67 The so-
called rights were merely privacy rights, which must not be a form of
an assignable property right:
The statutory creation in this state of a limited right of privacy was
intended for the protection of the personality of an individual against
unlawful invasion. It provided primarily a recovery for injury to the
person, not to his property or business .... True, where an individual's
right of privacy has been invaded there are certain other elements which
may be taken into consideration in assessing the damages. Thus, where
a cause of action under the Civil Rights statute has been established,
damages may include recovery for a so-called "property" interest
inherent and inextricably interwoven in the individual's personality, but
it is the injury to the person not to the property which establishes the
cause of action. That is the focal point of the statute.'
The New York courts used this interpretation to limit the impact
of privacy in general, and the publicity right in particular. The
approach of recognizing the privacy right as a personal, nonassignable
right was certainly not dictated by either the language of the statute or
the economic realities of the transaction.
64. Id
65. 1903 N.Y Laws, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, (codified as amended at N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW
§ 50 (McKinney 1998)).
66. SeeN.Y. Cr. RIGHTs LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
67. E.g., Bowman Gum, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 103 E Supp. 944, 953
(E.D.N.Y 1952), rev, Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951), aff'a, 107
N.E. 2d 485 (N.Y. 1952).
68. Bowman Gum, 103 E Supp. at 950 (citations omitted).
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New York finally recognized the need to change through the
subtle persuasion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. On behalf of the New York courts, the Second Circuit
graciously joined the jurisdictions willing to recognize publicity as a
distinct, commercial property right. In Haelan Labomtories, Inc. v
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., the Second Circuit assisted New York
courts in coming to grips with the growing need for publicity rights. 9
The Second Circuit ignored New York's baseball card decision of
the previous year, instead identifying the need for a distinct right of
publicity within the framework of sections 50 and 51 of the New York
Civil Rights Act."0 The Second Circuit explained that "in addition to
and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives
from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, ie., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing
his picture."' This statement merely reflects the statutory language of
the New York Civil Rights Act sections 50 and 51. The court went
further, however, by finding that if such a right exists, it is a
transferable right that may be sold exclusively.'2 Although the court
chose not to use the term "property right," it found that the publicity
right was a transferable interest rather than an inchoate personal right
of extension of good will that could only be transferred as part of the
sale of a business.'3
Most importantly for purposes of this discussion, the Second
Circuit explicitly recognized that the purpose of the right embodied in
the New York Civil Rights Act was a protection of the marketable
value of a performer's name or likeness:
This right might be called a "right of publicity' For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure
of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. This
right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be
69. 202 E2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
70. See id
71. Id
72. See id.
73. "Whether it be labelled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often
elsewhere, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has
pecuniary worth." Id.
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made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other
advertiser from using their pictures.74
For the first time, the authority to market oneself was no longer
limited in one of the premiere marketplaces for publicity. Beginning
with the Haelan Laboratories decision, New York courts reversed half a
century of limited enforcement of the Civil Rights Act and began to
provide robust publicity protection. The baseball players vindicated
the reasoning of Warren and Brandeis.
The litigation trend that emphasized the publicity arm of the
privacy rights is not surprising. The reason may stem from the
practical implications of litigation. Although privacy rights may
indeed be immutable parts of the natural law, there is very little
advantage in using the legal process to protect most privacy rights.
Legal actions are public events. A person seeking true seclusion is
hardly likely to subject herself to the public scrutiny of a lawsuit as a
means of enforcing the right not to be subjected to public scrutiny.
These social costs create a right for which the remedy is often more
objectionable than the injury. Further, in many situations, the damages
would be highly speculative. Unless damages are presumed, the
plaintiff would have to establish that the invasion into her seclusion
resulted in measurable damages. While this may be established
through medical expenses and allegations of emotional pain and
suffering, such claims were very hard to establish at the turn of the last
century.
Instead, the right of publicity brings with it the power both to
control the identity and to exploit that identity. The defendant has
profited by committing a tort against the plaintiff that may be
measured by either the damages to the plaintiff (if they are measurable,
such as the plaintiff's ordinary fee to grant permission to use the
publicity rights) or the unjust enrichment of the defendant. In other
words, if the ad is highly successful, then the plaintiff is entitled to the
defendant's windfall.
Without the economic incentive, the Warren and Brandeis article
may have had far less impact. The social and transaction costs
associated with the defense of privacy eliminate many of the actions.
Only in the area of publicity rights do the social costs tend to drop in
scope and the transaction costs of litigation bear a reasonable
proportion to the potential recovery.
74. Id.
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It should also be noted that oftentimes invasions of privacy are
companions to defamation actions, as it was for Pavesich in Georgia.
Extreme situations may result in cases in which the social costs and the
transaction costs are insufficient to stop the litigation, either because of
the resulting harm caused by the misconduct of the defendant,75 an
irrational plaintiff who values success in court over all else, or a
politically motivated victim.76 Still, it is an unlikely coincidence that
privacy law was reintroduced to the common law at a time in history
when technology was unleashing a new potential for media,
commerce, and communications.
In his lengthy exposition decrying the excessive control offered
by the right of publicity, Professor Michael Madow provides an
excellent historical review of the commercial exploitation of the
identities of the famous and notorious.7 He identifies a significant
shift in the attitudes towards the famous and not-so-famous regarding
the use of their photographs on other party's products."8 Madow points
to an editorial from 1895 to illustrate the change in attitude:
"Any likeness of anything that is in Heaven above" we may expect to
see in these days on city walls, slabsided rocks, or country barn doors,
as the sign or trade-mark of some quack medicine or shoddy
merchandise. If the "likeness" crammed into our vision by a persistent
advertiser happens to be his own, we may as well resolve to "suffer and
be strong?' But when some immortal face that the nation loves is taken
by a vulgar smart Aleck and degraded to an advertisement of eye salve,
liver pills, or a cure for piles, we ought to be strong enough to make him
do the suffering. 9
While this Case & Comment editorial captures the essence of the
evolving new law, it is the commercial nature of the use that embodies
the fundamental legal change. Professor Madow points out that the
legal actions tended to be against the commercial use of the name or
likeness rather than the selling of iconographic products, pictures, and
souvenirs embodying the famous parties."0
75. See William L. Prosser, rivacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 392 (1960). Prosser
identifies public disclosures of private facts, including a picture of a semiconscious patient,
an exhibition of pictures of a cesarean operation, pictures of medical anatomy, a woman's
masculine habits and demeanor, and publishing a person's debts. Id. at 392-93.
76. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,258 (1964).
77. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
PublicityRightis, 81 CAL. L. Rnv. 125, 149-51 (1993).
78. See id
79. Id at 152-53 (quoting AdverfsingBiigands, 2 CASE& Co~MMENT 3 (1895).
80. Id. at 153.
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The point is not that privacy law would never have developed but
for the Roberson and Pavesich cases to create economic exemplars.
Undoubtedly, as technology made it harder to protect one's "right to be
let alone," some form of law would have eventually stepped into the
breach. But law develops slowly, and it was Roberson and Pavesich
that led the decades-long transformation."1  Nonetheless, the
importance of the publicity rights is seldom heralded as a central
component of the natural laws our capitalist society values. Yet it is
just these cases that both led the privacy debate and legitimized those
rights.
This is particularly telling in New York. Since the Roberson
decision, no common law privacy right was ever available. The
statutory language was explicitly drafted to address the cases following
the misappropriation of name and likeness for commercial advantage.
Yet in 1964, the New York Court of Appeals extended the meaning of
sections 50 and 51 to embrace a much broader privacy right." In
Spatn v Juian Messner, Inc., the court had before it the unauthorized
and fictionalized biography of Warren Spahn, "one of professional
baseball's great left-handed pitchers '3 The court applied sections 50
and 51 to his invasion of privacy for the "commercial exploitation" of
the novel, finding that "the defendants' publication of a fictitious
biography of the plaintiff constitutes an unauthorized exploitation of
his personality for purposes of trade and that it is proscribed by section
51 of the Civil Right Law." This exceedingly broad definition of
exploitation extended the misappropriation doctrine to the furthest
reaches of the Warren and Brandeis landscape, blurring the four
distinct privacy torts of Dean Prosser into the single, remediable cause
of action identified by Warren and Brandeis. The court explained that
"[o]ver the years since the statute's enactment in 1903, its social
desirability and remedial nature have led to its being given a liberal
construction consonant with its over-all purpose."" Instead of an
81. See id. at 147. Copyright expert Melville Nimmer lamented the slow
development of publicity rights, saying that "although the concept of privacy which Brandeis
and Warren evolved fulfilled the demands of Beacon Street in 1890, it may seriously be
doubted that the application of this concept satisfactorily meets the needs of Broadway and
Hollywood in 1954.7 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203,203 (1954).
82. Spahn v Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 544-45 (N.Y. 1966).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 546.
85. Id at 544; see Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853, 857 (N.Y. 1959)
(holding that a reprint of a newspaper article in an advertisement is actionable by the party
named in the newspaper article); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.YS. 382, 388-89 (N.Y.
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illusory general expansion to which the court alludes, this case, based
on the need to protect a famous ballplayer's reputation, extended the
publicity rights embodied in the statute into a much greater general
right of privacy in New York. 6
Compare once again the language of Roberson. The early New
York court was primarily afiaid (some would say with good reason) of
the limits such an unarticulated and unbridled personal right could
create." Unlike a general right to seclusion or the abstract false light
theory that broadens defamation to less damaging statements, publicity
rights are more narrowly limited.
C. Supreme Court Recognition
The courts have not seemed to struggle when faced with the need
to balance the scope of the publicity rights against fundamental First
Amendment rights, perhaps oversimplifying the issues. The United
States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of publicity rights in
Zacchin" v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., in which a freelance
reporter televised the complete, fifteen second act of Hugo Zacchini,
the "human cannonball." Mr. Zacchini brought an action for
damages to his act under both common law copyright and state
publicity rights."9
Ohio had been recognizing privacy rights since 1956, when it
followed Haelan Labomtories and other decisions in extending privacy
and publicity rights.*0 As the Ohio Supreme Court explained:
An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted
appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of
one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or
the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as
to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person
of ordinary sensibilities.9"
Special Term 1937) (holding that a photograph used in news story is not actionable unless it
is used for advertising purposes). Neither of these cases, however, involves anything other
than traditional publicity appropriation torts.
86. See Pamela Edwards, Whatk the Score?" Does the Rfight of Publicity Protect
Professional Sports Leagues, 62 ALB. L. Rrv. 579, 590-96 (1998) (collecting modem state
laws for the protection of publicity rights).
87. SeeRoberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E.2d 442,443 (N.Y. 1902).
88. 433 U.S. 562,564 (1977).
89. See id at 564-65.
90. SeeHoush v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343-44 (Ohio 1956).
91. Id. at 341.
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The Ohio Supreme Court recognized Zacchini's publicity rights,
but held that any such rights were preempted by the First
Amendment. 2 According to the Ohio court, the freedom of the press
to report the news was paramount to Zacchini's interest in his act.93
The United State Supreme Court reversed.' The Court's
approach was simple:
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media
reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when
they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. The
Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to
compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it
would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner.9'
The Court discounted Ohio's attempt to reconcile broader privacy
laws with Supreme Court decisions on the First Amendment like New
York Times Co. v Sullivan, Time, Inc. v Hil, and Gertz v Robert
Welch, Inc!6 These seminal Supreme Court cases extended the First
Amendment protections of speech and the press into the state torts of
defamation and privacy, at least the false light variety. No longer could
a state allow damages for defamatory speech that was merely negligent
regarding a public official. 7  Nor could a plaintiff receive
compensation for an invasion of privacy unless the same standards
were applied. " As the Zacchini Court explained, a plaintiff alleging a
nondefamatory falsehood that invaded one's privacy, being held in a
false light "could not recover without showing that the [falsehood] was
knowingly false or was published with reckless disregard for the
truth-the same rigorous standard that had been applied in New York
Times Co. v Sullivan" '
Despite these Supreme Court decisions, the Court readily
distinguished Zacchini's situation. The Court explained that "Time,
Inc. v MEl, which was hotly contested and decided by a divided Court,
92. Zacchini, 433 US. at 565.
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Id. at 574-75.
96. Sec id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964)).
97. N Y Times, 376 US. at 279-80.
98. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88.
99. 433 U.S. at 571 (citation omitted).
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involved an entirely different tort from the 'right of publicity.""'  The
Court continued:
[T]he State's interest in permitting a "right of publicity" is in protecting
the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage
such entertainment .... [T]he State's interest is closely analogous to
the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do
with protecting feelings or reputation."0
The Time, Inc. v Hill decision provides a fascinating insight into
the transformation of the attitude of the Court towards state privacy
rights. 2 Perhaps not coincidentally, this is another entertainment case,
in this instance involving the promotion of a new play. The play The
Desperate Hours by Joseph Hayes was based on his earlier novel. '"3
Both were fictionalizations of a "true crime" event involving the
plaintiff, James Hill, and his family, who were held captive by three
escaped convicts for nineteen hours before being released unharmed.0
Neither the novel nor the play attempted to portray the fictional story
as that of the Hill family, but Life magazine staged some photographs
at the former Hill home, using actors from the NewYork production. 5
The Hill family did not like art imitating life, and particularly
objected to Life getting it wrong."6 Because the family in the play was
portrayed as heroic, libel was inappropriate, so they sued for invasion
of privacy, false light. 7 Although the Court ultimately required that
the "actual malice standard" of New York Times Co. v Sullivan be
extended to the false light cases, the Court was highly fragmented on
100. Id.
101. Id. at 573 (footnote omitted).
102. The lines of reasoning regarding constitutional privacy are sufficiently distinct
that the two strands are not dealt with simultaneously here. It is worth noting, however, that
both strands were first championed by Brandeis. As Supreme Court Justice, he authored a
famous dissent in Olmstead v United States, in which he wrote that the right of privacy is
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men'" 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). His Olmsteaddecision parallels his common law
article, declaring that the right to be free from intrusion is that much greater when it involves
the state. CfGrisvoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (protecting the privacy of
the bedroom by barring prosecution for prescribing contraceptives); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 656 (1961) (holding the exclusionary doctrine is an essential part of the right of
privacy); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1949), overruledbyMapp, 367 U.S. at 643
(describing immunity from unreasonable search and seizure in terms of "the right of
privacy").
103. See -171, 385 U.S. at 378.
104. See.
105. Seeid at 377-78.
106. See idat378.
107. Seeid at390-91.
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the decision, struggling to reach this position.'3 Most interestingly,
none of the five opinions (including two concurrences and two
dissents) seriously questioned the right to privacy adopted by the New
York courts or the general explanations of privacy law as documented
by Dean Prosser. 9 By 1966, the right of privacy that had been first
rejected and then narrowly circumscribed, was accepted by the
members of the Court even though they could agree on little else. The
debate regarding privacy had moved from its existence to the limits of
its enforcement when faced with protected First Amendment speech.
The theatrical adaptation of Hayes' novel brought the First Amendment
question to the forefront and answered all lingering doubts regarding
the availability of privacy protection.
In reviewing the Hi/! case, the majority of the Supreme Court
relied heavily on Spahn v Ju11an Messner, Inc., the New York Court of
Appeals case of the previous year that had found protection for Warren
Spahn."' Again, it is an entertainment case that framed the central
structure of the New York privacy law.
Spahn, at the time on appeal to the Supreme Court, was vacated
and remanded in light of the H!decision. In H1, the Court had been
concerned about the impact of the First Amendment on privacy law.
As Justice Fortas pointed out in his dissent in Hi, "[p]articularly
where the right of privacy is invaded by words-by the press or in a
book or pamphlet-the most careful and sensitive appraisal of the total
impact of the claimed tort upon the congeries of rights is required?""
The New York court, however, took little time to reinstate its
verdict. Because the book about Spahn was an intentional
fictionalization of Spahn's life, there were no First Amendment
concerns implicated."' The protection of truth central to Sullivan and
Mi! were not present when the work was knowingly fictionalized."3
The baseball player was again vindicated. Further, by claiming that
the injury was one of misappropriation rather than false light, the court
potentially limited the Supreme Court's First Amendment
108. Seeid.at390.
109. See id. at 383 (citing WLLA L. PROSSER, LAW OFTORTS 831-32 (3d ed. 1964)).
Various justices stated that the total number of jurisdictions recognizing privacy law was
either thirty or thirty-five. See id. at 383 n.7.
110. See id. at 380-87, 396-97 (discussing Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d
840 (N.Y. 1967)).
111. Id. at 415 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
112. Spatm,233 N.E.2d at 843.
113. See id.
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jurisprudence, or at least lessened the entanglement with narrow free
speech distinctions." '
In his 1960 article on privacy, Dean Prosser identified only four
states as having continued to reject privacy protection."5  Prosser
tracked the development of the recently created tort, categorizing them
into four discrete classes."6 Even as Prosser acknowledged that
Warren and Brandeis "were concerned with the evils of publication,"
Prosser himself seemed to dismiss the common law property and
copyright analysis, describing it as "some property right?"" Prosser
also suggested that "[tihere is little indication that Warren and
Brandeis intended to direct their article at the fourth branch of the tort,
the exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff's identity.""' Apparently,
Prosser was not predisposed towards rights of publicity and spent
much of his publicity analysis on what uses are not covered rather than
on what rights are protected.
Despite Prosser's disdain for publicity rights, he is quick to credit
the motion picture industry, or its abuses, for the development of the
tort of "public disclosure of private facts.""'9 According to Prosser, the
leading case for this tort was Melvin v Reid a case involving the
motion picture The Red Kimono which accurately reflected the true
life story of Gabrielle Darley, a prostitute who was tried and acquitted
of a sensational murder.' ° The film used her true maiden name, and
the film advertisements included statements that the film depicted the
true life of Gabrielle Darley Melvin, so her current identity was also
explicitly revealed.'2' The California court could not find a privacy
right because the statements were true and part of the legal public
record, so they based their denial of demurrer on the California
constitution's protection of the right to happiness."
114. Cf M-111, 385 U.S. at 386-87 (providing strong suggestion that Spahn should be
overturned). The New York Court of Appeals relied on the intentionally fictionalized aspects
of the case to avoid constitutional infirmity. See Spahn, 233 N.E.2d at 843. As a hybrid work
of fiction, a work will generally meet the actual malice standard. See id at 842-43.
115. Prosser, supa note 75, at 388.
116. Id. at 389.
117. Id. at 384, 389.
118. Id at 401.
119. Id. at 392.
120. 297 R 91,91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
121. See id.
122. The court reasoned:
The right to pursue and obtain happiness is guaranteed to all by the fundamental
law of our state. This right by its very nature includes the right to live free from the
unwarranted attack of others upon one's liberty, property, and reputation. Any
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Prosser noted that this constitutional basis for privacy has
disappeared from California case law, but the legacy was used to
control the motion picture and radio industries from publicly intruding
on the ghosts of one's past."n Although writing in 1960, twelve years
after motion pictures had been granted First Amendment protection,
Prosser did not delve into the First Amendment limitations on the right
to protect against the public disclosure of private facts. He stated that
"the facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and not public
ones?" '24 He did not give the basis for this limitation, however, and The
Red Kimono reflects a case in which all the facts were part of the
public record." Possibly, Prosser was anticipating a First Amendment
concern without stating it explicitly.
Other forms of privacy rights have also been expanded because of
the beachhead established by publicity or entertainment issues. The
Supreme Court in Zacchini adopted Prosser's distinction between
publicity and other privacy rights, but it did not suggest that only
publicity rights could be protected.'2 1 Instead, in both Hi! and
Zacchimn the Court recognized the central rights identified by Warren
and Brandeis, as they had been recategorized by Prosser in his 1960
article Privacy.
"The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff... 'to
be let alone."' Thus, according to Prosser, some courts had recognized
a cause of action for "intrusion" upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude; public disclosure of "private facts" about the plaintiffs
personal life; publicity that places the plaintiff in a "false light" in the
public eye; and "appropriation" of the plaintiff's name or likeness for
commercial purposes.'27
Both the majority and dissent in Zacchiniquoted Prosser and the
four types of torts as accurate reflections of the common law of torts.'
person living a life of rectitude has that right to happiness which includes a
freedom from unnecessary attacks on his character, social standing, or reputation.
Id. at 93.
123. SeeProsser, supra note 75, at 393.
124. Id at 394.
125. See Melvin, 297 P. at 93.
126. SeeZacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571 n.7 (1977).
127. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Prosser, supra note 75, at 389); see Goodenough,
supra note 15, at 735 (discussing the adoption of Prosser's formulation as part of the
RESTATEMENT OFTORTS).
128. SeeZacchin, 433 US. at 571; id at 581 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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By splitting the privacy rights into the inchoate rights of defamation-
like privacy torts and property-like publicity torts, the Supreme Court
announced that the policies of the First Amendment were readily
reconciled with the publicity cases, even though the First Amendment
would continue to limit the remainder of privacy law. 9
In doing so, the Supreme Court completed the progression of
publicity rights under the law. The publicity rights, the central property
rights of the entertainer, the athlete, and the human cannonball had
been elevated to the pinnacle of U.S. law, triumphing over the most
vigorously protected tenets of the Bill of Rights. While the Court
struggled to contrast publicity rights, freedom of speech and press
rights, and copyrights, the Court validated all three. All this within
eighty years of a young girl objecting to her picture on a sack of flour.
The entertainer's right recognized by the Supreme Court has
transformed both privacy and property laws in its ascension. Given the
juxtaposition of publicity rights and.the First Amendment, the Beatles
may indeed have been correct when they declared "we are bigger than
Jesus Christ?' 3 The unbridled First Amendment was reigned in by the
lowly Hugo Zacchini, carnival performer.
The sports figure was emboldened with a commodity that
transcended his team's identity. Athletes like Tiger Woods'3' and
Michael Jordan'32 have marketed their personality for tens of millions
of dollars. Celebrities like Woody Allen,'33 Jacqueline Kennedy
129. See itfa Part IV
130. On August 4, 1966, John Lennon remarked in a Rolling Stones interview that
"the Beatles are more popular than Jesus Christ." Beatles records were subsequently banned
in several states as well as South Africa. This Is the Week that Was, THE (LONDON) INDEP.,
July 31, 1995, at 22; see also Eve Zibart, John Lennon 1940-1980, WASH. POST, Dec. 10,
1980, at Dl. Of course, in some jurisdictions publicity rights are now recognized
postmortem.
131. Nicholas Stein, Celebity Inc.: How Have So Many Entertainers Muscled onto
This Year, List? By Transforming Themselves into Brands, FoRTuNE, Sept. 17, 2001, at 164
(estimating $54 million for Woods in the year 2000 of which $10 million was income and the
remainder was endorsements).
132. Peter Spiegel, Jordan & Co., FORBES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 180, 181 (estimating $47
million for Jordan in endorsements in 1997).
133. See Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 E Supp. 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that a cause of action of publicity and trademark infringement for using a look-alike
states a claim under the Lanham Act); Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 E Supp. 612, 625-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
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Onassis," Johnny Carson,'35 Elvis Presley,'6 and many others have
benefited from rights first identified by Warren and Brandeis.'37
While the Court continued, and continues, to struggle with the
limits of privacy and its impact on the First Amendment, the decisions
in cases such as Zacchi"zi and MY/! served to legitimize the law of
privacy itself. Laws unknown less than a century earlier and rejected
by state courts at the beginning of the last century had become so
pervasive as to be accepted by the Supreme Court almost without
challenge. " ' The entertainers, playwrights, and athletes forged the law
into the fabric of society so deeply that this fundamental right has been
expanded and never again seriously challenged.
Ell. COPYRIGHT
An analysis of entertainment law's impact on copyright seems
misplaced, and perhaps self-evident. If there is any body of law that is
"federal entertainment law," then the Copyright Act embodies that
statutory framework. As a statute, it is often shaped through direct
negotiation between entertainment media interests struggling amongst
themselves for the most equitable and balanced of statutory structures,
with consumer and other interest groups barely represented at the
table. Nonetheless, copyright was not always perceived as
entertainment's law, and this history, although now shrouded in the
mists of time, may be enlightening on the changes taking place in the
developing law of cyberspace.3
A. EarlylHstory: The Enghsh Role in Copyight
As a number of authors, most notably Jane Ginsburg of
Columbia University Law School and Paul Goldstein of Stanford Law
School, have recently recognized, copyright law does not have the
134. See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263-64 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 116 A.D.2d 1095 (N.Y App. Div. 1985).
135. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
1983).
136. See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 207 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
"The Velvet Elvis" was a confusingly similar mark and not entitled to protection as a parody);
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1382-83 (D.N.J. 1981) (protecting various
Presley trademarks, but allowing live performances to continue).
137. See Keith E. Lurie, Note, Waits v. Frito-Lay: The Song Remains the Same, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 187, 187-222 (1994).
138. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 570-72 (1977).
139. Wherever or whatever that law might be.
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noble roots that are sometimes ascribed to it.'0 In 1710, the English
Statute of Anne established the protection of books and radically
altered the monopoly on book publishing in England.'' Under the title
"An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of
Printed Books in the Authors of Purchasers of such Copies, during the
Times therein mentioned," the English government established
protections from copying by unauthorized publishers.'42
Prior to the Statute of Anne, a monopoly granted by the Crown to
the Stationers' Company had served to create a guild monopoly,
successfully protecting the publishing monopoly from 1556 to 1694.'"
The Stationers' Company had originally received protection because
early, unregulated markets led to a printing glut and economic ruin for
many of the printers in the ensuing shakeout.'" As Great Britain
expanded, the effectiveness of the Stationers' Company monopoly
began to wane as the result of trade between England and Scotland.
Despite strong demands for renewal of the Stationers' Company
monopoly, the House of Lords determined that a balanced property
right in the author would better serve the balance of trade than a
continued monopoly in the publisher. "'
The Statute of Anne provided far more economic regulation than
mere property interests for the author. In addition to copyright, it also
provided for a regulated marketplace by allowing a member of the
public to object to the monopolistic price set for a book, requiring the
Lord Chancellor to intervene and set a fair price.' 6 Much like the
140. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHVAY: FROM GUTENBURG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOx 41-44 (1994); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value.
Copjight Protection of Works ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1874 (1990).
141. An Act for the Encouragement ofLearning, 1709, 8 Ann., ch. 19 (Eng.), reprinted
in ROBERTA. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 2 (5th ed. 1999). Protection of
literary works traces its origins back to Roman law and is mentioned in writings by Cicero,
Horace and the Roman playwright Terence. RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS
HISTORY AND ITS LAWv 8 (1912).
142. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 141, at 2-3.
143. EDWARD B. SAmuELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 14 (2000).
144. Id
145. STORY, supm note 18, § 1147, at48-49.
146. The statute states:
[I]f upon such Enquiry and Examination it shall be found, that the price of such
Book or Books is inhanced, or any wise too High or Unreasonable, then and in
such case the [Lord Chancellor or other empowered officials] have hereby full
Power and Authority to reform and redress the same, and to limit and settle the
Price of every such printed Book and Books, from Time to Time, according to the
best of their Judgments, and as to them shall seem just and reasonable....
An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., ch. 19, § 4 (Eng.).
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compulsory royalty rates of the modem copyright statutes '47 and the
judicially determined royalties of the performing rights societies,"'8 the
Lord Chancellor retained authority to limit the sales price of protected
books, to fine booksellers and publishers for charging excessive fees,
and to allow for private recovery. 9
The birth of the Stationers' Company came only two years after
the birth of William Shakespeare.' Shakespeare, who remains
credited as the greatest English playwright in history, lived from 1564
to 1616, so his published folios were protected, if at all, under a
Stationers' Company contract.'
During Shakespeare's lifetime, the regulation of the theatre also
changed significantly. Prior to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, "any
gentleman could maintain a troupe of actors"'52 By the same token,
however, an actor not in the employ of a nobleman could be sanctioned
as a "rogue" or "vagabond"-criminal charges that could result in
severe penalties. "3 Elizabeth modified these regulations to limit which
nobles could sponsor theatrical troupes, licensed the content of plays,
and by 1574 vested the sole jurisdiction over licensure in the Master of
Revels, an office of the Crown." At the same time, she
decriminalized the status of being an actor who was not in the employ
of a nobleman, and by so doing changed the focus of regulation from
the evil of the actors to the forum and substance of the plays
themselves.'
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (providing compulsory license rates for recorded
music).
148. United States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(establishing by continuing court order the scope of ASCAP's permissible licensing and the
continuing jurisdiction of rate disputes for the performing rights societies); see also Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (holding that the issuance by ASCAP and BMI of
blanket licenses does not constitute price fixing per se that is unlawful under antitrust laws).
149. See GORnAN & GINSBURG, supm note 141, at 2. SeegenezllyJon Garon, Media
and Monopoly in the Informaton Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of
Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS. & ENT. L.J. 491 (1999) (discussing the present-day parallels with
monopolization and oligopoly in the media industries).
150. OscAR G. BROCKET, HISTORY oF THE THEATRE 192 (4th ed. 1982).
151. Typically, the playwright of that era would sell his script to the theatre outright to
ensure that other copies of the script were not distributed to competing theatre companies.
The theatre, in turn, would enter into a publishing agreement in the rare case in which the
plays were uncommonly popular.
152. SeeBRocKrr, supranote 150, at 196.
153. Id.
154. See id at 196-97. This situation remained until the Puritan revolution of 1642,
during which Charles I was beheaded. All production was banned until the Commonwealth
was overturned and Charles HI was returned to the throne, marking the start of the Restoration
in 1660. Id. at317-20.
155. Seeid.at 197.
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Regulation of theatre did not directly track the changes from the
Stationers' Company to the Statute of Anne. Some version of the
Master of Revels continued in London into the eighteenth century
regulating the English stage, controlling the content, and limiting the
patents to perform. The [Theatrical] Licensing Act of 1737 vested the
licensing authority in the Lord Chamberlain, limited the authorized
theatres to the City of Westminster (the official seat of government
within greater London), and "prohibited the acting for 'gain, hire, or
reward' of any play not previously licensed by the Lord
Chamberlain" 56  As a result of the Licensing Act, all theatres in
England outside of the two in Westminster were banned from showing
plays, and the bulk of theatrical production disappeared until the
nineteenth century. While these regulations were slowly relaxed over
the next century, they greatly limited live, theatrical entertainment in
England.
Beginning in 1710, playwrights could sell the copyright in their
plays to publishers.'57 Often, the theatre purchased the copyright to
control the publication of the work and discourage unlicensed
competition for the play."8 With the Licensing Act of 1737, most
copyright revenue ceased because the smaller theatres outside of
London were closed and the marketplace for written plays was
eliminated.59
The Licensing Act and severe limitations on theatrical production
meant that the gains of authors under the Statute of Anne did little for
the entertainment industry of the era.'" The age of "rights" heralded
by the Statute of Anne extended to map makers and book authors, but
not to the dramatists who followed in the shadows of Shakespeare.'6'
Not until 1833 were the protections afforded to book authors extended
to English playwrights.'62
156. Id at 328.
157. Seeid. at 332.
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Id
161. See id.; see Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 1873.
162. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 432 (1912). As explained by the Supreme
Court:
Performing right was not within the provisions of 8 Anne, c. 19, which gave
to authors the sole liberty of printing their books. The act of 1833, known as
"Bulwer-Lytton's Act," conferred statutory playwright in perpetuity throughout the
British dominions, in the case of dramatic pieces not printed and published; and for
a stated term, if printed and published.
Id (citation omitted).
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B. EarlyAmerican Copyight Protecton
From the time of the American Revolution, the founders actively
supported the adoption of copyright protection. The United States
Constitution gave the federal government authority "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' 63 In 1783, Congress recommended that
the states pass copyright legislation which generally "followed the
precedent of the English act of 1710 [the Statute of Anne].'""
Congress then passed the first national copyright act in 1790, entitled
An Act for the Encouragement of Learning,'65 which covered books
and maps. In so crafting the Copyright Act of 1790, the United States
imported not only the economic model for copyright protection from
England, but also incorporated its limited scope. Music was not
included, nor was the performance on the stage.'66 A playwright,
however, could be extended a copyright, but only to stop improper
copying of his written script. 6' Also excluded were sculptors, painters,
and other visual artists.'8
Over forty years later, in 1831, published music was added to the
list of copyrightable works. Nearly thirty years after that, in 1856,
Congress added copyright protection for public performances, phrased
as follows:
[T]o the author or proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or
suited for public representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer
upon the said author or proprietor, his heirs or assigns, along with the
sole right to print and publish the said composition, the sole right also to
act, perform, or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed,
or represented, on any stage or public place during the whole period for
which the copyright is obtained.... 69
This statute was enforced for the first time twelve years later,
when a New York playwright sued to enjoin the theft of a famous scene
163. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
164. BOWKER, supranote 141, at 34-35.
165. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 650 (1943).
166. SeeActofMay31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124-26.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 138-39; see Fenis, 223 U.S. at 436
("[The performing right or playright [sic] had no existence at common law separate and
apart from the manuscript of the author, but dates its origin from 3 & 4 Wm. I, c. 15, and in
this country from the act of Congress, Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138."); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F.
Cas. 1132, 1133 (S.D.N.Y 1868) (No. 3552).
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from his play.'7° At stake was the still-famous 'Railroad Scene" in
which a person is tied to the rail tracks just before an oncoming train
threatens to kill the helpless victim.'7' The scene, as improperly copied,
also included the hero (or heroine in the copy) being imprisoned in a
locked room adjacent to the impending accident, so that he (or she) is
forced to first break free before being able to free the victim.7 2 After
explaining that the term for dramatic composition was not defined, but
must instead be derived from the Act of 1831, the court readily found
that dramatic composition could include staging with or without
dialogue:
7 3
A character in a play who goes through with a series of events on the
stage without speaking, if such be his part in the play, is none the less an
actor in it than one who, in addition to motions and gestures, uses his
voice. A pantomime is a species of theatrical entertainment, in which
the whole action is represented by gesticulation, without the use of
words. A written work, consisting wholly of directions, set in order for
conveying the ideas of the author on a stage or public place, by means
of characters who represent the narrative wholly by action, is as much a
dramatic composition designed or suited for public representation, as if
language or dialogue were used in it to convey some of the ideas 4
The expansive language of the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York set the new tone for protection of dramatic works,
and this language anticipated the silent film era particularly well. By
finding that pantomime and stage direction was as much protected
authorship as the dialogue, the Daly court understood the nature of the
developing medium, expansively interpreting a statute that had taken
Congress nearly six decades to enact.
The court relied heavily on the musical composition cases that
had begun with the Act of 1831, suggesting that the dramatization
before the court was not a matter of first impression.' The court
quoted at length from a leading musical piracy case:
Now, it will be said, that one author may treat the subject very
differently from another who wrote before him. That observation is
true in many cases. A man may write upon morals in a manner quite
170. See Daly, 6 E Cas. at 1132. As the Daly court explained, "[tihe plaintiff is, by
profession, a dramatic author, his business being to compose, write, and produce on the
theatrical stage, dramatic compositions, commonly called plays." Id.
171. Seeid.at1133.
172. Seeid. at 1134-35.
173. Id at 1138.
174. Id. at 1136.
175. Id
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distinct from that of others who preceded him; but the subject of music
is to be regarded upon very different principles. It is the air or melody
which is the invention of the author, and which may, in such case, be the
subject of piracy; and you commit a piracy, if, by taking, not a single
bar, but several, you incorporate in the new work that in which the
whole meritorious part of the invention consists .... Now, it appears to
me, that if you take from the composition of an author all those bars
consecutively which form the entire air or melody, without any material
alteration, it is a piracy; though, on the other hand, you might take them
in a different order, or broken by the intersection of others, like words,
in such a manner as should not be a piracy. It must depend on whether
the air taken is substantially the same with the original. Now, the most
unlettered in music can distinguish one song from another, and the
mere adaptation of the air, either by changing it to a dance, or by
transferring it from one instrument to another, does not, even to
common apprehensions, alter the original subject. The ear tells you that
it is the same. The original air requires the aid of genius for its
construction, but a mere mechanic in music can make the adaptation or
accompaniment. Substantially, the piracy is, where the appropriated
music, though adapted to a different purpose from that of the original,
may still be recognized by the ear. The adding variations makes no
difference in the principle.'7
Most remarkable from this opinion is the resonance with which a
modem court could adopt this identical passage. The same issues of
piracy, line drawing, and substantial similarity remain the essential
copyright issues today. The New York court was quite visionary in the
nineteenth century. The effect of the decision was itself dramatic,
heralding the start of a new economic era for the theatre:
American drama begins with ... Daly. Until Dal/s time, men of
literary eminence could not be persuaded to take an interest in
playwriting because of the standards of production, because their work
was unprotected by copyright and because the theatre had no interest in
any quality beyond the effectiveness of a work on the platform."'
Music was obviously a highly valuable copyrighted work since
those rights were extended in 1831. As is evident from the language of
Daly, the court relied on this history to provide extensive protection to
drama. Still, copyright only protected the author from copying the
published music.
176. Id at 1137 (alteration in original) (quoting D'Almaine v. Boosey, 160 Eng. Rep.
117, 123 (1835)).
177. SAMuELs, supra note 143, at 139 (quotations omitted).
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Between 1831, when published music was first granted
copyright, and 1891, when the performance of music was added to the
exclusive rights of the author, a number of other entertainment forms
were addressed by Congress and the courts through the copyright laws.
One illustration of Congress's attitude towards the copyright and the
arts was Congress's adoption of photography as the first protected
visual art. Photography itself was rapidly developed as both an art and
a technology in response to the American Civil War. The Civil War
invested photography with the dynamic, instantaneous drama that
captured the eyes of the nation, propelling it rapidly through its slow
maturation. Photographers like Matthew Brady captured the essential
images of soldiers in the field as well as portraits of Lincoln and the
presidential cabinet.' 8 In recognition of this valuable new medium, on
March 3, 1865, Congress moved to add "photographs and the
negatives thereof ... upon the same conditions as to the authors of
prints and engravings."
19
The language of the statute suggests the mindset of Congress and
the attitude of the age. Photographs, like prints and engravings, are
illustrations that greatly enhance the "writings of an author." This
construction is reinforced by the remaining provisions of the 1865 Act,
which extend the deposit requirement to the Library of Congress, and
construct the word "book" to include all maps, prints, or other
engravings belonging to it.' Some commentators have posed at least
a rhetorical question as to the reason Congress should jump to protect
photographs while failing to include visual arts until 1870,' but the
pattern is clear in every medium. The economic and political goals of
copyright policy, like the Stationer's Company, the Licensing Act, and
the limitations imposed by the Statute of Anne, all serve to promote
the economic production of literary works. This agenda is an explicit
part of the statutory regimen, often recognized by the courts.
A comparison to England is instructive. In 1862, three years
before Congress moved to protect photography (and admittedly during
the height of the Civil War), England adopted a copyright act for works
of fine art, extending "copyright to paintings, drawings, and
photographs?"" 2 The term for this copyright protection was life plus
178. Id. at 136.
179. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540.
180. Id.§3-4.
181. SeeSAMuELS, supm note 143, at 137.
182. BOWKER, supra note 141, at 29 (citing Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862, 25 & 26
Vict., c. 68 (Eng.)).
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seven years." This was just one of a series of statutes from Great
Britain that treated the artist's copyright as separate and more broadly
protected than that of the general copyright."l
The distinction between the artist and the remainder of copyright
was never adopted in the United States. Instead, as the Supreme Court
explained in a twentieth-century dispute: "The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."""5
The explanation of the purpose underlying copyright, an
economic rationale that provides protection to the author or artist as a
necessary step in an economic transaction, may be entirely
appropriate. That debate is beyond the scope of this Article. The
pattern does set forth, in fairly stark terms, however, why photographs
used to promote government propaganda during and following the
Civil War would receive immediate copyright protection as a tool for
promoting or "advancing public welfare" while protecting oil paintings
and statuary would not rise to that level. The statues and paintings may
have an aesthetic value, but the economic value would only come
along later.
Typically, the aesthetic value became recognized when the
industry was sufficiently robust that economic value became present.
As a result, both Congress and the courts have inexorably expanded
the reach of copyright without having to make any significant changes
to the traditional notion of the corporate, business value of copyright.
For fine art, Congress first moved in this direction with the 1870
Copyright Act that extended copyright to "a painting, drawing,
chromo, statute, statuary, and of models or designs intended to be
perfected as works of the fine arts.6 The fine arts amendment to the
copyright laws paralleled the scope of works that had been protected in
England since 1862, but the term was not the generous life plus seven
183. Id.at30.
184. Id at 240.
185. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954); see 1 NIMMER & NIvMER, supm note
19, § 1.03. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyight: A Study of
Copyight in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. Ray. 281 (1970)
(examining the moral and economic rationale for copyright in books); Barry W. Tyerman,
Comment, The Economic Rationale for Copyrht Protection for Published Books: A Reply
to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REv I 100 (1971) (answering Breyer's article and arguing
that existing copyright law is both intellectually and financially profitable).
186. Copyright Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 193, 212.
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years. Instead the term of copyright remained the same twenty-eight-
year term, with a renewal term of fourteen additional years. 
7
The fine arts distinction was challenged in Bleistein v Donaldson
Lithographing Co., which involved a circus poster announcing "The
Great Wallace Shows-Colossal 3 Ring Circus, 2 Elevated Stages."''
The district and circuit courts found that the poster, as a mere
advertisement (and an advertisement for a circus!), was not worthy of
the fine art protection afforded by the statute. 8' Despite the rulings of
the lower courts, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, dismissed
such arguments with strident language.
First, he established that the work does not need the court to
determine its value, explaining:
We shall do no more than mention the suggestion that painting and
engraving unless for a mechanical end are not among the useful arts,
the progress of which Congress is empowered by the Constitution to
promote. The Constitution does not limit the useful to that which
satisfies immediate bodily needs.'90
In this dismissive introductory comment, he eliminated the
congressional construction that had valued and protected prints for
nearly a century longer than it had offered that same protection to
paintings. The sentence is undoubtedly correct, and any alternative
construction of the statute unbearably strained. Nonetheless, the
statement is strildng. Either society had come so far that the
distinctions once made were now incomprehensible historical oddities,
or the Court was unwilling to accept the legacy that Congress and the
lower courts had created.
The dissent took a different, more historically accurate approach.
Restating the decision of the Sixth Circuit, the dissent stated the
question in economic terms first:
That if a chromo, lithograph, or other print, engraving, or picture has no
other use than that of a mere advertisement, and no value aside from
this function, it would not be promotive of the useful arts, within the
187. Id. §§ 87-88.
188. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). For a reproduction of the poster in question, see SAMuELs,
supra note 143, at 141.
189. The decision of United States District Court for the District of Kentucky was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at
241. The Court had already found that a staged portrait (in this case, of Oscar Wilde) had
sufficient authorship to be protected by copyright, notwithstanding the significantly
mechanical process of photography. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53 (1884).
190. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at249.
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meaning of the constitutional provision, to protect the 'author' in the
exclusive use thereof, and the copyright statute should not be construed
as including such a publication, if any other construction is
admissible."'
This approach by the dissent has some economic merit.
Advertising needs no external incentive to be created, because the
incentive to advertise comes from the reward of sales of the advertised
product or service. As such, protecting the copyright in advertising
increases the costs to the public without any concomitant benefit to the
public. The advertising will be created whether the public wants it or
not. Indeed, most advertising is designed to get the public's attention
despite objection, hardly an endeavor needful of a statutory
monopoly.'2
Holmes did not address this economic issue. Whether or not it
had legitimate merit, it was not the real basis of the objection by the
dissent at the Supreme Court. Instead, the dissent had greater
concerns:
[The work] must have some connection with the fine arts to give it
intrinsic value, and that it shall have is the meaning which we attach to
the act of June 18, 1874, amending the provisions of the copyright law.
We are unable to discover anything useful or meritorious in the design
copyrighted by the plaintiffs in error other than as an advertisement of
acts to be done or exhibited to the public in Wallace's show ....
The clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited terms to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective works and
discoveries, does not, as I think, embrace a mere advertisement of a
circus.
193
Holmes did address the reach of the 1870 and 1874 provisions on
paintings, drawings, and sculpture. He explained, however, that even
a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one
man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a
restriction in the words of the act.
191. Id. at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
192. Cf Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that the Copyright and Patent
Clause could not be used to provide the basis of federal trademark law). A proper economic
argument would still protect advertisements because the investment in their quality would
depend on the ability to protect their exclusive use. If any ad created for a product could be
copied by a competitor by merely deleting references to the particular brand, the investment
in the advertising would drop considerably, ith a concomitant loss of information and
quality for the public.
193. Bleistein, 188 US. at 253 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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If there is a restriction it is not to be found in the limited pretensions
of these particular works. The least pretentious picture has more
originality in it than directories and the like, which may be
copyrighted.9
The Court dismissed the statutory constructions of both the lower
court and the dissent, which required the works be deemed fine art to
be protected.9 5
Holmes focused the bulk of his reasoning not on copyright at all,
nor on the niceties of economic incentives. Instead, Holmes began to
lay the groundwork for his significant decisions in the area of First
Amendment doctrine and the importance of the "marketplace of
ideas."'96 Over fifteen years earlier, and interpreting a different
provision of the Constitution, Holmes nonetheless looked to
fundamental principles, changing the focus of the opinion from the
rights of the parties to the role of the courts:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for
the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. It
is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a
change. That these pictures had their worth and their success is
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the
plaintiffs' rights.'97
194. Id at 250.
195. Seoid at250-51.
196. SeeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis explained:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment,
as all life is an experiment.
Id.
197. Bleistekn, 188 U.S. at251-52.
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The underlying phrases between the marketplace of political
ideas and crass entertainment are not lost on Holmes. To paraphrase
both opinions, if an idea, advertsemen or opinion commands the
interest of any pubic, it has a commercial value and the power of the
thought to get itselfaccepted. The best testis in the competition of the
market and that truth is the only ground upon which anyjudgment can
be made.'90 It would stretch the point of this Article to suggest that a
circus act is responsible for Holmes's development of the "marketplace
of ideas" metaphor, one of the most compelling intellectual images in
constitutional jurisprudence, but some minimal credit can be given for
the seeds first sown. Certainly, an alternative reading of Bleistein is
not that Holmes advocated a minimal level of creativity, but that the
value of the limited monopoly extended by copyright should be
defined by the marketplace rather than the courts.
C The Sttains ofMusicalProtection
The technological changes lamented by Warren and Brandeis as
invasions of privacy were also changing the world of public
entertainment through music. Mechanical devices and musical boxes
that had started as works of beauty were transforming into machines
that recreated music.'" By 1876, the music box was overtaken by the
player piano, which received its grand public display at the
Philadelphia Centennial Exposition."° The next year, Thomas Edison
invented the phonograph."' The player piano used air to pump the
action of a specially equipped piano. Because the quality of sound was
based primarily on the quality of the piano, the sound quality of piano
rolls could be amazingly close to live performance. Well into the
twentieth century, the player piano was the respected musical player in
the home.
Within a decade of these technological marvels, Congress moved
to amend the copyright laws once again. The performance rights for
198. Compare id. at 251-52, with Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
199. Kohn on Music Licensing explains:
Originally placed in snuff boxes, watches, and various ornamental objects and
commonly used today in jewel boxes, figurines, and children's toys, the music box
was invented in 1796 by Antoine Favre, a Swiss watchmaker. In the 1820s, as they
became popular in homes, music boxes were mass produced to fulfill demand. By
the mid-19th century, several developments in the technology lead to music boxes
that could play a wider selection of music for a longer period of time.
AL KoHN & BOB KOHN, KoHN ON Music LICENSING 653 (2d ed. 1996).
200. SAmiELS, supm note 143, at 33.
201. SeeKoHN & KOHN, supra note 199, at 654.
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music were finally extended to composers and songwriters in 18 9 7.2'
As discussed in greater detail below, those same performance rights
were then limited by Congress in 1909.203
While the homeowner and restaurateur understood the player
piano and its almost-live action, the early courts did not. In 1888, the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed
the copyright protection for the song Cradle Empty, Baby; Gone."
The court explained the problem simply:
The sole question in issue is whether these perforated sheets of paper
are an infringement of copyrighted sheet music. To the ordinary mind it
is certainly a difficult thing to consider these strips of paper as sheet
music. There is no clef, or bars, or lines, or spaces, or other marks
which are found in common printed music, but only plain strips of
paper with rows of holes or perforations." 5
Having thus framed the issue, the court took only two more paragraphs
to find that the plain strips of perforated paper could not infringe the
copyrighted music of the songwriter.'
Without the burden of copyright, piano roll manufacturers were
quite successful. According to the Supreme Court in l'te-Smith
Music Publishing Co. v Apolo Co., in 1902 "from seventy to seventy-
five thousand of such instruments were in use in the United States, and
that from one million to one million and a half of such perforated
musical rolls ... were made in this country in that year.'" 7 Still, the
rights conferred by copyright were limited by statute and narrowly
construed. As such, the cases in both England and the United States
universally found that the piano rolls did not constitute a copying of
the copyrighted song."' These dramatic changes to the technology and
the explosion of entertainment business led to a call for significant
reform in copyright laws. In 1905, the President asked Congress to
revise the copyright act in keeping with the technological change.2
202. SeeAet of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4,29 Stat. 481,481-82.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (superseded).
204. Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 E 584, 584 (D. Mass. 1888).
205. Id. at 584.
206. Seeid. at 584-85.
207. 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908).
208. See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 199, at 656; see also Wlite-Smith Music Publg,
209 U.S. at 1 (holding that piano rolls were not copying of musical composition, but merely
part of mechanism for reproducing sound).
209. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 E 470, 477-78 (E.D.
S.C. 1924), affY, 2 E2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924) (discussing the two different bills that were
debated regarding the 1909 Copyright Act).
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Hearings were held in both 1906 and 1908."10 The statute was
fundamentally altered, but the approach continued to inch forward
slowly.
The copyright gloss on piano rolls and phonograph recordings
created in White-Smith Music Publishing continued to pervade the new
1909 Copyright Act. The Act overcame the judicial objections to the
perforated blank paper, and, by implication, the even more obtuse wax-
covered cardboard cylinders being used for Edison's phonographs."'
The new Act extended copyright protection to musical works
embodied in "any system of notation or any form of record in which
the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be
read or reproduced.' '1 The congressional leap over the courts to
machine-readable works under copyright, however, was not unfettered.
Congress wished to grant copyright holders the exclusive right to
record their work on piano rolls or phonograph records, but feared that
the large musical publishers would then be able to dominate the
marketplace for popular music. 13 As a compromise, the exclusive
right to record the musical composition was initially vested in the
copyright holder."' Once exercised, however, that right could also be
exercised by any other recording company willing to pay a fee set by
Congress.1 5 This mandatory permission became the first compulsory
license under the Copyright Act.216 The initial statutory charge was
"two cents on each part manufactured?' 2 7  Congress, like its
predecessors drafting the Statute of Anne, feared that an exclusive
right to control the use of this popular medium could lead to abuse and
monopoly. In fact, one such company was already in the marketplace.
The Aeolian Company had anticipated the 1909 Copyright Act by
purchasing many of the copyright interests in piano rolls, garnering a
significant portion of the market.
One of the issues that remained unanswered was whether a
recording company could copy the recordings of its competitors or
whether it had to manufacture a master recording independently using
210. See id.
211. KOHN & KOHN, supra note 199, at 654.
212. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-88.
213. See KOHN & KoHN, supra note 199, at 656.
214. See id.
215. Seeid
216. See id. at 657.
217. SeeAct of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-88; KoHN & KoHN, supra
note 199, at 656-57.
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its own artists.218 Shortly after the compulsory mechanical license went
into effect in 1912, the first case on this matter was decided. Aeolian,
the largest owner of piano roll rights, quickly sued to protect its
holdings. The result is surprising from a copyright perspective, but
predictable for its business application. In Aeoi'an Co. v RoyalMusic
Roll Co., a New York district court found that the mechanical license
granted by Congress extended only to the copyrighted work embodied
in the piano roll."9 The license did not extend to the manner in which
the work was manufactured."' As such, the physical copying of the
roll was not permitted under the statute, and the court issued a
temporary injunction."
The court explained that "any party aggrieved may file a bill in
equity and a [District] Court of the United States may grant an
injunction to prevent and restrain the violation of any rights secured by
such act?"' The court based its analysis on the theory that
the subsequent user [of the copyright] does not thereby secure the right
to copy the perforated rolls or records. He cannot avail himself of the
skill and labor of the original manufacturer of the perforated roll or
record by copying or duplicating the same, but must resort to the
copyrighted composition or sheet music, and not pirate the work of a
competitor who has made an original perforated roll.'
The court's argument is compelling and commonly used. The
only problem stems from the lack of a statutory (or constitutional"4 )
basis. According to Congress and the Supreme Court, the piano roll is
a mechanical copy, not a work protected by copyright.Y As such, there
are no property rights in the piano roll that are subject to copyright
protection. Nonetheless, the case is consistent with the approach of
Congress and the courts to enforce the recognized economic rights at
stake in the entertainment business. 6
218. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colo. Magnetics, Inc., 497 E2d 285, 287
(10th Cir. 1974); Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 E2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1972); Aeolian
Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926, 927 (W.D.N.Y 1912).
219. 196 E at 927-28.
220. See id
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 927.
224. SeeFeist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991).
225. See Aeolian Co., 196 E at 927-28.
226. This analysis has itself been rejected. States have recognized that the property
rights of the embodied recording were highly valuable. As technology moved from piano
rolls to first 78 rpm and later Long Playing 33-1/3 rpm (LPs), the creativity necessary to
master and record a sound recording was recognized. In 1971, Congress finally extended
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In stopping a party from usurping the "skill and labor of the
original manufacturer" of the piano rolls, the court recognized that the
balance achieved in the 1909 Copyright Act was the balance between
manufacturers of the commodity and the public."' By its own terms,
the interests of the artist and authors were severely limited once
publication or mechanical distribution occurred.
Just as the law had evolved in the previous century, copyright law
moved to protect the entertainer and became shaped by the
entertainer's interests only grudgingly, as the economic power of the
entertainer coincided with the commercial interests protected by the
Act. Congress had moved the law significantly from a limited tool for
the protection of maps, books, and charts into the realm of protecting
popular entertainment, but the courts generally continued to favor
economic interests over artistic endeavors. Protection for artistic
endeavors came slowly, consuming well over a century. Not until new
technology transformed public lives did the playwright and songwriter
truly move into the core of copyright protection.
This same pattern can be seen again in the development of
musical performance rights for composers and songwriters." The
exclusive right to control musical performances was extended in
1897.22 Except for the early cases discussing the ability to record
piano rolls and phonograph records, only one reported opinion appears
to have applied the 1897 performance right. In that case, the court
held that a song being used in The Wizard of Oz was not infringed
when another actress mimicked the performance of the Oz star in a
comedy revue."
Had the court simply ruled that the rights were subject to fair use
limitations and the parody was well within traditional notions of
comment and criticism, then a good deal of judicial mischief (both
copyright protection to the sound recordings themselves. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 391-92 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § l(f) (superseded)).
227. Aeolian Co., 196 F at 927.
228. A general public performance right in performers has never been adopted. A
limited right exists for digital recordings and transmissions. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000) ("[I]n
the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission.").
229. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4,29 Stat. 481,481-82 states:
Any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical
composition for which a copyright has been obtained, without the consent of the
proprietor of said dramatic of musical composition... shall be liable for damages
... not less than one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every
subsequent performance.
230. Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 E 977, 977-78 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
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then and now) could have been avoided. Instead, however, the court
first reviewed the lyrics of the song."' After reprinting them, the court
commented:
[C]ounsel are agreed that there is nothing dramatic about either the
words or the music. Assuming, for present purposes, that a lyric is
capable of being 'performed or represented' in the sense that should be
given to those words as they are used by the statute, the question
remains, is the song in fact being performed or represented? In my
opinion, the question should be answered in the negative."
Having decided there was not much about the song to protect, the
court quickly concluded that no protection was available."' The court
explained that the defendant's actress "does not sing it, she merely
imitates the singer; and the interest in her own performance is due, not
to the song, but to the degree of excellence of the imitation?'
The results of the only published litigation on the performance
right left the musicians without legal recourse. For composers,
policing public performing halls was incredibly difficult; documenting
which song was improperly performed at which date and time was
even more so. The accepted culture of free musical performances
meant that composers had neither the artistic nor economic clout to
change the perception or enforcement of the law.
The Copyright Act of 1909 heralded a number of changes to the
economic status of the composers, signifying a fundamentally different
era in the protection of copyrighted works." The new phrasing of the
protection for musical works was considered "both broader and more
definite" despite a number of textual errors in the musical sections. 6
Interestingly, the more definite language again guaranteed the
exclusive rights to public performance of music, but in fewer
situations. The statute excluded a number of nonprofit performances
by name, stating that,
231. Seeidat978.
232. Id.
233. Seeid.at979.
234. Id; cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,580-81 n.14-15 (1994)
(distinguishing parody from satire for purposes of identifying the amount that may be copied
under fair use).
235. SeeAct of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-88; see alsoM. Witmark &
Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 E 470,477-78 (E.D. S.C. 1924), affT 2 E2d 1020 (4th
Cir. 1924) (discussing the two different bills that were debated regarding the 1909 Copyright
Act).
236. See BoWlKER, supra note 141, at 43, 164-65. Bowker labeled the "octavo
choruses" as improperly phrased because it "has no musical significance?' Id. at 164.
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nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to prevent the performance
of religious or secular works, such as oratorios, cantatas, masses, or
octavo choruses by public schools, church choirs, or vocal societies,
rented, borrowed, or obtained from some public library, public school,
church choir, school choir, or vocal society, provided the performance is
given for charitable or educational purposes and not for profit."
This express protection for nonprofit public performances was
complemented by an express requirement in section 1(e) that the right
extended only when publicly performed "for the purpose of public
performance for profit'" The result of this language was a reduction
in the rights of composers and songwriters after the expansive 1909
Act was adopted.
The copyright laws are always a balance. For songwriters and
composers, the balance was that they received first publication rights
over piano rolls and phonograph records. They received a two-cent
royalty on all other mechanical recordings made thereafter. What they
gave up was merely the public performance right to charitable
programs and free concerts. 39  Given their financial success, this
limited concession was a small burden, and Congress used the
concession to balance the extensive economic rights granted."' In this
balancing, Congress granted the more economically valuable right
while withholding exclusive powers over activities that would probably
be exercised, if at all, for artistic, political, or content-related reasons,
rather than for financial purposes. A composer who objected to
student performances of his work could no longer stop the
performance. The volunteers at the local church were immunized
from asking for permission. These were not economically valuable
rights, so they were not as highly valued.
237. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 104 (superseded)).
238. Id. § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075.
239. See id
240. Compare this result with the Digital Millenium Copyright Act compromise
embodied in the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 201-206,
112 Stat. 2830, 2830-34. Like its 1909 counterpart, Congress granted musicians an
extension in the term of copyright protection, but balanced it by reducing enforcement rights
in certain public venues, bars, restaurants, and stores. See id. § 202. These were the same
venues protected by the "for profit" designation in the 1909 Act. As Marilyn Bergman,
president of ASCAP, lamented "In one sweeping legislative action, the House and Senate
have passed copyright-term extension with one hand yet severely curtailed copyright
protection with the other." Bill Holland, Congress Extends C'i'ght Term; WIPO Passage
Seen, BILLBOARD, Oct. 17, 1998, at 5, 109; Frances Preston, president of BMI was more
direct: "It is a sad day for all creators of music in America and intellectual property rights
owners"' Id
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The economic balance changed one night over dinner. In 1913,
noted music lawyer Nathan Burkan hosted nine composers and music
publishers to discuss forming a performing rights organization.24 ' This
was not the first attempt to organize. The Soci~t6 des Auteurs,
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) had opened a New
York office in 1911 242 Although it had been formed in France in 1851,
the opportunity for a performing rights society was only beginning to
develop as music halls and other entertainment venues were expanding
with silent pictures, nickelodeons, and other amusements. The group
agreed to form the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) and began to strategize."3
One of the primary targets for the group were the restaurants with
bands and stage shows.'M Most restaurants refused to pay for musical
performance rights, asserting that the "for profit" requirement meant
that a separate admission charge was required before the floorshow
was a "for profit" performance." ' Any other profit made was for the
food, or in the case of the movie theatres, for the film. 6 The United
States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in New York was not
amenable to the complaints of the authors and publishers. So, despite
some early success for ASCAP, the Second Circuit held that there was
no "for profit" standard met without an admission payment."7 As the
court explained, the "for profit" requirement "does not make a
performance any less gratuitous to an audience because some one pays
the musician for rendering it, or because it was a means of attracting
custom, or was a part of the operation of the hotel?' 4' Nonetheless,
Victor Herbert, a founding member of ASCAP, pushed for Supreme
Court review.
249
By 1917, when the Supreme Court took up the dispute, silent
motion pictures, restaurants, and innumerable clubs had joined the
staid opera house or vaudeville theatre, dramatically transforming the
nature of nightlife in America. Justice Holmes, writing for a
unanimous Court, did not mince words:
241. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 140, at 68.
242. Id
243. Seeidat69.
244. See id
245. See John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 E 229,231 (2d Cir. 1915).
246. See i.
247. See id
248. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 229 . 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1915), rev'4 242 U.S. 591 (1917)
(quoting John Church Co., 221 E at 233).
249. SeeGOLDSTEIN, supmanote 140, at 70-71.
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If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance
where money is taken at the door they are very imperfectly protected.
Performances not different in kind from those of the defendants could
be given that might compete with and even destroy the success of the
monopoly that the law intends the plaintiffs to have. It is enough to say
that there is no need to construe the statute so narrowly. The
defendants' performances are not eleemosynary. They are part of a
total for which the public pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is
attributed to a particular item which those present are expected to order,
is not important. It is true that the music is not the sole object, but
neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper elsewhere.
The object is a repast in surroundings that to people having limited
powers of conversation or disliking the rival noise give a luxurious
pleasure not to be had from eating a silent meal. If music did not pay it
would be given up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether
it pays or not the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough.20
The opinion is a much more elegant restatement of the district
court's opinion in the first of Victor Herbert's cases. But most
importantly, just as it had recognized the importance of protecting the
economic interests of the artists and publishers, the Court was explicit
in providing relief from the restaurants free riding on the musical
entertainment.
D. Birth ofa Notion: The Modem Entertainment Era
The modem era truly began with the invention of the motion
picture. "So rapid has been the growth of the motion picture industry
that within a quarter of a century after its birth, it has taken its place
among the five foremost business enterprises of the country""
The era of the modem motion picture began with the early
developments of photography, motion picture cameras, and projectors
that could flash each frame of the film onto the screen. 2 In 1887,
George Eastman perfected a working roll film and Thomas Edison's
company used the film to create the first American film camera, which
he began marketing successfully in 1888.3 The relationship between
250. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
251. Louis D. FROHLICK & CHARLEs SCHWARTZ, THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURES
INCLUDING THE LAW OFTHETHEATRE V (1918).
252. SeeGERALDMAST, A SHORTHISTORY OFTHE MOVIES 13 (4th ed. 1986).
253. See id. at 14; ARTHUR KNIGHT, THE LIVELIEST ART 5 (The MacMillian Co. 1979)
(1957). By 1888, Eastman began marketing the Kodak camera with the slogan, "[y]ou press
the button, we do the rest." In relation to the history of copyright, it was probably a good
thing that Sarony had fought his copyright battle when he did, establishing the legal
protection before the instant camera made photography much like the creation of piano rolls.
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film and music was not coincidental. Edison's own experimentation
with motion pictures came directly from his attempt to add filmed
images to his phonograph: "Pictures were not important in themselves
to Edison, but were merely to make the phonographic experience
fuller.'2  Nonetheless, despite his limited interest in motion pictures,
engineers at the Edison Company continued to refine cameras. Within
a year of Eastman's film, cameras were invented that could make short
films.55 Edison patented his invention in the United States in 189l."
In 1896, Edison purchased the rights to Thomas Armat's motion
picture projector, the machine that successfully incorporated the gate
into the projector and allowed the 35mm image to be flashed onto the
screen for one-sixteenth of a second. 7
The modem movie was born. The timing was ripe. Congress
had just extended copyright to the public performances of drama and
the new technologies of sound, photography, and projection had sprung
up to create new media to exploit these rights. Born from Edison's
experimentation of the phonograph and protected from its inception by
intellectual property laws, the motion picture industry was poised to
reinvent the relationship between entertainment and the law.
Both law and technology were necessary for this industrial
explosion to begin. As soon as Edison began marketing films, others
began copying them. An early court decision held that protection
"extended the copyrighting system to 'any ... photograph,' but not to
an aggregation of photographs; and ... that every photograph, no
matter how or for what purpose it may be conjoined with others, shall
be separately registered, and that the prescribed notice of copyright
254. MAST, supra note 252, at 14.
255. Id.
256. Seeid at 15. Edison failed to pay the additional $150 for the international patent
protection, however, and set off an international race for the creation of motion picture
cameras and projectors. Nearly simultaneous inventions in England, France, Germany
highlighted the explosion of new technologies at the end of the nineteenth century. See
KNIGHT, supra note 253, at 8-9.
257. MAST, supra note 252, at 22. Edison had invented the sprockets for the film, but
while those allowed for synchronous timing, other problems remained. Another of the
important technical developments was the "Latham Loop," first invented for a camera rather
than the projector. See id at 20. A "Latham Loop" consisted of a small loop of film float
just before the gate, protecting the film from tightening and ripping. Id. Edison's true genius
was to purchase the patent rights to the "Latham Loop" and the Armat projector to use with
his sprocketed machine, a design that has not been significantly changed in film projectors in
this century. SeegenerallyMotion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502 (1917) (discussing the extent of patent rights for motion picture machines).
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shall be inscribed upon each of them.""2  The Court of Appeals
reversed, 9 but in the five-month period following the lower court
decision, Edison had abandoned his company's filmmaking.26  With
the reversal of the decision, the company returned to production and
ultimate control of the film industry for the next decade. I
The legal attitude towards the entertainment industry changed
with the introduction of luminaries like Eastman and Edison. While
the law may have treated all comers alike, the sophistication of the
practice and the stakes were not perceived as great when the Great
Wallace Show fought to protect its posters as compared with when the
Edison Company sought to enjoin economic injury for its works. The
law of copyright remained an economic balancing, but now the
balance was weighted in favor of the movie producers.
Justice Holmes again had the opportunity to shape the future of
the entertainment field with his opinion involving one of the first film
adaptations of a popular novel, Ben Hur..2 . Holmes extended the
approach laid down in Daly that an infringement may occur even if
done through pantomime.263 This is important because otherwise the
silent films would all be immune from liability. Holmes's approach
also treated motion pictures as another form of drama, which had the
benefit of fitting into the protections for dramatic presentations."
Holmes's approach provided for unambiguous protection to
authors against filmmakers and ensured that filmmakers could not
reproduce the films of their competitors. Had the Court limited the
protection to photographs, then the dramatization rights under section
l(b) of the 1909 Act would have been the basis for legal protection,
likely increasing uncertainty for years.
258. Edison v. Lubin, 119 E 993 (E.D. Pa.), rev, 122 E 240 (3d Cir. 1903), appeal
dismissead 195 U.S. 625 (1904).
259. Edison v. Lubin, 122 E 240, 243 (3d Cir. 1903).
260. SAMUEIS, supa note 143, at 61.
261. Id
262. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60 (1911); SAMUELS, supra note 143, at
57-59.
263. See Kalem, 222 U.S. at 61.
264. Justice Holmes wrote:
The essence of the matter in the case last supposed is not the mechanism employed
but that we see the event or story lived. The moving pictures are only less vivid
than reflections from a mirror. With the former as with the latter our visual
impression-what we see-is caused by the real pantomime of real men through
the medium of natural forces, although the machinery is different and more
complex.
Id at 61-62.
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The dramatic rights approach had an interesting, unintended
consequence. Through Harper Brothers, General Wallace, Ben Hues
author, had licensed the play for a Broadway production. Fourteen
years later, the play's producers sought to use their license agreement
to create another film version of Ben Hu..65 Wallace and the Harper
Brothers objected, but the court, reviewing the terms of the license
agreement, held that the language was unambiguously limited to the
stage performance. 6 The court went further, however, and addressed
what impact the sale of the dramatic rights for the stage had on the
dramatic rights for film:
In my opinion, there is implied a negative covenant on the part of the
plaintiffs (the grantors of defendants' restricted license) not to use the
ungranted portion of the copyright estate to the detriment, if not
destruction, of the licensees' estate. Admittedly, if Harper Bros ...
permitted photo-plays of Ben Hur to infest the country, the market for
the spoken play would be greatly impaired, if not destroyed. This being
the fact, the law is analogous to that which implies, from a covenant to
make a certain use of property, a covenant negative against doing
anything else with it.267
While this may have been an issue that could have been appealed,
particularly given the litigation history and the explicit knowledge of a
book's valuable film rights, the parties chose to work together.
Ultimately the Broadway producers negotiated a fifty percent royalty,
leading to the first blockbuster money loser.6 The film grossed $9
million, but lost $850,000 after payment of the royalties."9
Justice Holmes again weighed in on the balance of economic
interests in copyright in Manmers v Morosco, a dispute regarding the
production rights to Peg O'MyHeart2 7  Holmes endorsed the Harper
Bros. approach by recognizing "the impossibility of supposing that the
author reserved the right to destroy the value of the right granted: 27'
265. SeeHarper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 . 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); SAMUELS, supranote
143, at 58.
266. See Harper Bros., 232 E at 612.
267. Id. at 613.
268. SAMUELS, supranote 143, at 59.
269. Id.
270. See252 U.S. 317, 323 (1920).
271. Id at 326. The majority only reached the issue of the film grant after it disposed
of the claim that the rights to all production had terminated under a five-year provision of the
agreements. See id at 325. Justice Clarke's dissent provides a far better analysis of the
contract than that of the majority, but the Court may have been so eager to review the grant of
film rights that it glossed over the more fundamental flaw in the lower courts' decisions. See
id at 327-29 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
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Instead of granting the film rights to the Broadway producer, however,
Holmes adopted the language of the Harper Bros. court, enjoining
both parties from making a motion picture version of the play.2
The lower courts had granted the film rights to the Broadway
producer under a license providing the producer "the sole and
exclusive license and liberty to produce, perform and represent the
said play in the United States of America and the Dominion of
Canada: 2  Holmes pointed out that the remainder of the contract
provided the playwright the power to control the play's development.27
For example, the contract provides that "[n]o alterations, eliminations
or additions are to be made without the approval of the author and the
rehearsals and production of the play are to be under his direction?"
As such, the contract does not suggest that a silent, motion picture
adaptation could be made. As a practical matter, if the lower courts'
decisions had been affirmed but this provision enforced, the result
would have been the same, because no right to make a silent picture
could be exercised without the author agreeing to the pantomime
version of the script.
By adopting the analysis of Harper Bros., the Supreme Court
dramatically changed the bargaining power of the two parties. The
Court assumed, seemingly with no evidence before it, that because the
parties disagreed as to the scope of the rights granted, an implied
understanding must have existed. Put another way, the Court imposed
an assumption that Harper Brothers would not have reserved the film
rights, nor would the Broadway producers have allowed Harper
Brothers to keep the film rights, because of the damage such rights
would have done to the stage play. While this point is often negotiated
in rights agreements, many examples exist showing that the
assumption cannot be universally applied.
Contemporaneous productions based on public domain works
often coexist. No publicly available study empirically analyzes the
market impact of prior release in other media, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that the threat may be overstated. This is particularly true
when the story is already known, such as when the works are derived
from a popular novel or factual incident. Theatre and film producers
are intensely concerned with the acquisition of the nonffm rights, but
the reason is driven more to control the marketing of the project and
272. Seeid.at327.
273. Id at 323.
274. Seeid at324.
275. Id.
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participate in the income of the other media than out of any actualized
market destruction.
In the case of Ben Hur, the result is even more striking. The play
had run for fourteen years, and according to the court, "the public
might [have been] growing tired of the play as shown with actors
speaking on the stage?'276 In other words, the economics of the
relationship were coming to an end. By creating a negative covenant
not to compete in other markets, the Court increased the value of the
stage rights dramatically at the expense of the underlying rights holder.
In the case of Peg O'MyHear4 the result is patently unfair to the
playwright. The strained interpretation of the initial grant of rights
extended a five-year contract into perpetuity.2" Following that, the
Court enjoined both parties from developing film rights."8 This was
hardly the arrangement bargained for when the author negotiated that
his wife star in the play as a first-class production for a maximum of
five years. 9 Nonetheless, the case illustrates the interpretation of
contracts granting copyright licenses. Nowhere was there a discussion
of the playwright's need to control the production, the concern that
poorly mounted productions can dramatically affect the opportunity to
present future plays, or the artistic control that was central to the face
of the contract." Instead of the rights explicitly before the Court in the
language of the contract, Justice Holmes and the majority focused on
rights that must necessarily be at stake by implication: the competitive
economic interests of the producers to avoid destructive competition.,
The Court went so far as to recognize that the parties were
concerned with the artistic elements of the license, but they were used
merely to illustrate the limits on the distribution of the commodity:
The stipulations against alterations, eliminations or additions, and that
the rehearsals and production of the play shall be under the direction of
the author, denote the same thing, and clearly indicate that no other
form of production is contemplated. The residuary clause, so to speak,
by which the play is to drop to stock companies shows the lowest point
to which the author was willing to let it go.2S
276. Harper Bros. v. Kaw, 232 E 609, 610 (S.D.N.Y 1916).
277. See Maimers, 252 US. at 325.
278. Seeidat327.
279. Seeid at 324.
280. See generally Jon Garon, Note, Directory Choice: The Fine Line Between
Interpretaion and Infringement of an AuthorI Wort 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 277
(1988) (discussing the importance of first performance rights for playwrights).
281. See Manners, 252 U.S. at 326-27.
282. Id at 326.
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Framed in terms of quality assurance, the stock production provision
fits in nicely with other sales contracts for the distribution of
commodities.
The Supreme Court was very slow to embrace any respect for
films as artistic endeavors. As discussed in the next Part, the Court
was explicitly hostile to the notion that films were an expressive forum
for public discourse. They were not worthy to be traded in the
marketplace of ideas." Despite this disrespect for the content of films,
the Court recognized the importance of their economic power and, as a
result, protected those rights expansively.
E The CopyrhtRoadTveled
As the stage, music, and film industries developed, Congress and
the courts expanded the copyright laws to meet their growing needs.
By 1920, each of these entertainment fields had received unparalleled
economic protection under copyright commensurate with its growth."
In each area, the rights were acquired when the field had matured to
the point where the economic opportunities were too large to allow a
competitor to take a free ride on the labor of the entertainment
industry.
Throughout the growth of the early entertainment industry, the
United States remained rather isolationist. In 1886, the Berne
Convention was formed to provide national treatment, extending to
foreigners all the copyright protections a country would give its
citizens."5 Signing the Berne Convention would have greatly extended
the term of copyright, vested copyright upon fixation, and provided
moral rights to the authors."6 The first bill to amend the 1909
Copyright Act and join the Berne Convention was presented to
Congress in 1922, but it did not succeed."7 Instead, efforts for the
United States to join the Beme Convention were not successfully
concluded until 1988, slightly more than a century after its inception.
283. See hfin notes 409-419 and accompanying text (discussing Mut. Film Corp. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), overuled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US.
495 (1952)).
284. SeegenemllyFRoHuicK & ScmVARTz, supm note 251, at 499.
285. ARTHUR B. HANSON, OMNIBUS COPYRIGrr REVisioN 11 (1973). This book was
prepared by the Cambridge Research Institute on behalf of Congress.
286. Id at 11-12. "According to the 1928 Rome revision of the Berne convention,
'moral rights' consist of the author's right to claim authorship of the work and the 'right to
object to any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration of the work that would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation."' Id at 12.
287. Seeid at 11-12.
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Unlike England, the United States chose not to protect the rights
of musicians and playwrights until late in the nineteenth century. The
United States did not grant a preferential copyright term to artists.
Although the statute called for the protection of fine art in 1870, the
designation did not entitle the holder to special privilege, and the
courts quickly eroded any distinction between art and commercial
illustrations. In the early debate over the Berne Convention, the
motion picture industry raised concerns that the term of copyright
should not be extended from the twenty-eight years with a renewal
period of an additional twenty-eight years to the modem formulation
of life plus a period of years because "they wanted to use copyrighted
novels and stories as the basis of films. "' Copyright policy remained
unaltered to benefit the movie industry at the expense of the authors,
composers, and artists.
This summary is not a listing of America's failings in protecting
the artist.289 Instead, it serves as a reminder of the choices Congress
and the courts have made in developing copyright law in the United
States. The point is not that copyright is unavailable for the entertainer
and the artist, but that its development was steered by the growth of the
entertainment industry rather than the art form or the technology.
Only when the industry was mature did the law begin to protect
the property interests. In almost every dispute, the tension was
between two economically sophisticated interests using the tensions
inherent in copyright to redistribute the bargaining leverage.
Enforcement of the performance right in music took twenty years. It
began when ASCAP, an economically sophisticated organization,
began to represent the interests of the songwriters and the publishers.
The interests shaping the congressional debate are fairly well
accepted, and the purpose of the courts is to enforce the statutory rights
created by Congress, so there may be no need to illustrate the parallel
agenda of the courts. Still, in many ways, the Supreme Court led the
nation beyond the congressional compromises, indelibly stamping
copyright law with its singular value judgments on the economic
importance of copyright; that what is good for the content producers is
good for the public.
288. Id. at 12. The report noted, however, that "[w]ith the increased use of old movies
on television, motion picture producers discovered that a longer copyright term would benefit
them." Id.
289. I can see how some commentators could construe this as the "moral rights path
not taken?' While that path is an alternative to the path embraced in the United States, it is
not my purpose to suggest that we failed by refusing that choice.
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The Court's approach is best illustrated by a case in which
copyright was unavailable. In Internaional News Serice v
Associated Press, the Court had to weigh the right of the International
News Service (INS) to reprint news stories written by the Associated
Press (AP) or by journalists at newspapers that were members of the
AP's news-sharing service.'f The best solution to the AP claim would
have been a congressional choice to join the Berne Convention or at
least to accept its principle that copyright should subsist without the
requirement of registration and deposit." ' As a competitor, INS had a
difficult time showing its general good faith in the healthy competition
for distributing the news. INS had already been enjoined by the
district court from bribing journalists or from inducing newspapers to
send it advance copies of stories in violation of the AP bylaws.2 Still,
the use of uncopyrighted material was free to anyone, so the remaining
claim was dismissed by the lower court.293
The Supreme Court reversed, finding against INS even for its
unfair exploitation of AP's interest in the timeliness of the news, the
so-called hot news exception.9  The case includes both a concurrence
by Justice Holmes and a dissent by Justice Brandeis, distilling much of
the Court's debate on intellectual property"'
The majority opinion authored by Justice Pitney took a strong
stance to protect the economic interests of AP.96 As to copyrighted
authorship, the majority is rather dismissive: "It is not to be supposed
that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress
... intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to
report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the
290. 248 U.S. 215,230-31(1918).
291. Id. at 233. ("Complainant's news matter is not copyrighted. It is said that it could
not, in practice, be copyrighted, because of the large number of dispatches that are sent daily
... :') Justice Brandeis points out that Congress had assessed particular legislation to address
the problem but rejected it. See id. at 264-65 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In 1886, the
Committee on the Library rejected the following protection that would have readily addressed
the situation:
That any daily or weekly newspaper, or any association of daily or weekly
newspapers, published in the United States or any of the Territories thereof, shall
have the sole right to print, issue, and sell, for the term of eight hours, dating from
the hour of going to press, the contents of said daily or weekly newspaper, or the
collected news of said newspaper association, exceeding one hundred words.
Id at 265 n.l (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting S. 1728, 48th Cong., 1st sess. (1884)).
292. Seeid. at231.
293. Seeid. at231-32.
294. See id. at 24546.
295. Seeid at 2464S (Holmes, J., concurring); id. at 248-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
296. Seeid.at234.
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knowledge of it.2 97 Nonetheless, the Court does see a public interest in
protecting the distribution of the
daily events of the world at the breakfast table of the millions at a price
that, while of trifling moment to each reader, is sufficient in the
aggregate to afford compensation for the cost of gathering and
distributing it, with the added profit so necessary as an incentive to
effective action in the commercial world. 98
The Court framed unfair competition law as a matter of
significant public interest. The Court therefore was willing to extend it
to the otherwise unprotected activity of copying uncopyrighted works:
The question here is not so much the rights of either party as against the
public but their rights as between themselves. And although we may
and do assume that neither party has any remaining property interest as
against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its
first publication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining
property interest in it as between themselves.'"
The economic rights were recognized and protected.
Justice Holmes, the author of many of the seminal copyright
cases, concurred but suggested the Court should reach the result in a
more modest manner. He pointed out that the legal dispute before the
court is one of unfair competition, so that if INS is doing anything
wrong it is suggesting that the content of its stories was gathered by its
members.3" Holmes suggested the more modest remedy of requiring
proper attribution of the copied stories:
When an uncopyrighted combination of words is published there is no
general right to forbid other people repeating them-in other words
there is no property in the combination or in the thoughts or facts that
the words express. Property, a creation of law, does not arise from
value, although exchangeable-a matter of fact. Many exchangeable
values may be destroyed intentionally without compensation. Property
depends upon exclusion by law from interference, and a person is not
excluded from using any combination of words merely because
someone has used it before, even if it took labor and genius to make it.
If a given person is to be prohibited from making the use of words that
his neighbors are free to make some other ground must be found. One
such ground is vaguely expressed in the phrase unfair trade. This
means that the words are repeated by a competitor in business in such a
297. Id.
298. Id. at 235.
299. Id. at 236 (citation omitted).
300. See id at 246-47 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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way as to convey a misrepresentation that materially injures the person
who first used them, by appropriating credit of some kind which the
first user has earned."'
Justice Holmes's concurring opinion recognized the importance
of copyright law, but also reinforces the limits Congress and the courts
have developed for the body of law. The limitation he pressed on the
Court is designed to separate the case from an extended copyright
case, which it has become,. 2 to a nearly run-of-the-mill unfair
competition case that would have anticipated the language of section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.3 Unlike the majority, Holmes's proposed
remedy gave the AP far less control over the unprotected,
uncopyrighted works. By choosing its broader decision, the Court
valued the economic rights of AP over the law of copyright itself.
Justice Brandeis's dissent provided the most strident alternative
voice in the debate. As protected expression, Brandeis was dismissive:
If news be treated as possessing the characteristics not of a trade secret,
but of literary property, then the earliest issue of a paper of general
circulation or the earliest public posting of a bulletin which embodies
such news would, under the established rules governing literary
property, operate as a publication, and all property in the news would
then cease.3"
Copyright, however, was not Brandeis's concern. The coauthor of
United States privacy law and early advocate for expansive First
Amendment protection, Brandeis recognized the dangers inherent in
giving any expansive monopoly power to news gathering. Unlike the
rest of the Court, Brandeis saw the issue as one of social policy.
Ironically, Brandeis thought that the legislature, rather than the courts,
should be the source of protection,3" if any should be created, so that it
would be more narrowly crafted:
Or legislators dealing with the subject might conclude, that the right to
news values should be protected to the extent of permitting recovery of
damages for any unauthorized use, but that protection by injunction
should be denied, just as courts of equity ordinarily refuse (perhaps in
301. Id. (Holmes J., concurring).
302. See generally Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 E3d 841 (2d Cir.
1997) (denying misappropriation protection for live sports scores delivered to defendant's
subscribers' pagers).
303. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (protecting unregistered
marks from being marketed with a false designation of origin).
304. IntlNews, 248 U.S. at 256 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
305. Contra Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442,443-44 (N.Y. 1902)
(discussing evils of a court extending the common law rules).
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the interest of free speech) to restrain actionable libels, and for other
reasons decline to protect by injunction mere political rights ....
Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should
precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any
property right in news or of the circumstances under which news
gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public
interest. Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed
regulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights conferred or to
introduce the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations.
Considerations such as these should lead us to decline to establish a
new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly-disclosed wrong,
although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear."6
Ultimately, in Brandeis's view, the protection of the AP's interests
are not outweighed by the social implications that might flow from
granting it an injunction. Brandeis's view captures the essence of the
social and political concerns embedded in information policy, areas in
which his voice held much greater weight when addressing privacy
and First Amendment policy.
Holmes's careful balancing approach reflects his ability to
capture the essence of the law's policy. For the AP, his approach would
have offered only a pyrrhic victory, continuing to balance the
economic rationale for copyright against the need for robust
competition. Holmes's model was to provide robust protection for
rights granted, but not to imply the creation of any new rights.
The prevailing opinion of the majority ignored Brandeis (as it
often did in that era) and took Holmes's earlier decisions protecting
economic interests too much to heart. The AP was granted a brief
ownership in its news, elevating the property interests in news
gathering as the best way to protect the public interest in having the
news be as fresh as the orange juice delivered daily to the breakfast
table.30 7
Ultimately, the debate among the justices of the Court highlighted
the range of interests the Court was viewing in intellectual property
law. On one hand, no discussion appeared regarding copyright's
preemption of state unfair competition law; on the other, suggestions
that news could not be copyrighted were quickly dismissed.3" The
entire debate focused on the economic interests and their distribution
306. Int'lNews, 248 U.S. at 266-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
307. Seeidat236.
308. Seeidat234.
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among the parties."' Both the majority and dissent spoke of the
essential public policy of maximizing the dissemination of the news,
the majority through protection of the news-gathering process, the
dissent through the freedom to disseminate everything not protected by
copyright
'10
The Court paralleled and often led Congress in its emphasis on
protecting the economic interests of the content producers as the
underlying purpose and character of intellectual property law. The
economic lens through which Congress and the courts view copyright
served the interests of the entertainment industry well. Beginning in
the 1920s, as Congress fruitlessly debated the merits of revising the
copyright laws, the new nature of the debate became apparent. The
Register of Copyright duly noted this trend:
It may be said that in general the major controversies were rooted in
the conflicting interests of the various author and publisher groups on
the one hand, and the user of copyrighted material, such as
broadcasters, motion picture producers, and record manufacturers, on
the other. Each effort to revise the law resolved itself into an attempt to
reconcile this conflict of interest through extended discussion and
negotiation with the various groups concerned in order to work out
compromise solutions to the controversial issues. Such an attempt was
successful in the enactment of the 1909 revision and almost succeeded
... in 1931!"
309. Id at 236-42. The Court had to weigh the right of INS to reprint new stories
written by the AP or by journalists at newspapers that were members with APs news-sharing
service.
310. See generally id.
311. HANSON, supra note 285, at 13-14 (quoting U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright
Law Revision Prepared for the Sen. Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (Comm. Print 1960)). Cf A.A. GOLDMAN, THE HISTORY OF U.S.A.
COPYRIGHT LAW REvmsION 1901-1954, at 9-10 (1957) (available Franklin Pierce Law Center
Library) (describing the Vestal Bill, H.R. 12549, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930)). "The Vestal
bill, coming so near to enactment in the 71st Congress, marked the high tide of the efforts to
revise the law for adherence to the Berne Convention?' Id. at 10.
The Report of the 1931 legislation effectively contrasts the roles of the various
entertainment industries. "It has been found that practically all the industries and all the
authors have united in support of this revision. The authors, playwrights, screen writers,
composers .... motion picture producers, the newspapers and magazines, the allied printing
trades [sic] unions, the librarians, the majority of the theatrical managers, all of these have
appeared at the hearings and have supported the principles of the bill?' Id at 9 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 71-1689 (1930)). The 1931 Bill passed the House of Representatives only to be
scuttled in the Senate, where it was opposed by "the radio broadcasters who were opposed to
the fundamental principles of automatic copyright; the theatrical producers who opposed
divisible copyright; and the manufacturers of coin-operated phonographs who objected to the
elimination of the juke-box exemption?' Id. at 10.
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Although the Copyright Office described even the debate of the
1909 Copyright Act as a negotiation between the users and the
producers, none of the "users" identified in the preceding paragraph
existed in 1906 at the time of the 1909 debate. Except for the piano
roll manufacturers and the jukebox operators, the industry of copyright
"users" had not yet formed. Within a decade, however, these interests
grew from curiosities to economic powers, setting international trade
policy and transforming copyright into the law of the entertainment
industry.
One other Supreme Court decision may illustrate the impact of
the entertainment industry on the nature of copyright. In Feist
Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., the Court repudiated
one of the historically significant props supporting copyright
protection: the diligence and effort that an author put into a work."
The significance of Feist is more than that it ended the sweat of
the brow doctrine by requiring minimal creativity, but that it ended a
century of constructionist originality by replacing it with creativist
originality.3"3 - No longer could work be owned simply because of the
effort it took to create it. Instead an author had to create something at
least minimally unique. The sweat of the brow doctrine was entirely
consistent with the economic basis of copyright and implicitly
endorsed in International News Service because it was the usurpation
of economic interests that was being protected by the Court. This, in
fact, was exactly what the courts had done, beginning with Aeolian
Co., in which the court barred the copying of piano rolls and
phonorecords that were not themselves protectible under copyright.
312. The Court explained:
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a
work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is used in copyright,
means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily,
as they possess some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it
might be.
499 US. 340, 345 (1991) (citations omitted); seealsoJessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990) (discussing authorship as "translation and recombination"
rather than originality).
313. See Niels B. Schaumann, An Az'st& Privilege, 15 CARDozo ARTS & ENT L.J.
249,257-58 (1997).
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The legacy of misappropriation protection was finally eliminated
by a 1971 amendment to the 1909 Copyright Act.314 The interests in
protecting against record piracy far outweighed the niceties of minimal
creative necessity."' Like photography, the choices made (or
overlooked) in fLxing the sound recording is sufficiently creative to
meet the originality requirement under Feist
As the nature of copyright has changed over time, the traditional
protection of copyright has moved from a more expansive,
constructionist approach to what Professor Ginsburg describes as
personality-based protection.31 1 The creativist or personality-based
model has not been viewed as such by the courts. Rather, the courts
continue to advance a primarily economic rationale for copyright
protection. The difference is that now the entertainment industries-
film, television, music, publishing, etc.-are the driving economic
force. Minimal but necessary creativity remains at the heart of this
economic model, but against this backdrop, the rationale for protecting
databases and phone books seems strangely at odds with the Copyright
Act. In essence, as the entertainment industry has moved into the
central economic role, the other content producers that could benefit
from low levels of anticopying protection have been moved out of
copyright entirely.
317
Entertainment has redefined copyright itself.
IV CENSORSHIP LAWS AND THE FiRsT AMENDMENT
The history of entertainment in Western society has been a tug-
of-war between public adulation and outrage. The theatres of
Elizabethan England were often shut down due to scandalous conduct,
and William Shakespeare was forced to change the character of
Falstaff because the riotous knight drew the ire of members of the
Queen's court.1 In the United States, these laws primarily manifested
314. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 391-92; seeGoldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1973).
315. See Robert P Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187,2196-97 (2000).
316. Ginsburg, supra note 140, at 1868 (tracing the beginning of the change to the late-
nineteenth century, personality-based concept of copyright).
317. See id. at 1907-08. Professor Ginsburg makes a compelling case for copyright
protection for works of "low" authorship. See id. Her suggestion that there be differing
copyright regimes for different types of works becomes critical, given the overstated
emphasis on economic rights for even the personality-based works. Seeid.
318. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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in the forms of censorship,3"9 motion picture production ordinances,"'
and blue laws. 21  Every form of entertainment has had some
censorship." The historically significant impact of the entertainment
industry is found not in its struggle to achieve protection from
censorship under the First Amendment, but that the struggle has been
allowed to take place at all.
The First Amendment was drafted as an absolute limit on federal
congressional power. The nineteenth-century political conflict
expanded the limitations on free speech, weakening its absolutist rigor,
but paving the way for broader coverage of the right. The twentieth-
century analysis that has posited the position of the prohibition as
euphemistic was necessitated by a much broader definition of speech
than that intended by the framers of the Constitution. As film, music,
and theatre have moved into the expressive realm, however, the
absolute prohibition has been emasculated, leaving a weakened barrier
to regulation that can be pierced through narrow tailoring and self-
serving findings of necessity. The real effect of entertainment law has
been to broaden First Amendment protection to a much more inclusive
definition of speech, but severely curtail the absolute protection
afforded to political speech.
A. The Negative Constitution
The Constitution was drafted as a series of limitations placed on
the newly formed federal government, containing a balance of power
between the state and federal governments as well as between the
government and the governed. The intent was to shape carefully and
limit the powers of this government over the states and the people. As
Madison explained, "[ilt is of great importance in a republic not only
319. SeegenerallyMichael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom ofExpression
from 1791 to 1917 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263 (1986) (tracking judicial refinement of the First
Amendment); Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor. Freedom of
Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitze Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew,
33 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 741 (1992) (discussing the evolution of censorship law in the U.S.);
Comment, Censorship ofMotion Pictures, 49 YALE L.J. 87 (1939) (same).
320. See Jon Garon, Star Wars: Film Pernittng, PiorRestraint& Government Role
in the EntertainmentIndustry, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1996) (tracking the expansion of
free speech into the production, as vell as dissemination, of film content).
321. Blue laws are statutes or ordinances banning immoral activities on Sunday, which
is reserved as a day of worship. SeeCarolina Amusement Co. v. Martin, 115 S.E.2d 273,276
(S.C. 1960) (upholding Sunday ban on showing of motion pictures); FROMLICK & SCMVARTZ,
supranote 251, at 391 (citing pre-1917 cases concerning blue laws).
322. See Garon, supra note 149, at 500 (citing examples of censorship in various
forms of entertainment).
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to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard
one part of the society against the injustice of the other part,"' The
Constitution itself, through the definition of sedition and the limited
scope of federal authority, had been carefully crafted to satisfy those
objecting to a federal government and to strip it of any power to silence
the press or use the laws of treason to control speech.
24
According to Hamilton, the protections of speech, press, and
petition were not missing from the Constitution because they were not
needed." The Constitution had no need to state those many things that
the federal government could not do, because such a list was infinite.
The Constitution was designed to repudiate the tyranny of England.
The evils suffered by the survivors of the American Revolutionary War
included claims of sedition, illegal searches, quartering of troops, and
taxation without representation. Hamilton makes this point by listing
the bill of rights concepts incorporated into the main text of the
Constitution: limitations on impeachment, the privilege of habeas
corpus, no writs of attainder, no ex post facto laws, no titles of nobility,
the right to jury trial, and the limits on the definition of treason
requiring "the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act." 6
Regarding the constitutional silence on the subject of the press,
Hamilton is explicit. He questions the meaning of the term, a debate
that has continued unabated to this day. In response to those
demanding a protection against press censorship, he asks "[w]hy, for
instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed?"'' 7 Hamilton raised fears that any statement on the press
could be used to expand the federal government's jurisdiction:
323. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 357-58 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
324. See William T. Mayton, Seitious Libel and the Lost Guaratee ofa Freedom of
Expression, 84 CoLuNM. L. RE. 91, 117-18 (1984). Professor Mayton states:
James Iredell in North Carolina explained that "the future Congress will have no
other authority over [the press] than [copyright laws] .... If the Congress should
exercise any other power over the press than this, they will do it without any
warrant from this Constitution, and must answer for it as for any other act of
tyranny." This consensus included those opposed to the Constitution. Richard
Henry Lee, one of the more learned and influential of the Constitution's opponents
was, as he said, bound to "confess I do not see in what cases the congress can, with
any pretense of right, make a law to suppress the freedom of the press."
Id. at 118 (alterations in original) (quoting PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITION OF THE UNITED
STATES 316, 360-61 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968) (1888)).
325. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 534-35 (Alexander Hamilton).
326. Id.
327. Id at 535.
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"[Legislators] might urge ... that the provision against restraining the
liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a right to prescribe
proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the
national government?' 328 Hamilton argued against the entire Bill of
Rights as implying constructive powers into the Constitution.
Hamilton, of course, was defending the Constitution as drafted.
While others, like Madison, were urging a Bill of Rights, the more
minimalist approach was deemed more apt to be ratified. The more
contentious Bill of Rights, therefore, came later, starting with the first
Congress.
The Constitutional Convention included a brief discussion of the
new government's power over the press. A proposal was made that the
Constitution state that "the liberty of the press should be inviolably
observed?' 329 It was defeated with the following explanation: "It is
unnecessary-[t]he power of Congress does not extend to the Press"3 '0
Instead, the Constitution was ratified at the convention with a very
powerful, explicit statement:
Whereas the powers granted under the proposed Constitution are the
gift of the people, and every power not granted thereby remains with
them,... and, among other essential rights, liberty of conscience and of
the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any
authority of the United States.
33
'
This statement reinforced the notions articulated by Hamilton that the
Constitution was limited and that the powers were not to be extended.
That this model lasted for less than three years33 does not change the
correctness of the position at the time. Time, however, marches on.
B. The ManyRights Counted as First
As drafted, the Constitution did not give any positive right to the
federal government to regulate the press. Necessarily, however, once
the Bill of Rights was introduced, the essential negative right was
included, or else those opposed to the Bill of Rights would be proved
328. Id
329. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 617 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
330. Id at 618.
331. SeeMayton, supra note 324, at 119 (alterations in original).
332. Congress was urged to adopt a Bill of Rights by President Washington in his
inaugural address. On Sept. 25, 1789, Congress took up the issue. The first draft,
predominantly written by James Madison, contained twelve amendments, of which most
were substantially rewritten, and articles three through twelve were ratified. In 1791, these
ten Amendments to the Constitution were adopted.
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correct that by negative implication those items left unenumerated
would eventually become powers of the federal government,
notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment, which reserved all rights not
granted to the States.
In drafting the Bill of Rights, Madison concerned himself not
only with the dangers of the government aggregating power, but also
of the majority tyrannizing the minority, who might have their liberty
stripped away by those in power.333 The First Amendment as written
may have only captured a small portion of Madison's concerns.
However, the Senate changed the text, shifting the focus from the
people to the federal government?
The amendment finally adopted contained a number of distinct,
but conjoined clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."335 Each of these clauses is distinct but
interrelated. Because the power to regulate the press or speech had
never been granted to Congress, the First Amendment was drafted as a
negative right, a further reminder of the limitation on the federal
government.36 Religion was included in this same provision, but the
power enumerated was the broader term, "respecting" an
establishment of religion. Like religious exercise, the rights of petition
and assembly were each separate and distinct rights under English law.
Although beyond the scope of this Article, at least one historical
comment is worth noting on the possible relationships among the
clauses. 37 Madison, the primary drafter of the Bill of Rights, explains
333. Akhil ReedAmar, The Bill ofRights asa Constituon, 100YALEL.J. 1131, 1144
(1991). Madison states:
But I confess that I do conceive, that in a Government modified like this of the
United States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the
legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against
that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the
highest prerogative of power. But this is not found in either the executive or the
legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by
the majority against the minority.
Id. at 1148 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454-55 (J. Gales ed., 1789) (1st ed. pagination)
(June 8, 1789)).
334. Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of The FrstAmendmen4 80 Nw. U.L. Rnv
1156,1168 (1986).
335. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
336. See Denbeaux, supra note 334, at 1167 n.39.
337. There remains a commonality in the clauses because each is a communicative
act. Religion is rarely prosecuted. Conducting illegal teaching of doctrine, giving sermons
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his views on the need to regulate the power of government and the
power of the majority:
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority
will be insecure .... In a free government the security for civil rights
must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case
in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of
sects.
338
The juxtaposition was an intentional message. As one First
Amendment historian commented, "The absence of freedom of
speech, especially on religious subjects, in seventeenth-century
Massachusetts is so familiar a fact that a mere reminder should
suffice?' 339 Speech and religion were as linked as speech and politics.
The protections of the First Amendment were all of a kind."0
The structure in Madison's logic and the text are clear. Each of
these rights is distinct, but they are all tied together in the common
desire to allow for the minority to be free of tyranny from the
government and the majority. The amendment, however, was a mere
step in this direction. Madison's original draft did not include the
limitation that "Congress shall" but rather was drafted to encompass
on banned topics, holding prayer meetings, printing banned liturgy, and other communicative
acts are violations of the law for which punishments have been historically meted. Freedom
to conduct one's own religion without the right to free speech might have quickly devolved
into a weakened privacy right so that only rituals in one's home were beyond the power of the
government to reach. A religious organization that failed to invoke the name of the Father,
Son, and the Holy Ghost (or Allah or HaShem), to recite that we are "One nation under God,"
or to state "in God we Trust" prior to each session, could have been found to violate the laws
because it was merely a statute on the language necessary to conduct a sanctioned meeting.
Religious freedom alone might not have been held to stop such intrusion, but alongside
prohibitions on laws abridging speech the obligation to provide constitutional protection
becomes much stronger.
338. THEFEDERALISTNo. 51, at 358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
339. See LEONARD W LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 30 (1960) (discussing
convictions beginning in 1635 for acts including seditious sermons, petitions against civil
authority, improper religious speech, and seditious libel).
340. The Supreme Court continued to be mindful of this juxtaposition:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to
his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know,
at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are,
prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
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absolute rights or ideals.3" Nonetheless, the first step at national
protection was made.
Each of the clauses in the First Amendment is reflective of a
distinct English and colonial tradition during the drafting of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. A brief understanding of the then-
contemporary meaning of each clause (except those of religion) will
help frame the later discussions of the First Amendment."
1. "The Right of the People Peaceably to Assemble and to Petition
the Government for Redress"
The oldest right, listed last, is the ability to petition the government for
redress. 3 It preceded even the Magna Carta as a fundamental
component of English law.' The right to petition was the protection
from prosecution for a properly structured claim for relief. Simply put,
the right was a form of safe harbor, providing protection from a claim
of sedition or libel when the form of the request was correctly
structured." The power to petition the government was adopted by
each of the colonies. 6 It was a fundamental part of participatory
government, allowing groups of people to address common
complaints."
The right needed protection to be fully robust. Various historical
attempts had been made to limit the right by limiting the number of
petitioners, the structure of the petition, and the proper recipients of the
petition."5 Any such law could abrogate the fundamental nature of the
petition while masquerading as a mere technical regulation. The
colonists would brook no such limitations. To the colonists and
Americans ratifying the Bill of Rights, this was a long-held and highly
341. SeeAmar, supm note 333, at 1137.
342. I have excluded a deeper discussion of the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause because subsequent history has tended to separate them from the other
provisions.
343. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
344. Gregory A. Mark, The Vest'gial Consituton: The History and Significance of
the R ight to Petiton, 66 FORDHA L. REv. 2153, 2163 (1998).
345. Seeid at2170-72.
346. Seeid.at2177.
347. See id.
348. For example, Blackstone's Commentafies states:
[No petidon to the king, or either house ofparliamen; foranyalteradon in church
or state, shall be signed by above twenty persons, unless the matter thereof be
approved by three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury, in the
country; and in London by the lord mayor, alderman, and common council: nor
shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at a time.
1 WiLLAtM BLACKSTONE, Coism'mRiEs *143 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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valuable right, inexorably linked with responsive government and fully
formed in structure and substance.
The right to assemble was a similarly explicit, limited right, as
viewed by the members of the Philadelphia debates on the Bill of
Rights. The right to assemble is one of the rights Hamilton would have
identified as already existing in the Constitution, the right to amend or
revoke the document and reform the federal government by will of the
people as necessary. The preamble to the Constitution "implied a right
of 'the People' (acting by majority vote in special conventions) to alter
or abolish their government whenever they deemed proper: what 'the
People' had 'ordain[ed] and establish[ed]' (by majority vote in special
conventions), they or their "posterity" could dis-establish at will (by a
similar mode)."' 9
Today, the meaning of assembly can be construed much more
broadly than that implied by the political definition at the time of the
Constitution. Congregations assemble as a prerequisite for prayer
service; political activists assemble crowds as a means to promote their
messages; audiences assemble to participate in the spectacle of sport
and entertainment. Each of these is an assembly, but not the historical
type of political assembly envisioned in the Constitution or by the
public that ratified and amended it."' The text joined together the right
to assemble and to petition as forms of sharing grievances with the
government. By placing in the Amendment the phrase "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for
redress" certainly reflects a particular understanding of assembly.
Both assembly and petition were rights to seek redress from the
government.
2. "Congress Shall Make No Law... Abridging the Freedom of
Speech, or of the Press"
The clause granting freedom of the press and speech is perhaps the
most contentious clause of the First Amendment. The battle regarding
its meaning begins with the Federalist Papers, continues through
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
and remains at the heart of today's constitutional debate. The debate
stems from the phrase "Congress shall make no law." From the time
349. Amar, supra note 333, at 1153. Professor Amar's view is that the right of the
people to assemble and amend or revise the Constitution is in addition to that provided by
Article V SeeAkhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited" Amending the Constitution Outside
Aicle V, 55 U. CI. L. Ray. 1043, 1044 (1988).
350. Amar, supranote 333, at 1152-57.
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of its drafting, the participants, scholars, and practitioners have debated
over the meaning of the phrase. The dispute will not be resolved here.
The conflict is best framed by Justice Story. He decried the
suggestion that the statement is intended to be absolute as the language
sounds:
That this amendment was intended to secure to every citizen an
absolute right to speak, or write, or print, whatever he might please,
without any responsibility, public or private, therefor, is a supposition
too wild to be indulged by any rational man. This would be to allow
every citizen a right to destroy, at his pleasure, the reputation, the peace,
the property, and even the personal safety of every other citizen. A man
might ... stir up sedition, rebellion, and treason even against the
government itself, in the wantonness of his passions or the corruption of
his heart. Civil society could not go on under such circumstances."'
Story equated the power to "accuse another of the most infamous
crimes" with the printing of treasonous statements."' Story
acknowledged that other commentators do not share his views. He
suggested the alternative view provides that "every individual certainly
has a right to speak, or publish his sentiments on the measures of
government. To do this without restraint, control, or fear of
punishment for so doing, is that which constitutes the genuine freedom
of the press' 35
3
Story looked to Blackstone for historical support that the evil
identified in England was the licensing of newspapers, an evil that was
eliminated when the printer's licensing act expired in 1694." This
351. 3 STORY, supra note 18, § 1874, at 731-32 (footnote omitted).
352. Id
353. Id. § 1880, at738-39.
354. Id § 1876, at 734-35. Story explains:
The art of printing, soon after its introduction, (we are told,) was looked upon, as
well in England, as in other countries, as merely a matter of state, and subject to the
coercion of the crown. It was therefore regulated in England by the king's
proclamations, prohibitions, charters of privilege, and licenses, and finally by the
decrees of the Court of Star Chamber, which limited the number of printers, and of
presses, which each should employ, and prohibited new publications, unless
previously approved by proper licensers. On the demolition of this odious
jurisdiction, in 1641, the long parliament of Charles the First, after their rupture
with that prince, assumed the same powers, which the Star Chamber exercised,
with respect to licensing books; and during the Commonwealth (such is human
frailty, and the love of power, even in republics!) they issued their ordinances for
that purpose, founded principally upon a Star Chamber decree, in 1637. After the
restoration of Charles the Second, a statute on the same subject was passed, copied,
with some few alterations, from the parliamentary ordinances. The act expired in
1679, and was revived and continued for a few years after the revolution of 1688.
Many attempts were made by the government to keep it in force; but it was so
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construction might well support the Blackstone-based approach that
the First Amendment was designed to stop prior or previous restraint,
but weakened the notion of absolute limitations on the government
regarding the press. Both the majority and dissent in Near v
Minesota quote Blackstone for support in fighting the evils of prior
restraint."' The majority quoted: "Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this,
is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his
own temerity."56 The dissent quoted:
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was
formerly done, both before and since the revolution [of 1688], is to
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and
make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion, and government.
357
Story is unquestionably correct that, as part of its purpose, the
clause was intended explicitly to eliminate the government's power to
establish a licensing system. This was an evil well-known and
successfully abolished in England. While this was an evil no one
wished to reinstate in the United States, the phrase selected by the
drafters is much longer than necessary to prohibit only the licensing of
the press. Something more was intended, or at least alluded to. If a
prohibition on licensure was the full extent of the clause, then
Hamilton was correct that the right would not be enhanced by restating
it.
Another issue with Story's approach-the implication that the
mere elimination of licensure precludes previous restraint of an
inciting, libelous work, or a work copyrighted by another party-has
been historically proven false. There are many instances when a story
can be identified before it goes to press and stopped.58 This may not
strongly resisted by parliament, that it expired in 1694, and has never since been
revived.
Id. For a discussion of this act's limitation on copyright, see supra notes 143-145 and
accompanying text.
355. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
356. Id. at 713-14 (quoting 4 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE *151-52).
357. Id. at 733-34 (Butler, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 4 WLLiAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES * 152).
358. E.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F Supp. 990, 993 (WD. wis. 1979)
(seeking temporary and permanent injunctions on the publishing of nuclear bomb secrets).
Near is inapplicable because in that case, the Court prohibited the state from declaring a
particular newspaper a public nuisance. 283 US. at 723-24.
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be done systematically, but the failure to catch every offense does not
mean that the problem has been eliminated. Indeed, if this were the
scope of the protection, numerous articles would now be written on the
legality of using passive Internet surveillance techniques to anticipate
the topics appearing in tomorrow's papers (or the websites updated
five minutes from now). At a minimum, the protection must extend to
prior restraint itself, rather than the licensing scheme that supported it.
The Supreme Court recognized this component of the meaning in
Near when it barred the State of Minnesota from closing a malicious
gossip column as a public nuisance.'59
The prior restraint in Near did not stem from an illegal licensing
system, but rather from such a sufficiently robust record of slanderous
and inciting material that it was found to be a public nuisance."f
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that the law could not allow an
improper goal to be achieved by using a novel legal claim.6 '
The real fear that Story had with an absolutist approach to the
First Amendment is that he equated that reading with a ban on all
regulation of speech. By writing so persuasively to his peers and the
Court that the law was not absolute, Story also framed the scope of the
law as covering statements regarding all speech, including defamatory
speech about one's neighbors.6
Story suggested the wrong set of limitations that should have
been placed on the Freedom of Speech clause of the First Amendment.
His interpretation requires that the limit be on unreasonable limitations
or that the clause extend only to prior restraint. This reading is not
necessary. The freedom of speech and press that could not be abridged
was the right to object to the government, orally and in print. The
Constitution included this as part of the implicit Bill of Rights alluded
to by Hamilton, namely the absolute protection for statements made in
Congress and the definition of treason that required an overt act. Like
the rights to petition and to assemble, speech and press could be
359. SeeNear,283 U.S. at7ll.
360. Id. at 706.
361. See id. at 707. Compare the Court's similar treatment of false light claims and
claims for emotional distress as ways around the constitutional limitations on defamation.
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (parody); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (false light privacy claim).
362. "That this amendment was intended to secure to every citizen an absolute right to
speak ... would be to allow every citizen a right to destroy at his pleasure the reputation, the
peace, the property, and even the personal safety of every other citizen." 3 STORY, supm note
18, § 1874, at 731-32.
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interpreted much more broadly, but this was not the fashion used when
the provisions were drafted and were not expanded intentionally.
Again we return to the convergence of political and religious
speech in the colonies. The primary libel cases were political cases or
political/religious cases wherein the speaker was accused of sedition,
libel, or heresy. These were political prosecutions for speech. The
impact of censorship can be felt as heavily through fines as through
licensure. It does not encourage freedom for the state to hold that it
will refrain from stopping speech but will instead jail the speaker for
distribution of a single copy of a statement. Imagine how much poorer
we would be if Dr. King had been subject to civil or criminal liability if
his vision of a colorblind God could result in heresy charges.363
Similarly, eliminating prior restraint on publishing "unauthorized"
versions of the Bible provides little solace, if the printer finds his
copies confiscated and himself in jail, following the initial distribution
of those same copies. Without more, the elimination of prior restraint
is an illusory protection that may result in an even more pernicious
form of governmental control through the vagaries inherent in
selective protection.
In the most common types of speech cases, those of defamation
and those involving copyright, the actions are between private parties.
The state is necessarily neutral. It has little interest in which of the two
parties originated a book or a map, only that the rights among the
citizens be fairly adjudicated. In most situations, the same is true in
cases concerning slander and libel. In such cases, the freedom of
speech is not implicated because it is outside the absolutely protected
freedoms to criticize the government. If the person was acting in an
official capacity, however, the absolute right would be invoked and no
complaint could lie.
With the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v
Sulvax, the Court has moved us back in that direction." Times v
Sull'van represents the furthest an absolutist approach can go within
the framework of the original First Amendment because it was a civil
action applied to the states and involved a governmental employee
suing on his own behalf. It ably illustrates where the absolutist line
should have been drawn.
363. The seven arrests of Dr. King during the Montgomery protests were deemed
libelous by plaintiffs in N.Y Times v. Sullivan because the advertisement at issue did not state
specifically who arrested Dr. King, but rather disputed the frequency or nature of the arrests.
376 US. 254, 258 (1964).
364. Seeid. at280-81.
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To be absolutely barred from governmental action, the speech
must be of or concerning the government, its officers, or its
administration.36 The advertisement at issue in the case involved the
role of the police in the civil rights protests in Montgomery, Alabama,
and therefore, it involved governmental action."
The case applied the First Amendment to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than through its own language.367
Madison had hoped for a broader statement, but the states were
deemed to have sufficient protections of their own, and the First
Amendment was not viewed as applying to the states when drafted."
The First Amendment did not fully capture the essence of Madison's
analysis until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment after the
Civil War.36  Eventually, however, his more expansive vision was
embodied in the Constitution as interpreted by the courts.
Finally, the case was applied to a civil action rather than a
criminal action.37 The Court recognized the tremendous chilling effect
even a civil action would have on the free press to criticize the
government and chose to limit significantly the instances when an
action could be brought.37' The Court also skipped past the argument
that the law applied only to state actions, not private suits, by pointing
out that the discretion given to the jury included far broader damages
than the state criminal fines would allow.372 Whether the distinction
between a personal claim and a civil claim in one's professional
capacity had been made in 1779 is unclear. The distinction of Times v
Sullivan seems consistent with the fears of interference with the rights
to speak and print.3 3 Thomas Jefferson, sometimes considered a
strong advocate of the natural rights model of free speech, placed the
365. Seeid.at265.
366. Seeid. at260-61.
367. See id. at 265; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. NewYork,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment for the first time).
368. See supraPart IVA.
369. SeeAmar, supranote 333, at 1137.
370. See N Y Times, 376 US. at 265.
371. Seeid.at277.
372. Seeid. at 268-69.
373. The Court opined:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on
their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented
by statute.
Id. at 265.
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proviso as 'private injury.'"' It would seem too easy a subversion to
avoid an absolute protection merely by claiming the injury was
personal rather than professional.
Justice Black's concurrence captures this absolutist approach
directly:
I base my vote to reverse on the belief that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments not merely "delimit" a State's power to award damages to
"public officials against critics of their official conduct" but completely
prohibit a State from exercising such a power .... The requirement that
malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right
critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to
the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment. Unlike the
Court, therefore, I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the
Times and the individual defendants had an absolute, unconditional
constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their
criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials .... [B]riefs
before us show that in Alabama there are now pending eleven libel suits
by local and state officials against the Times seeking $5,600,000, and
five such suits against the Columbia Broadcasting System seeking
$1,700,000. Moreover, this technique for harassing and punishing a
free press-now that it has been shown to be possible-is by no means
limited to cases with racial overtones; it can be used in other fields
where public feelings may make local as well as out-of-state
newspapers easy prey for libel verdict seekers ....
The power of the United States to do that is, in my judgment,
precisely nil. Such was the general view held when the First
Amendment was adopted and ever since."
Although the Court went very far to approximate the absolute
nature of the First Amendment right, it still gave the plaintiff the power
to allege and assert a claim for libel, which can lead to increased
insurance costs for newspapers and some heightened caution in what is
printed. As Justice Black points out, the costs may be incurred through
the filing of multiple suits, nibbling the defendant to a slow death by
ducks-motions, filings, and costly discovery. An absolutist approach
would have barred an official from bringing a claim. 6 Justice Black is
374. Draft Constitution for Vrgiia art. IV (Jue 1776), in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRINS 344 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) ("Printing presses shall be free, except so far as
by commission of private injury cause may be given of private action').
375. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 293,295-96 (Black, J., concurring).
376. The protection of the jury trial was another critical component of the
Constitution's implicit Bill of Rights. To the extent that a civil trial before ajury was required
to find libel, in this case, Hamilton would probably have suggested that the government had
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correct that the founders would have expected a different result.
History, however, has rewritten our past.
C The Tradition of Censorship
The First Amendment had little opportunity to be tested by the
early courts. With the exception of the Sedition Act of 1798... that
never reached the Supreme Court, few attempts were made by
Congress to legislate in this area initially." During this same period,
censorship continued unabated. Neither Blackstone nor Story looked
to the [Theatrical] Licensing Act of 1737 as embodying the same evil
as that of press licensing, neither in degree nor in kind. The freedoms
sought over speech and press simply did not extend to the theatre or
mere entertainment.
In the realm of stage performance, fears of governmental or
public tyranny were not voiced at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution or for many years following it."9 The general attitude was
that theatrical entertainments were an acceptable form of trade like
most others, but perhaps in need of greater local control. As one court
explained, there was
no objection to ... admitting theatrical entertainments to be as
meritorious as other occupations. But it seems to be peculiarly proper
[to license and tax] employments of this kind. They require to be
watched. Towns are put to expense in preserving order, and it is proper
been sufficiently limited and a jury finding for damages should have been sustained.
Madison, however, was quite explicit that the danger was the power of the sovereign and in a
nation "of the People" the sovereign majority must itself be limited. Jefferson, when
advocating the natural right to speak, would have been likely to propound the "private"
remedy for injury narrowly-certainly far from the official capacity that was at issue in New
York Times. Nonetheless, this distinction is not dictated from the history of the First
Amendment because participants themselves were unlikely to have had a common
understanding as to the limits. But see LEVY, supra note 339, at 301-02 (suggesting that
Jefferson, as president, was quick to use the courts to punish his political opponents).
Perhaps the real point behind Jefferson's approach, then, is that the power of the government
will be used, so it must be limited rather than trusted to good will.
377. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 596-97.
378. See LEvy, supra note 339, at 301-02. Claims for seditious libel were brought in
Connecticut common law courts against newspapers in 1804 on behalf of the United States
government for attacks on the government. See id.
379. E.g., Hodges v. Nashville, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 61, 67 (1840) ("The town of
Nashville was incorporated by the act of 1806, ch. 33, in the 2d section of which, among
other things, the power is given to the Corporation to provide for 'licensing, regulating, or
restraining theatrical or other public amusements within the town."); Carey v. Washington, 5
D.C. (5 Cranch) 13 (1836)(No. 2404) (discussing the licensing of theatricals in 1810);
Wallace v. Usher, 7 Ky. (I Bibb) 508 (1817) (reviewing theatrical licensing law of 1811).
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they should be indemnified for inconveniences or injuries occasioned
by employments of this nature."'
I have not found any serious discussion suggesting that theatre
and popular entertainment were worthy of the same type of protection
as the press, assembly, or speech written during the time of the
Revolutionary War or the constitutional debates. That is not to say that
no such sentiments existed or that they were not proposed from time to
time. One suggestion is that theatre was considered quintessentially
English and as such strongly disfavored by the citizens of the newly
formed nation." Another is that the puritanical traditions of the
colonies had embraced the English censorship laws.38 Such laws were
passed by the Continental Congress in 1774, as well as by a number of
individual colonies.383 The political reality was that at the time the First
Amendment was written it did not extend past the soap box to the
professional stage.
The idea that stagecraft was a form of political and religious
speech was not new to the nation. Colonial plays were carefully
screened to protect against heretical content. In The Republic, Plato
recognized the power and potential for evil inherent in staged
performances3  Plato strongly advocated controlling the words
spoken on the stage because of the impact they had on the audience
and the ability of the playwright to stir emotions and sway thoughts. '
He apologized to Homer and the other poets, but recognized that when
done to tell an otherwise morally uplifting, religious story, the
representation of bad characters or improper thoughts could affect the
public, leading them to improper thoughts and deeds. 8
The role of the stage regulators continued, moving increasingly
towards the more puritanical than the political. Perhaps this was
centered in a populist notion that even plays regarding politics should
not be banned, but more likely it was centered on the nature of the
American stage. With no copyright for playwrights and no official
theatre like that of London, America simply was not producing
380. Boston v. Schaffer, 26 Mass. (1 Pick.) 415,419 (1830).
381. SeeCAMBRIDEGUDErToAMEPcAN THATRE 100 (Don B. Wilmeth &Tice L.
Miller eds., 1993).
382. See id
383. Id
384. PLATO, REPUBLIC 71 (Tom Griffith trans., G.R.E Ferrari ed., 2000) (Book III).
385. Id at 76-78.
386. Id at 78 ("No, he said, it would be quite wrong to praise this kind of behaviour.
It's only my high opinion of Homer, I said, which stops me calling it impious to talk like this
...... (quotations omitted)).
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significant playwrights. In New York, the theatre producers, controlled
by the increasingly powerful Theatrical Syndicate from the late 1880s
through the early part of the twentieth century, were reluctant to run
afoul of political dislikes."7 On occasion, when more realistic plays
were offered, the leading cast members would be arrested.388 Such
arrests occurred against Clyde Fitch's Sapho in 1900, Arnold Daly's
Mrs. Warren;k Profession in 1905, and George Scarborough's The Lure
in 1913. Mae West was arrested for her play Sex in the 1920s.39'
In addition to the occasional arrest of an actor to discourage
overly risqu6 or realistic plays, a few specific laws were enacted that
explicitly transcended the prior restraint policies of the First
Amendment. In 1873, the Comstock Laws were enacted to regulate
the dissemination of birth control information.39' By 1927, the Wales
Padlock Act gave authorities the power to close theatres, to arrest
actors, and to ban productions that were thought to be indecent.392
Whatever the First Amendment meant to Madison, Hamilton,
Jefferson, or Story, it did not have sufficient reach to bar the prior
restraint of theatrical presentations.
D. The Mutual Distaste for the Motion Picture
At its inception, the motion picture was seen as an outgrowth of
the theatre. Its New York origins were populated with the stars of the
New York stage. The courts treated the transfer of dramatic rights to
include both stage and film rights.3 Theatres often hung film screens
to show one-reel and two-reel films between the live acts. As the child
387. SeeCAMBRIDGE GUIDETO AmERICAN THEATRE, supra note 381, at 100.
388. Id
389. Id.
390. See id.
391. SeeComstockAct, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598, 598-99 (1873) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1465 (2000)) (barring dissemination of information on birth control);
Message Photo-Play Co. v. Bell, 166 N.YS. 338 (1917) (upholding ban on film entitled
"Birth Control" about the life of Margaret Sanger); see Barry Steinhardt, The
Communications Decency Act: Morally Necessary or Poliftcs as Usual?, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL CommE'. 727, 728 (1996); see generally Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and
Pornography: Do We Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality 46 CASE
NV. RES. L. REV. 449 (1996) (discussing the history and problems with censorship of speech
and pornography).
392. Wales Padlock Act, ch. 690, 1927 N.Y. Law 1731 (repealed 1965) (creating a
misdemeanor to present plays involving "sex degeneracy or sex perversion"); see Jewelle
Gomez, Do We Have a Chance Against the FarRight?, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 195, 197 n.8
(1993).
393. SeeManners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 326 (1920); Harper Bros. v. Kaw, 232 E
609,613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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of the stage, the legal privileges and rights of the new entertainment
were circumscribed by that which had gone before. Because theatre
was subject to censorship and outside First Amendment protection,
motion pictures would be treated no differently.394 Just as dramatic
performance by film had been considered a contractual extension of
stage rights,395 so too were the laws regulating theatrical licensure
extended to the motion picture industry without significant debate or
comment."6
As early as 1897, a nickelodeon 7 film of Fatima, a then-famous
"cooch" dancer, "so offended some members of certain communities
that exhibitors superimposed broad white stripes across the screen to
cover the areas where Fatima displayed her most lascivious wares" 3
The censors' bars were needed despite the rather heavy, embroidered
costume she wore.
Regulation from within the industry continued. In both the
United States and England, producers and exhibitors chose to self-
regulate as a method of controlling the potentially more damaging
censorship of the government. In England, for example, the British
Board of Film Censors was founded in 1912.' " In the United States,
self-censorship began in 1909 with the National Board of Review of
Motion Pictures, a board of laypersons dedicated to preventing
obscenity from being distributed, better organizing the blockades
against the Fatima and the cooch dancers."
The Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America
undertook a series of actions that culminated in 1930 with the
Production Code. The organization's president, Will Hays, became the
czar of American morality as the Hays Office regulated the morality of
production for Hollywood." '
394. See Comment, supra note 319, at 90. This 1939 comment on film censorship
lays much of the blame on English theatrical censorship. Without the theatrical regulations of
England, the "pulpit, press, and play would today be on a footing of equality." Id. at 89
(quoting JoHN L. PALMER, THE CENSORAND THE THEATRES 20 (1913)).
395. SeesupraPart II.D.
396. SeeComment, supra note 319, at 90.
397. A nickelodeon is "[a] makeshift motion picture theater, often a converted store,
which proliferated all over the U.S. during the first decade of the century. Nickelodeons were
so called because they charged a nickel (five cents) for admission" See KATz, supra note 9,
at 859.
398. SeeMAST, supranote 252, at 105.
399. LESIE HALLIWELL, THEFiLMGOER'S COMPANION 125 (7th ed. 1979).
400. See Michael Asimow, Divorce in the Movies: From the Hays Code to Kramer v.
Kramer, 24 LEGAL STUD. E 221,226 n.18 (2000).
401. SeeHALLIWELL, supra note 399, at 306.
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Self-regulation served to blunt but not to eliminate governmental
regulation. As the dominant economic force in entertainment, the
motion picture industry again led the way. As one commentator put it,
"[m]otion pictures were the first significant form of electronic media.
They were also the first [electronic media] to be subject to
censorship.:")2 By 1912, three states and many cities had censorship
laws designed to review the content of film. 3  Unlike the more
difficult task of censoring a play without seeing the entire production,
censoring a film was relatively easy; the film was previewed before the
review board."0 Typically, the board would approve, disapprove, or
demand that certain changes in the form of cuts to the film were made
as a condition of approval.
The impact of the reviews was exacerbated by the differing
standards and tastes among cities and states. The same film might be
approved in New York but ordered changed in Virginia. The national
distributors of films would work to ensure that a film met the least
possible resistance because any violation could result in a significant
disruption of the distribution agreements for the film throughout the
country. One role of private censorship was to anticipate the most
restrictive local or state censorship to protect the distributor from
having a film be subsequently deemed inappropriate.' 5
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to review the situation in
1915. In Mutual Film Corp. v Industial Commission, the Ohio
censorship statute was challenged by a fflmmaker on both interstate
commerce and free speech grounds."6 The Ohio statute represented
the general censorship approach of the era. "Only such films as are in
the judgment and discretion of the board of censors of a moral,
educational or amusing and harmless character shall be passed and
approved by such board: ' The interstate commerce argument was, in
many ways, the more practical of the two arguments. Films were
admittedly shipped in interstate commerce; the exhibitors often owned
or were members of consortia that crossed state lines. Interstate
402. Ronald NV. Adelman, The FirstAmendment and the Metaphor ofFree Tde, 38
ARiz. L. REV. 1125,1142 (1996).
403. SeeComment, supmrnote 319, at 91, 97.
404. E.g., Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n., 236 US. 230,240 (1915), overruledby
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
405. See Comment, supra note 319, at 100-01. Despite this, the author of this
comment suggests that voluntary review is far better than censorship and prior restraint. See
id. at 102.
406. 236 U.S. at 239.
407. Id. at 240.
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commerce was a justiciable issue for the federal courts. ' The Court's
dismissal of the claim, however terse, was at least based on the merits
of the claim and its conclusion that so long as the board only reviewed
films exhibited or displayed in Ohio, there was no concern regarding
the censorship's effect." In light of the tradition of entertainment
censorship, this approach is not remarkable, although it strains to avoid
the realities of film distribution." '
The Mutual'. also argued that its free speech rights were violated
under both the stat&'2 and federal constitutions, with the federal
Constitution applying pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment but the
district court had properly rejected the argument."3 As such, the Court
could easily have sidestepped the issue of the First Amendment,
because it was not properly before the Court. By its own interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was powerless to adjudicate
the state and federal free speech rights at issue in the claim.4 '
At the Supreme Court, The Mutual first made the argument that
the statute interfered with interstate commerce, but this claim was
dismissed because the board's review was limited to films exhibited or
displayed in Ohio."5 More importantly, The Mutual challenged the law
as a form of restraint of free speech, placing before the Court a
question as to whether the law violated the prohibition that "no law
may be passed 'to restrain the liberty of speech or of the press'
408. Seeid.at240.
409. Id. at 240.
410. Cf Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 US. 200,
209 (1922) (holding that exhibitions of baseball are purely state affairs and not subject to
federal antitrust legislation).
411. "The Mutual" was the term commonly used for the company and the case. See
John Wertheimer, Mutual Film Reviewed" The Movies, Censorsht, and Free Speech in
Progressive Amezica, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 158, 159 (1993).
412. The Ohio Constitution also has a strong free speech clause:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press. In all criminal
prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall
appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.
OHiO CONST. art. I, § 11.
413. SeeMut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 215 F 138, 141 (N.D. Ohio 1914), aff9
236 U.S. 230 (1915), overmedbyJoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The
Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to the states in 1925. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 US. 652 (1925).
414. Mut Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 243.
415. Seeid. at239-40.
638 [Vol. 76:559
ENTER TAINMENT LA W
provided in the Ohio Constitution."6 The Court reviewed the issue by
questioning whether films fell within the range of activities included in
"speech, writing or printing" that, the Court conceded, were immune
from the type of censorship in question:
Are moving pictures within the principle, as it is contended they are?
They, indeed, may be mediums of thought, but so are many things. So
is the theatre, the circus, and all other shows and spectacles, and their
performances may be thus brought by the like reasoning under the same
immunity from repression or supervision as the public press,--made
the same agencies of civil liberty.
... We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained
which extends the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the
multitudinous shows which are advertised on the bill-boards of our
cities and towns ... and which seeks to bring motion pictures and other
spectacles into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty
of opinion.
The judicial sense supporting the common sense of the country is
against the contention."7
The unanimous Court upheld the judiciary's common sense,
reaching past the limits of the Constitution to uphold censorship under
both state and federal constitutional law. Although many of the
justices later had a change of heart,4"' the proposition that films could
be subject to prior censorship lasted until 1948, and the Mutual Film
opinion itself was not actually overturned until 1952. ' The law was
quite settled at the time.
The first significance of the Court's handling of The Mutual was
an opportunity to advance the idea that theatre, film, and amusements
were within the scope of the First Amendment.' The second
significance was to promote the use of censorship against motion
416. Id. at 242 (quoting OHio CoNsT., art. I, § 11).
417. Id. at 243-44; see DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN COmaNICATiONS LAW 9 (1991).
418. Wertheimer, supra note 411, at 161. ("Years later, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
was said to have expressed regret for ever having signed his name to the Mutual Film
opinion."). Ironically, the opinion was well founded on legal precedent. Perhaps the best
judicial defense of the case was that Justice Brandeis was not yet on the Court, so it had yet to
find its conscience.
419. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US. 495, 502 (1952); LIVELY, supMnote
417, at 9.
420. See Mn Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 244 (discussing cases upholding regulations of
both theatrical and film censorship and licensing). "It seems not to have occurred to anybody
in the cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the power which
was illustrated. The rights of property were only considered as involved." Id.
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pictures by the state and federal governments."' Within a year of the
decision, new statutes were adopted to ratify and to strengthen the
power to censor granted by the Court."
It may be worth noting this was not a particularly good period for
other aspects of the First Amendment. The Espionage Act was
adopted in 1917 for purposes of protecting the United States from its
enemies during World War L4 The Supreme Court upheld convictions
for publication of treasonous statements."' Justice Holmes wrote that
"[the question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree.' Like the decision in The Mutual, however, the Court paid
little attention to its own limitations, requiring that no more overt an
act than the printing of the document was necessary for criminal
liability 6 The pamphleting became the necessary overt act as similar
"conduct" was criminalized.2 7 Perhaps these cases represent the best
argument for an absolutist approach to political speech, that we must
defend ourselves against human nature in times of stress by erecting
absolute barriers to ensure that which we hold dear is not destroyed in
an effort to protect it.4
Of course, the clear and present danger test has been repudiated.
As the Court has explained, "the constitutional guarantees of free
421. Id at 244-45.
422. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2000) (criminalizing and banning importation of "any
obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy... motion-picture film"); Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356,
§ 1453, 42 Stat. 858, 920, repealed byAct of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, § 651(a)(1), 46 Stat.
590, 762 ("[A]ll photographic-films imported... shall be subject to such censorship as may
be imposed by the Secretary of the Treasury."); Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 268, 41 Stat. 1060,
1060-61 (prohibiting interstate transportation of "any obscene, lewd, or lascivious, or any
filthy" film); Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 380, 38 Stat. 114, 151 (same); Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 321, § 245, 35 Stat. 1088, 1138; see also Comment, supranote 319, at 93-97, 102
(collecting federal, state, and local regulations used to censor or criminalize immoral content
in motion pictures).
423. SeespionageAct, ch. 30, § 3,40 Stat. 217,219(1917).
424. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 US. 47 (1919).
425. Id. at 52.
426. See id. So much for the court of time overturning the Sedition Act.
427. See also Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 468 (1920) (upholding
conspiracy convictions using circulation of pamphlets as overt acts); Abrams v. United States,
250 US. 616, 617 (1919) (same); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585 (1919); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (same); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 US. 204, 205
(1919). This approach was also cited in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), in which
a conviction for membership in the Communist Party was upheld.
428. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendmen; 85
COLuM. L. REv 449, 514 (1985).
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speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action' 29 Much is made of this
new formulation, yet the phrases "clear and present danger" or
"producing imminent lawless action" do not ring as discordantly as the
Court would have us believe. As Justice Douglas pointed out when
concurring in Brandenburg v Ohio, the Court had applied the more
modem test in United States v O'Brien only to convict a protester for
burning a draft card.' 30 The Court upheld that conviction because
"legislation to insure the continuing availability of issued [military
registration and eligibility] certificates serves a legitimate and
substantial purpose in the system's administration.'4 3' But as Douglas
notes, the conviction was not for failing to proffer the defendant's card
when lawffly obligated to do so, it was for the political act of burning
it in protest, an act less overt than most of the Espionage Act
convictions the Court proudly overturned.32
The application of the seemingly benign Brandenburg test
illustrates the problems of balancing applied by the courts. Like the
almost absolute nature of Times v Sulhivan, the almost overt act of the
imminent lawless action test left a wide range of political speech
unprotected by the First Amendment.433
E. The Broadening ofSpeech and the Narrowing ofProtection
During the twenty years following The Mutual, the nature of the
country changed dramatically in terms of its technology, social
economy, and politics. Increasingly, the voice of Justice Brandeis
spoke out for greater personal freedoms in privacy and speech. The
success of winning two wars may have reduced the fear that a
pamphleteer could reverse our way of life. Nonetheless, the threat of
Germany was replaced with a fear of Soviet Russia and Communism.
429. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state
may not punish threatening speech unless the speech is directed to incite imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite such action)
430. See id. at 454-55 (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. O'Brien, 391 US.
367, 382 (1968).
431. Brandenburg, 395 US. at 455 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 377-78).
432. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
433. If the constitutional barriers against governmental oppression only apply in times
of peace when there is little tension or debate, perhaps the barriers are set too low. Cf Blasi,
supra note 428, at 464 (discussing developments that affect the level of tolerance).
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The novelty of silent pictures gave way to the central cultural role that
films had taken in American entertainment and the importance of the
newsreel in sharing the pictures and propaganda of the war effort.
During the 1930s, states like New York were recognizing the
difficulties of The Mutual decision on free speech protections. Some
states began to exempt newsreels or "current events" films from the
censorship laws.4"' The standard for review also began to change. The
Second Circuit ruled in 1934 that the work, taken in its entirety, had to
be judged violative of the statute to have a license denied.3' This
standard, of course, seems more familiar to Roth v UnitedState4 36 and
its reformulation in the Aiilertest,43' but the origins of requiring that a
work be treated as a whole began much earlier. In 1931, the Court
declared that, at least regarding prior restraint, a near absolutist
approach was appropriate to protect the press.
43
Still, despite these improvements, the state regulation of film
continued. Not until 1948 did the Supreme Court finally acknowledge
that films were entitled to some measure of First Amendment
protection, and even that protection was far less than the level
suggested by Near v Minnesot "9 The Mutual was never mentioned
by the Court in the opinion.
The Court, however, was forced to deal squarely with the
repudiation of film censorship in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v W7son."
Interestingly from a First Amendment perspective, the film The
Miracle had been banned as sacrilegious." For the first time, the
Court admitted it could not create separate standards based on whether
a work was merely entertainment.'4 "The line between the informing
434. See Comment, supa note 319, at 93.
435. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 E2d 705 (2d Cir.
1934); seeComment, supra note 319, at 93 & n.39.
436. 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957); see alsoA Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413,418 (1966) (applying the Roth test).
437. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973) ("A state offense must also be limited
to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value?')
438. SeeNearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,716 (1931).
439. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) ("We
have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press
whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.') Despite this sweeping language, the
Court was merely reviewing the ability to apply antitrust laws to the studios, divesting the
film companies of their ownership in the theaters throughout the country. The Court saw no
First Amendment issues that stripped the filmmakers of their exhibitor ownership.
440. 343 U.S. 495,498 (1952).
441. Seeid
442. See id at 501. As the Court explained:
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and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right
[a free press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's
doctrine?
The Court also addressed the danger of pernicious immorality
that the Mutual Court identified could come from baseless
entertainments such as film.' Admitting that film had the capacity to
promote immoral conduct through propaganda and persuasion, the
Court nonetheless rejected the threat of evil as sufficient to allow for
censorship."' Instead, the Bustyn Court anticipated another of the
Miller test prongs by stating that the "capacity for evil ... may be
relevant in determining the permissible scope of community
control: " 6
The tendency is to herald the Buistyn decision as a tremendous
step in granting broad First Amendment protection to all forms of
speech. But, because the Paramount Court had admitted that
distinctions based on the film medium were already gone, Burstyn was
attempting to do something else. The concurrence by Justice Reed
points out that the opinion, though laudatory of film and recognizing
its speech role, failed to ban the practice of censorship or licensing."
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the
communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety
of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression.
Id
443. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948)).
444. The Court explained:
[Films] may be used for evil, and against that possibility the statute was enacted.
Their power of amusement and, it may be, education, the audiences they assemble,
not of women alone nor of men alone, but together, not of adults only, but of
children, make them the more insidious in corruption by a pretense of worthy
purpose or if they should degenerate from worthy purpose. Indeed, we may go
beyond that possibility. They take their attraction from the general interest, eager
and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a prurient interest may be excited
and appealed to. Besides, there are some things which should not have pictorial
representation in public places and to all audiences.
Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230,242 (1915), overruledbyJoseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
445. Joseph Burstyn, 343 US. at 502.
446. Id
447. Justice Reed states:
Assuming that a state may establish a system for the licensing of motion
pictures, an issue not foreclosed by the Court's opinion, our duty requires us to
examine the facts of the refusal of a license in each case to determine whether the
principles of the First Amendment have been honored. This film does not seem to
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Had Justice Story been correct about the meaning of the First
Amendment, then the primary purpose of the Burstyz decision should
have been to eliminate the licensing practices for film just as they had
been banned in 1694 for the English press. The failure of the Court to
take this seemingly modest additional step results in detailed
discussions about the meaning of the word "sacrilegious" (even though
the other provisions of the First Amendment should clearly have
eliminated any right of a government official to regulate such public
statements) as well as a continuous stream of litigation regarding the
scope of the censor's powers.
Ironically, then, of the two cases on film and the First
Amendment, the Buistyn decision was far weaker than The Mutual,
despite the outcomes of the two cases. Burstyn and the cases which
have followed continued to struggle with the central meaning of the
First Amendment in large part because it no longer had a central
meaning. Hamilton's comments regarding speech and press may
indeed have been proven right:
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which
would not leave the utmost latitude of evasion? I hold it to be
impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine
declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must
altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the
people and of the government."
New York was again before the Supreme Court seven years later.
This time the claim was the immorality of Lady Chatterly. Lover 9
Finding three isolated scenes in the film immoral, the licensing board
refused to issue a license until the scenes in question were deleted."'
Again, the Supreme Court reversed.45'
Without dwelling on the Court's admonition that works be taken
as a whole, the decision of the Court again diluted the First
Amendment protection, not only for films but for all forms of speech.
The Court refused to address the meaningful issues of the case:
me to be of a character that the First Amendment permits a state to exclude from
public view.
Id. at 506-07 (Reed, J., concurring).
448. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
449. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ., 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959).
450. Seeid.
451. Seeidat690.
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Specifically, there is no occasion to consider the appellant's contention
that the State is entirely without power to require films of any kind to be
licensed prior to their exhibition. Nor need we here determine whether,
despite problems peculiar to motion pictures, the controls which a State
may impose upon this medium of expression are precisely coextensive
with those allowable for newspapers, books, or individual speech. It is
enough for the present case to reaffirm that motion pictures are within
the First and Fourteenth Amendments' basic protection.4 52
Rather than clarifying the role of the First Amendment or
supporting it, the Court continued to encourage New York and other
jurisdictions to exert some police powers over films and other forms of
speech. Even as the Court has expanded the type of speech covered by
the First Amendment,453 it has softened the fundamental principles at
the heart of the First Amendment.
4
This is not to suggest that the Court has made all the decisions
incorrectly. Instead, the problem is the ambiguity that the expansion of
speech has created for the courts, legislatures, and the public. For a
good example, look to the rock musical Hair Hair, a strongly political
satire of the Vietnam era, was very explicit and politically charged.
Not surprisingly, it sometimes faced opposition in finding theatrical
venues for its touring productions. Having been denied a permit to use
the Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium in Tennessee, the production
company sued and lost in federal district court.55 Because the
production included nudity and simulated sex, the lower court
determined it would violate city ordinances and state law. '56 "'his
criminal conduct, the court reasoned, was neither speech nor symbolic
speech, and was to be viewed separately from the musical's speech
elements. Being pure conduct, comparable to rape or murder, it was
not entitled to First Amendment protection 57
With an irony lost on the Court (if not to the producers of the
play), the Court quoted Burstyn for a strong statement of First
Amendment protection: "The basic principles of freedom of speech
452. Id. at 689-90 (footnotes omitted).
453. By the time of Kingsley, the Court had already decided Roth. The Court added
commercial speech in 1976. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
454. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968)
(invalidating the licensing scheme as a form of prior restraint but refusing to extend Near v
Minnesota to film).
455. Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 341 F Supp. 465 (E.D. Tenn. 1972),
aff, 486 E2d 894 (6th Cir. 1973), rev, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
456. Id. at476.
457. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,551-52 (1975).
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and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary.
Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this
Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification
in this case for making an exception to that rule"'"55 The Court points
to the procedural safeguards to assuage its guilt that it has allowed
censors a free hand, one that only gets lightly slapped after the fact.
The Court implemented its three-pronged test for a prior restraint
to remain enforceable:
Firs4 the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any
restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified
brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo.
Thir, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured.459
While each of these three elements is necessary for prior restraint, a
better test would be whether the presentation of the material would
result in an overt act sufficient to commit a crime (such as treason)
unrelated to the speech. Perhaps such a test could ban the publication
of troop locations on the eve of a military strike while leaving the
government out of most prior licensing.
The only imminent threat suggested by the cases is that of
information so sensitive that no postpublication remedy can put the
genie back into the bottle." For virtually everything else, the civil and
criminal system are more than sufficient to chill the extreme speech at
the margins. Unfortunately, one of the side effects of protection for the
entertainment industry has been to foreclose the opportunity of the
Court to return to any of the absolutist notions of the First
Amendment. Even the absolute protection from prior restraint for the
press that predated the American Revolution today seems beyond
America's regulatory grasp.
Freedom from prior restraint of political speech, however defined,
is similarly precluded. Even if society could make the distinctions that
458. Id at 558 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,503 (1952)).
459. Id at 560; seeFreedmanv. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,58 (1965).
460. Assuming that truly obscene and violent images are psychologically
traumatizing, even a single inappropriate showing can harm a child (or adult) if it is
sufficiently horrific. While this is probably true, I think the balancing of harms is misplaced.
To protect against this theoretical harm, we allow for a system of prior review and policing
for certain published materials, typically pornographic films. Yet there seems no evidence
that the damage to the public is noticeably different in those jurisdictions that have opted not
to install licensing boards over those that have continued to support a licensing regime.
Given decades to test the effectiveness of licensing, perhaps it is time to declare that even the
most modest costs in time and money caused by the remaining licensing schemes are burdens
that can no longer be justified against such a broad, ill-defined evil.
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some film censors had made in the thirties to treat contemporaneous
news (like newsreels) as a form of press rather than entertainment, the
blurred line between documentary and recreation would make any
such effort fail."' Only if we could impose a First Amendment regime
that allowed for no prior restraint and no criminal or civil liability for
statements made about the government, including public officials,
could we approach such a model. While this might still be less than
what Madison had in mind, it remains an improvement over Times v
Sullivan and the cases refusing to bar prior restraint of motion pictures.
E Entert iment FimstAmendment-TheRatings Game
One legacy of Burstyn has been to overturn the Theatrical
Licensing Act of 1737 as it has been transformed in the United States
for regulation of the stage."' Another is to broaden the concept of free
speech to virtually all media. For free speech advocates, this
secondary effect should be heralded as a fundamental success for the
entertainment industry.
The acceptance of the entertainment industry into the realm of
the First Amendment, however, has come at a considerable price.
Primarily, the price has been paid by the public in terms of the
entertainment products available. 3  To blunt the growth of
government-sponsored censorship, the motion picture industry
organized itself very early to provide censorship of its own. This
collaboration was, and remains, an excellent opportunity for an
industry that often strays into the illegal realm of antitrust violations to
collaborate with the encouragement of Congress. Put another way, the
offer of self-regulation by the film companies has resulted in very
461. Examples of such films include A/i Boys Don't Cry The Perfect Storm; and The
Insider, as well as more historical films, including Schindler. List Roots, and Amistad
462. This protection does not extend to all stage performances, however, and the Court
continues to allow for regulations requiring pasties and G-strings for nude dancing because
the G-string evidently provides a prophylactic barrier to the secondary effects of erotic
entertainment in local communities. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292-93
(2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1991). Perhaps this was the
imminent lawless action conceived of by the Court in Brandenburg.
463. As this is a law review article, I am avoiding any sociological discussion as to the
reasons the United States seems to encourage an almost unlimited amount of violent content
in its unregulated literature while remaining rather puritanical (if not prudish) regarding
nudity. While I suggest in this Part of the Article that some of this is the direct result of the
so-called voluntary ratings system, such an analysis obviously misses the social and political
forces that shaped the ratings themselves, and as such it would be naive and unfair to lay the
blame on the Hays Commission or the Motion Picture Associating of American (MIAA).
Instead, I merely suggest that the ratings system exaggerated the concerns of certain vocal
minorities, allowing for the standards to be set in a nonrepresentative fashion.
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standardized offerings and significant concerted activities. Congress
and the public has apparently accepted this bargain without really
assessing its consequences.
1. The EarlyYears
From the inception of the film era, concerns were raised
regarding the licentious, immoral tone films sometimes took. It was
the exhibitors that censored Fatima in 1897 by covering her fully
clothed chest and groin with censorship stripes.'4  Early censorship
was available through the theatre's licensing board, which regulated the
stage performances and required licenses to operate. As such, the
theatres and exhibitors took steps to ensure that they were not closed
by paying close attention to the citizens' groups that objected to
particular films.
Early film censorship was highly fragmented. Without a central
organizing body, the exhibitors, the distribution exchanges, and the
film producers were at odds with each other. Silent films were often
shown as acts in variety entertainments, so the local theatrical licensing
board had jurisdiction to throw a movie out or to ban it from being
shown.
Internally, the move to control the content of the films was a
smaller component of the attempts to control the industry. In 1908,
Thomas Edison joined with the two other companies he had been
fighting in court over motion picture patents, the American Mutoscope
and Biograph Company. '65 They formed the Motion Picture Patents
Company, entered into an exclusive license with Eastman to control all
film stock, and set out to monopolize all motion picture production in
the United States.4" The Patents Company, or "the Trust" as it was
known, sought to control all film production, charging licensing fees
for the uses of the cameras and projectors patented by members of the
Trust.4 7 To bolster the value of their movies (which were not as
successful in the marketplace as their competition from Universal or
The Mutual), the Trust gave a seal of approval for its films. Edison's
pictures were of wholesome entertainment.
The Trust was not the only group trying to censor the content of
motion pictures. Often, citizen panels were formed by the clergy in
464. See MAST, supm note 252, at 105.
465. SeeNEAL GABLER, ANEMPiREOFTHEIROWN 58 (1988).
466. Id at 57-58; seeMotion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 506-07 (1917).
467. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 507-08.
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communities motivated by hedonistic movies that were produced by
heathens in Hollywood. The founder of Universal, Carl Laemmle, and
many of the filmmakers fighting the trust in Hollywood, were first- or
second-generation Jewish immigrants. In addition to Laemmle, these
producers included Louis Mayer, Samuel Goldwyn, Adolph Zucker,
Jack Warner, William Fox, Harry Cohn, and many others."' The result
was that the non-Trust films tended to come from Jewish producers,
with a few films from Irish and Catholic producers as well."9 The
Trust used this as part of its campaign against the competition.
"Behind the censorship drives of some of these organizations lay a
thinly veiled antisemitism ... 7 This was not a secondary effect of
the drive to promote film censorship. Movies being made by new
immigrants, particularly Jews, were inherently suspect. The anti-
Semitism was not thinly veiled.
Nonetheless, the effect of the censorship was sporadic and
random. When the Supreme Court ruled against the Trust in 1917,
finding that it was an illegal monopoly using its patent to promote its
motion pictures illegally, the first phase in organized motion picture
self-censorship came to an end.471
The end of the Trust's censorship did not end the public demand
for control over this rapidly growing industry. The demise of the Trust
left a vacuum to be filled. Further, problems related to drug abuse by
actors, the divorce and quick remarriage of Mary Pickford, and the
notorious trial of Fatty Arbuckle for the death of a young woman at a
party led to increased demands that something be done about
Hollywood. 72
2. The Hays Office and the Production Code
Taking their cue from the baseball scandal involving the Chicago
White Sox, the film producers decided that the best antidote for their
Jewish, immoral product was a commissioner of film who was beyond
reproach. The choice was Will Hays, former postmaster general of the
United States.73 Hays had most recently served as President Harding's
468. SeeGABLER, supr note 465, at 2-3.
469. Seeid.at 59.
470. See MAST, supr note 252, at 105.
471. Moton Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 510.
472. See MAST, supa note 252, at 106. Arbuckle was finally acquitted after three
trials, but never successfully returned to acting because of threats of boycotts of his films.
See id.
473. Seeid. at 107.
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campaign manager.474 As a Republican and a Presbyterian elder, he
represented the perfect image for the Jewish film industry." Hays was
elected president of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of
America."6 The members were the major studios, Columbia (now
Sony), Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Paramount, RKO (now also owned by
Paramount's parent company Viacom), Twentieth Century-Fox, United
Artists, Universal, and Warner Bros.7 With the addition of Disney
and the merger of United Artists into Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the list
has remained essentially unchanged."'
The Hays Office, as the organization was generally known,
undertook to clean up the image of the film industry. Initially, this was
a rather ad hoe process of reviewing movies and clearing them for
distribution, with a healthy dose of public relations thrown in at every
step. By 1927, however, the Hays Office began to formalize its
practices. In 1927, the Hays Office promulgated the Production Code,
an official document outlining the principles of film production for
approved films in the United States. 9
The timing could not have been worse. The Production Code and
the formal process for "voluntarily" regulating filmmaking was
approved in 1930, just as the Depression began to eat away at audience
attendance.8 ' The producers responded to the social conflict and
falling attendance with "films of questionable decency.'" In addition,
talking pictures increased the costs of production, and social groups
were demanding more wholesome entertainment.
A particularly powerful lobbying group, the Legion of Decency, a
Catholic organization, began a drive to create a boycott of films they
did not deem appropriate. 8' The message of religious tolerance among
minority religions that Madison had hoped for seemed lost. "It is only
because they [the Hollywood Jews] are outside the moral sphere of
American culture that they blunder so badly that they require periodic
campaigns such as that of the Legion of Decency [a Catholic reform
group] to set them right. 3 The Hays Office responded by creating
474. Id
475. Id
476. Id
477. Comment, supra note 319, at 103 n.95.
478. See MOTION PICTURE ASS'N OF AM., available at http://wwv.mpaa.org/aboutf
content.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2001).
479. SeeMAST, supa note 252, at 107-08, 134.
480. See Comment, supm note 319, at 104.
481. Id
482. Id
483. GABLER, supra note 465, at 2 (alterations in original).
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"Class C" films, films forbidden to be viewed by Catholics by the
Legion of Decency or Catholic leaders. Because the goal of the Hays
Office was to ensure that the Catholic boycott did not hurt production
or the image of the filmmakers, the creation of the Class C
classification meant that no member studio could produce or distribute
such a film.A Only foreign imports were banned through the work of
the Legion of Decency because the Production Code effectively
eliminated any production of films that might even come close to
resulting in the Legion's objections.
One particular example illustrates the impact of the Production
Code's impact on the quality and nature of film production in the
United States during the 1930s. In 1936, George Bernard Shaw's St.
Joan was under development as an American motion picture.48' The
history of Joan of Arc had previously been the subject of a substantial,
detailed, and historical retelling by America's own Mark Twain,
released to mixed reviews and tremendous sales. Nonetheless, despite
eleven years on stage and millions of copies of a book on the subject in
circulation, Shaw's St. Joan was deemed a violation of the Production
Code because of certain, anti-Catholic sentiments."
It may be asked how a Catholic censorship can possibly hurt me, as
Saint Joan was hailed by all instructed Catholics as a very unexpected
first installment of justice to the Church from Protestant quarters ....
As I thought that the Hays Organization represented unsectarian
American decency, I never dreamt that Saint Joan had anything to fear
from it. Conceive my amazement when I found that the censorship of
the Hays Organization includes that of a body called the Catholic
Action, professing, on what authority I know not, to be a Roman
Catholic doctrinal censorship. 7
Shaw then explains some of the particular changes demanded of
the play:
In the play it is necessarily explained that the Church must not take life.
It could excommunicate Joan and hand her over to the secular arm, but
it could not under any circumstances kill her. The Catholic Action is
unaware of the existence of any such scruple. It prescribes the
484. See Comment, supra note 319, at 104.
485. See George Bernard Shaw, Saint Joan Banned, Film Censorship in the United
States, London Mercury XXXVI, Oct. 1936, reprinted in SHAwV ON THEATRE 244 (E.J. West
ed., 1958).
486. See id.
487. Id.
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following correction. The Bishop must not say "the Church cannot take
life?' He must say "The Church does not wish death?' 
48
Shaw's letter also describes a number of similar line changes that
presumably turn the play into a less objectionable piece of literature."'
The purpose of this example is not to vilify the Catholic Action, the
Jewish producers, or even the Production Code. The example serves
to illustrate graphically the problems of the Production Code and the
alleged benefits of voluntary censorship. Choices were made on a
line-by-line analysis of each script produced and each film completed.
The single person in charge of the Production Code essentially dictated
the morality and sensibility of the entire nation.
The Hays Office established a comprehensive process of prior
review of source material to ensure that plays and novels were
acceptable before they were purchased as the subjects for future films.
The Production Code banned scenes, such as a man and women
sharing a bed (even if married); topics such as promiscuity, brutality, or
pleasant depictions of immorality; and words ranging from "God" and
"sex" to "guts,' "nuts,' "nerts" and "louse."9" Hays Office members
were fined as much as $25,000 for violating the Code. These exacting
rules and fines applied to every major studio and distributor in the
United States. With detailed constraints and complete participation,
there is no doubt that the films produced were more highly scrutinized
than any governmental regulation could have created.
The pernicious danger of the Production Code was the illusion of
free speech it created. So long as all the members of the cartel abided
by the Production Code, no threat existed that a competitor would
produce films that could prove popular because they were outside the
Production Code. Neither erotic films nor politically challenging
projects could be contemplated. Indeed, the Production Code had
written in its opening paragraph that "theatrical motion pictures ... are
primarily to be regarded as Entetainment"'
488. Idat245.
489. Id at 245-46. Shaw, for example, was told to remove the scene in which Joan
was threatened with the rack at her heresy trial "not because it is not true, but because it is
'essentially damaging."' Id. at 246.
490. SeeMAST, supm note 252, at 226.
491. Comment, supa note 319, at 104. A summary of the essential Production Code
principles provided the following:
I. No picture shall be produced which will lower the moral standards of those
who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience should never be thrown to the side
of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin.
2. Correct standards of life, subject only to the requirements of drama and
entertainment, shall be presented.
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The greatest problem of the Production Code was its success.
Although it has been significantly modified in response to the
concerns that only Will Hays and a few deputies dictated the tastes and
morality for the entire company, the reality is that the current Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) has not significantly
modified the effects of this system to this day.
According to the MPAA website, this tradition remains solid. As
the MPAA proudly announces on its website:
[F]ounded in 1922 as the trade association of the American film
industry, the MPAA has broadened its mandate over the years to reflect
the diversity of an expanding industry. The initial task assigned to the
association was to stem the waves of criticism of American movies,
then silent, while sometimes rambunctious and rowdy, and to restore a
more favorable public image for the motion picture business.492
The success of the Production Code existed before the films were
granted protection by free speech. It was designed as a fence around a
fence, crafted to ensure that Hollywood films were not censored by the
governmental review boards out of fear of the negative press that
would ensue and of the difficulties a finding of immorality would have
on the already negotiated distribution agreements. As such, it resulted
in far greater censorship than would have been required by the
government, probably more stringent than would have been tolerated
by the public of its elected officials. But as a voluntary activity, it was
not in the interest of the filmmakers, distributors, exhibitors, or
government officials to complain.
Had the motion picture not engaged in such a fevered battle to
protect its public image from legitimate criticism, the Hays Office
would never have been needed. Whether the decision to join the Hays
Office was the correct decision is impossible to tell. Eighty years later,
it is unfair to second-guess the decision that allowed the senior heads
of the Hollywood production establishment to hand over the button for
the green light to a political fundraiser and former postmaster general.
Perhaps without the First Amendment as a safeguard, there was
legitimate concern that the studios themselves could be shuttered or
the presidents of the studios jailed and fined personally for the films
distributed by their companies that various cities or states deemed
3. Law, natural or human, shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created
for its violation.
Id
492. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF A MRICA, available at http://www.mpaa.org/
aboutlcontent/htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2001).
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indecent. Perhaps the overwhelming wave of anti-Semitism that swept
America prior to its entry into World War II threatened the very
existence of Jewish Hollywood 349 1 Or perhaps the wisdom of a motion
picture trust was not lost on the current generation of studio heads, so
they used the Production Code and the Hays Office as a sanctioned
method of maintaining the cartel-like operations of the studio
system.
494
Whatever the motivation, the decisions were repeated. In the late
1940s, the threat of Communism was rapidly cooling the relations the
United States had with the Soviet Union. Allies no more, Communism
was now viewed as a significant threat to the United States.Y When
the Hollywood Communists 6 (many of them from the next wave of
Jewish immigration) became the focus of public pressure and
governmental concern, the members of the Hays Office successor, the
MPAA, again chose to cooperate with the legal and voluntary
censorship systems despite the ultimate cost such collaboration would
have.
497
To protect the reputation of Hollywood, admitted Communists
were no longer allowed to work; political speech resulted in a lifetime
bar to employment. Hollywood and the studios that actively
collaborated with the House Un-American Activities Committee bear
much of the blame for their participation and capitulation. But so do
the courts. Again the legacy of limited First Amendment protection
came to haunt the nation. Only through an absolute First Amendment
493. See GABLER, supmrnote 465, at 277-328.
494. Id at 47-50.
495. See Blasi, supm note 428, at 464-65.
496. See GABLER, supra note 465, at 356 ("With its commingling of Communists and
Jews, Hollywood was obviously an ideal quarry....").
497. See Erica Bose, Comment, Three Brave Men: An Examination of Three
Attorneys Who Represented the Hollywood Nineteen in the House Un-American Actiities
Committee Hearings in 1947and the Consequences They Facea 6 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 321,
324 (1999). Bose reports:
The [House Un-American Activities Committee] hearings began on Oct. 13,
1947, with the friendly witnesses. During these first five days such individuals as
producers Jack L. Warner and Louis B. Mayer, and novelist Ayn Rand testified
against the evils of communism and those individuals in Hollywood trying to insert
subversive communist ideas into motion pictures.
Id; see also Paul R. Joseph, Pleasantville: An Essay on Law, Power, and Transcendence in
Our CultualMythologicalPas4 24 NOvA L. REv. 621,635-38 (2000) (discussing the politics
of Pleasantville and its represented era as the community versus the other); David Lempert,
The "Jewish Question" in Russia and the Rearting of History, 22 LEGAL STUD. E 457, 465
(1998) (looking at twentieth-century historical events in Russia through the eyes of the Jewish
people).
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protection of political speech could the activities of Congress have
been stopped without the witch-hunts and show trials.
For the public, two important imprints were left by the Hays
Office legacy. The first deals with voluntary censorship. The notion
that voluntary censorship is a benign, unintrusive model designed to
promote positive values without sacrificing free expression or
democratic values has been sold to us since 1922. In addition to
motion pictures, the media has added voluntary ratings to television,
music, and video games, often at the urging of Congress. Despite the
illustrative experience of many works like Shaw's St Joan, unpopular
works (with the censors) continue to be banned and blocked.
The illusion of a permissive, voluntary system is further strained
by the discordant statements of the MPAA and the exhibitors. Jack
Valenti, current MPAA president, explains the voluntary nature of the
rating system this way: "If parents don't care, or if they are languid in
guiding their children's moviegoing, the rating system becomes
useless. Indeed, if you are 18 or over, or if you have no children, the
rating system has no meaning for you. Ratings are meant for parents,
no one else."9 Following this explanation, it would appear any person
can attend any movie, subject only to parental control and personal
taste. Only the system does not quite work this way.
Following the massacre of high school students in Littleton,
Colorado in 1999, President Clinton pressured the National
Association of Theater Owners to enforce the so-called voluntary
movie-ratings restrictions by requiring photographic identification.4
Under the policy now enforced by the vast majority of theater
exhibitors, Valenti's statement becomes a false promise. Parents who
wish to encourage their teenage children to attend appropriate but
mature films must accompany them to the theater. While still
technically voluntary, the system urged by the President seems much
like the governmental ban on alcohol and tobacco from which it is
modeled.
The second legacy of the Hays Office was to weaken the impact
of state-sponsored censorship. The fence within the fence of the Hays
Office effectively marginalized the state and local film boards. Their
threat kept the Hays Office humming, but only so no film board could
have an opportunity to complain about the content of a Hollywood
498. Jack Valenti, How ItAll Began, available athttp://www.mpaa.orgmovieratings/
about/content3.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
499. Jesse Hamlin, Theaters to Check Ds for R 'Films: Voluntary Effort to Limit
Violence Seen byKids, S.E CHRON., June 9, 1999, at A1.
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film. The effect was to desensitize the public and the courts to the real
censorship taking place. Perhaps if the Supreme Court had hundreds
of petitions to grant certiorari in cases like St. Joan, it would have
realized that allowing a system of prior restraint for motion pictures
was fundamentally inconsistent with First Amendment principles of
the eighteenth or nineteenth century.
Because a film takes weeks or months to be produced and edited,
the risk of it resulting in an overt act that could meet even the
"imminent lawless action" test seems absurd. Given the minimal risk
that a motion picture could ever be dangerous, as opposed to immoral
or obscene, the need to protect the public with prior restraint was far
less than that in evidence in Near v Minnesota in which the paper was
tried for its past activities. Nonetheless, the few obscure cases that
went to the obscenity review boards or to the courts gave little
suggestion that a large-scale regime had developed to interfere with the
production of films at every stage of their development.
V THE MEDIA AND TBE MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT
Despite the rampant censorship of the Hays Office, the
participation by the studio executives in the House Un-American
Activities Committee hearings, and the First Amendment protection
now available under Burstyn, the Production Code survived. Finally,
in 1968, the MPAA eliminated the Production Code by replacing it
with the modem Code and Rating Administration (CARA)."'
The rating system eliminated the formal code, replacing it with a
review board that designates the age appropriateness of each film or
advertising trailer by providing a letter code for each audience group." '
500. See MAST, supa note 252, at 430.
501. VOLUNTARY MovIE RATING SYSTEM, available at http://vww.mpaa.org/
movieratings/content.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001). The current rating guidelines are as
follows:
Voluntary Movie Rating System
G General Audiences All ages admitted
PG Parental Guidance Some material may not be suitable for
Suggested children
PG-13 Parents Strongly Some material may be inappropriate for
Cautioned children under 13.
R Restricted Under 17 requires accompanying parent or
adult guardian.
NC-17 No One 17 and Under
Admitted
The X rating was changed to the trademarked NC- 17 rating in 1990, along with the addition
of the PG-13 rating. The PG-13 change was designed to clarify the difference between teen
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Despite the advisory nature of the ratings, the standards were generally
the same as the Production Code, with an emphasis on minimizing
brutality, respecting religion, and upholding the dignity of human
life.] The new ratings were so popular that jurisdictions tried to
incorporate them directly into local law. 3
Also, like its predecessor, CARA has the de facto effect of
comprehensive censorship. No television advertisements can take
place for a motion picture that is not rated by the MPAA, and many
newspaper chains refuse to carry the print advertisements. Because
everything is "voluntary" and the advertising outlets (primarily
television and newspapers) have their own First Amendment rights
regarding the advertisements they choose to run, little can be done to
provide alternatives to the rating system. The system is further
reinforced because most film productions are distributed by members
of the MPAA, and those companies generally require a rating of the
film as part of the filmmaker's delivery requirements. 5" In other
words, an independent filmmaker can get her movie financed by a
distributor but only by agreeing to deliver a film of the appropriate
rating, typically PG-13 or R. The fflm must be edited until the
standard is met or the filmmaker can neither get paid nor get the film
distributed.5 Structured in this fashion, the movie industry cannot
readily move away from the MPAA rating guidelines.
A. The Current Technologies: Cable, Wireless, andBeyond
Nor is there any movement to leave voluntary ratings. Instead,
the television industry has adopted the model as its own."6 Like the
MPAA, the television industry has implemented a standardized set of
ratings, adopted a ratings board to review and to designate programs,
and preteen movies. The NC-17 designation was designed to give the MPAA control over the
adult film category. The X rating had been ceded in the marketplace to the pornography
industry.
502. See Shoshana D. Samole, Rock & Roll Control. Censoring Music Lyrics in the
'90, 13 U. MmIAn ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 175, 186 n.77 (1995) (quoting EDWARD DEGRAZA
& ROGER K. NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS: MOVIES, CENSORS, & THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 120
(1982)).
503. See Motion Picture Ass'n v. Specter, 315 E Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(finding a law that criminalized the misuse of the MPAA ratings unconstitutionally vague);
see Samole, supra note 502, at 186.
504. See JoHN W. CONES, THE FEATURE FILm DismmutoN DEAL 88 (1997).
505. Id
506. See THE TV PARENTAL GUIDELINES, available at http://www.tvguidelines.org/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
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and voluntarily set standards for uniform compliance. 7 Also like the
MPAA ratings, the television ratings replace a much sterner
Production Code that each of the networks used to review the script of
every episode being produced to assure it met the appropriate
standards of morality, decency, and language.
The modem television ratings approximate those of the motion
picture during the days of the Hays Office for another important
reason as well. One consequence of the slow development of the First
Amendment in the entertainment arena is the continuing range of
content regulation in broadcast media such as radio,"8 television, ' and
cable,"' and all media in which children may be exposed to the
content.'
1
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, the Court explained that
this content regulation was based in part on the theory that "[b]ecause
of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium 5 The Court gave Congress wide
latitude to treat each broadcaster "as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices which are representative
of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred
from the airwaves' 51
3
507. Id.
508. SeeFCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,729 (1978); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 US. 190, 210-214 (1943).
509. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (upholding the fairness
doctrine that required broadcasters to provide free air time for opposing candidates to rebut
endorsements or personal attacks).
510. See genellyTumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding
the "must carry" provisions that require cable system operators to provide bandwidth or
channel availability to local broadcasters). But see United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (striking down requirement that channels primarily dedicated to
sexually oriented programming eliminate all signal bleed as a form of content regulation
because it was limited to adult-oriented programming only).
511. Motion pictures may still be subject to some censorship because standards can be
constitutionally different for minors than adults. The Court in Sable Cormnunications v
FCC, 492 US. 115, 126 (1989), explains:
The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest. We have recognized that there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature
that is not obscene by adult standards.
See alsoNew York v. Ferber, 458 US. 747, 756-757 (1982); Pacifica Found., 438 US. at 749-
50; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-640 (1968).
512. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 390.
513. Idat389.
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The Court was concerned that the audience be protected from the
potential monopoly that such limited broadcast media might have:
"[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio
and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount?'
514
Rather than treating the free speech interests of the broadcaster as
paramount, the Court has allowed Congress to identify a variety of
objectives, such as: "(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air
local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination
of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair
competition in the market for television programming. ' 1'
The result is that television has adopted a "voluntary" rating
system against a backdrop of federal regulatory approval,
governmental license renewals, and systematic content review. Again,
the voluntary fence has been carefully built around the regulatory
fence. 16 Because these fences do not apply to the Internet, ' however,
the next test for free speech and censorship will come when the
unregulated world begins to challenge the voluntarily monitored
media.
A classic example of these illusory free speech rights is
embodied in the rhetoric of the Court in FCC v League of Women
Voters. ' There, the Court struck down a governmental ban of editorial
content generated by public television stations that receive federal
funds."9 The decision went to great lengths to stress the importance of
editorial discretion and the need to speak regarding issues of public
concern."' Repeatedly, it stressed that "the expression of editorial
opinion... is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment
protection?''
Yet despite the rhetoric of a Court deeply concerned with the
ability of a local public broadcaster to express editorial opinion, the
514. Id at 390.
515. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994), affd 520 U.S. 180
(1997).
516. Nor does any of this regulation stop networks from airing Temptation Island on
Fox or Real Sex on HBO.
517. SeeReno v.ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997).
518. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
519. See id. at 402.
520. Seeid. at 392-93.
521. Id at375-76.
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real impact of the case is to reaffirm how much power Congress can
wield over the public broadcast stations:
Congress may, in the exercise of this power, seek to assure that the
public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of
information on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be
addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of
those who own and operate broadcasting stations."
Justice Stevens, in dissent, suggested that the law should be
upheld because, given the pernicious power of the government to
coerce editorials favorable to the government through the funding,
licensing, and other regulatory controls a ban is favorable to the false
suggestion of independence. 23 Philosophically, this may be true, but it
damns the entire First Amendment to suggest it cannot be upheld in
part.
Nonetheless, most of Steven's concerns remain valid. The
majority reserved as the domain of the First Amendment only the
shallowest of rights, the power to editorialize.52' The same section of
the law barred the endorsement of political candidates, and the same
editorial process can result in a loss of license if the governmental
regulator determines that the editorial content is not fairly balanced."
Ultimately, balance itself should be questioned rather than being
accepted as a valuable goal worthy of diluting First Amendment
protection. Does the public get an improved marketplace of ideas if
both good and bad ideas are forced into the square as equals? To
illustrate with an extreme example, television and newspapers hardly
provide a balanced picture of witchcraft or Communism because the
public has determined that these are immoral positions that cannot be
defended. The First Amendment protects the speakers who espouse
522. Id at 377.
523. Justice Stevens opined:
The court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with great care.
An artist is likely to paint a flattering portrait of his patron. The child who wants a
new toy does not preface his request with a comment on how fat his mother is.
Newspaper publishers have been known to listen to their advertising managers.
Elected officials may remember how their elections were financed. By enacting
the statutory provision that the Court invalidates today, a sophisticated group of
legislators expressed a concern about the potential impact of Government funds on
pervasive and powerful organs of mass communication. One need not have heard
the raucous voice of Adolf Hitler over Radio Berlin to appreciate the importance of
that concern.
Id at 408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
524. See id. at 370 n.7.
525. Id. at 402.
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these unpopular ideas, but it should not then be transformed into a
vehicle to promote them. The same is true for moderate beliefs. It
should not require so-called balance to present calls to end hunger,
illiteracy, or whatever social ill the station chooses. When all the
balancing is done, an absolute ban on government interference would
produce fewer harms, fewer governmental entanglements, and fewer
lawsuits. When it comes to Congress making laws abridging the
freedom of speech, less is more.
The First Amendment has had to take on meanings never
intended by the founding fathers as technology forces forms of speech
never before thought imaginable. Both Congress and the courts have
struggled to maintain a balance between the ideals of the First
Amendment and the political reality facing the nation.
In upholding new laws adopted by Congress, the courts
concluded that Congress had made "reasonable inferences, based upon
substantial evidence, that increases in the concentration of cable
operators threatened diversity and competition in the cable industry."'5"
Diversity and competition in the cable industry is a laudatory goal.
Just as the competitors to the Motion Picture Patents Company
successfully showed that that company had illegally monopolized the
early motion picture industry, the government and the other cable
operators should use antitrust laws and other vehicles to protect a
competitive market.27 Instead, however, Congress and the FCC have
acted to protect their idealized concept of a diverse marketplace
through regulation and licensing.
The regulations set capacity limits on audience reach, something
no law would be allowed for a newspaper or motion picture."' Implicit
in this regulation is an assumption that the stations carried by the cable
operators are generally the same, so channels like Nickelodeon, HBO,
or Bravo could still have 100% market saturation as every cable
operator selected to carry that channel. This assumption may very be
accurate, and indeed, the direct result of the regulatory structure. The
diversity so cherished by Congress has created a homogenization of
content.
526. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. United States, 211 E3d 1313, 1319-20 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
527. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917); accord United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (finding
vertical and horizontal monopolies among the motion picture studios).
528. See47 C.ER. § 76.503 (2000).
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Another of the interests Congress has attempted to promote is
"localism": Content originating from each local community "to
ensure that 'all communities of appreciable size' have their own voices
'as an outlet for local self-expression.""' Viewers of television can
judge independently whether this approach has been successful, but
most programming today comes from networks or national syndicators
rather than local stations. These relationships are promoted through
FCC policy to help build audiences for local programming.!3 The net
effect of these promotional goals is an increasingly regulated
marketplace where only the most powerful of content providers can
compete.
Whether the market would be similarly dominated without
regulation is unclear, but the regulation has not fostered meaningful
diversity of content nor promotion of local content. Further, because
all the networks but NBC are owned by the same companies that make
up the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America and its
successor, the MPAA, the diversity of voices has not changed much
since Edison's Trust was busted in 1917 and the new oligopoly was
formed. Given nearly a century of the same voices, perhaps it is time
that Congress recognize that the damage being done to the First
Amendment is not outweighed by the tangential impact it has on the
entertainment marketplace.
The need to deregulate the television marketplace may be further
suggested by the move to adopt voluntary ratings. As with the motion
picture industry during the days of the Hays Office, the ratings are
designed to blunt the governmental intrusion into content decisions.
Without the government as a perceived threat, the only purpose of the
ratings would be to serve the audience. If localism was dropped as a
goal at the same time, then perhaps additional programming
opportunities would be opened up for smaller niche programs that
would be unable to attract a sufficiently large audience on the local
529. Baoding Hsieh Fan, Wen Chaimel Surfers Flip to the Web: Copjzht Liability
for Interaet Broadcasting, 52 FED. CoMM. L.J. 619, 635 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1968)).
530. Professor Baoding Hsieh Fan explains:
[T]he FCC has structured its regulations in order to promote strong
network/affiliate relationships. The broadcast networks-ABC, CBS, NBC, and
FOX-have partnered with affiliated television stations in markets across the
country to offer a unique mix of national programming produced by the networks,
local programming produced by the stations, and syndicated programs acquired by
stations from third parties.
Id at 635-36.
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level, but might be successful on the national level. For example,
Spanish language television is available as local programming in some
markets, but local stations featuring reruns may supplant the choice for
a cable operator to carry such a station in other markets. By contrast,
children's television through cable stations like Disney and
Nickelodeon have improved children's broadcasting in recent years
because they deliver niche programs to a national audience."'
Alternatively, if the governmental regulations are truly necessary,
then the content restrictions should become an open, public process. It
should require due process and appellate procedures just as the
Supreme Court has required when upholding film censorship
ordinances, namely that the government have the burden, that any prior
restraint be imposed only briefly to allow for judicial review, and that a
prompt judicial determination be available."' The goal is not to
advocate the end of parental advisory labels that help the viewer make
informed decisions. The goal is to remove one of the two censorship
fences surrounding the content. While I believe it is the viewer rather
than the government who should select what is appropriate and
inappropriate to watch, a governmental system that bans the most
offensive of speech is not inconsistent with the First Amendment
jurisprudence applied over the last century
When the self-censorship is designed to protect against a slow,
costly governmental censorship, however, the choices made are
necessarily going to be unduly conservative. The safe path is to avoid
the censor's process entirely. If the safeguards are not in place for an
efficient hearing and timely determination, the very triggering of the
censorship process is tantamount to losing that hearing. Television,
with its congressional goals of localism and diversity, a process of
531. Other such channels presently include HGTV for home and garden, Bmvo for
arts, the Discovery Channelfor educational science, etc. Cable has allowed these channels to
develop without the need for local broadcast affiliates, but these niche programmers may
have developed as affiliated national networks had Congress not thought that localism was
preferred.
532. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas stated:
The Court today holds that a system of movie censorship must contain at least
three procedural safeguards if it is not to run afoul of the First Amendment:
(1) the censor must have the burden of instituting judicial proceedings;
(2) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only briefly in order to
preserve the status quo; and
(3) a prompt judicial determination of obscenity must be assured.
Id.; see also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (remanding the case
for want of "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standard for officials to follow").
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ongoing license renewal, and the ability of the FCC to bring regulatory
actions against broadcasters,533 creates the greatest threat of implied
censorship controls. This, unfortunately, is one of the chief outgrowths
of the Hays Office.
Technology may still change this. As part of the overhaul of the
Telecommunications Act in 1996, Congress ordered television
manufacturers to begin installing the V-Chip, a customizable screening
device intended to give viewers, and particularly parents, control over
the actual broadcasts that can be viewed on each particular television
set." The goal is to provide parents with a mechanism that will allow
them to program the voluntary parental advisory categories into the
television in order to block access to offensive programs from coming
into the home. While this will protect all viewers from unwanted
exposure to materials those individuals feel is offensive, the primary
goal is to provide parents control over the content viewed by their
children when the parents are not present. 3'
Whether or not the V-Chip itself proves successful, the
technology is rapidly developing for some type of efficient filtering
system. With the ability to control the unwanted content coming into
the home, many of the traditional reasons for regulating television
differently from other forms of media begin to erode. At such a time,
perhaps, the voluntary rating systems will truly be voluntary. The
threat of repercussions will no longer stop a broadcaster from creating
content that is unpopular, nor advertisers from selling space to promote
those shows.
B. Regalating the Piano Roll
One need only look at the Internet for an example of what
happens when the market controls its own content rather than looking
towards the government. Admittedly, the Internet has a fundamentally
different media structure. Today, the costs of distributing content are
533. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1978) (upholding
restrictions on indecent speech in the broadcast medium); Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Letter to Mel Karmazin, President, Infinity Broad.
Corp., 9 EC.C.R. 1746 (1994) (describing how the "Howard Stem Show" received Notice of
Apparent Liability in the amount of $400,000 for indecent speech).
534. SeeTelecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. V 1999); Charles
W Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond ScarciOy. A NewParad'gm forAssessing the Constituionality
ofBroadcastRegulaton, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1695 (1997).
535. Cf Policies and Rules Concerning Chiidrenl Television Programming, 11
F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,699 (1996) (strengthening the FCC'S enforcement of the Children's
Television Act of 1990).
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much lower, the audience is less heavily aggregated towards any
particular site, and the quality is marginal for most of the audience
because of limitations on the speed of content distribution. The legal
structure is different because the courts have stopped Congress from
establishing a regulatory system on content distributors."6
As a result of these legal and technological differences, the
content on the Internet is fundamentally different from that on
television or radio. While traditional media like film are represented,
the content is significantly more diverse and eclectic.37 The Court's
protection of the First Amendment over the government's perceived
interest in protecting society has not seemed to have had devastating
societal consequences. Whether a long-term erosion of morality or
civility will ensue cannot be adequately gauged. Like the world
Eastman and Edison created after the phonograph, instant
photography, radio and motion pictures, the next century's
entertainment will be different and it will impact society. Whether the
impact will be for our benefit cannot be known in advance and
probably will never be fully agreed upon by historians.
The First Amendment is only one of the regulatory tools at stake.
Copyright is equally potent for shaping the new technologies. Like the
laws and court opinions surrounding the piano rolls in the first decade
of the last century, the government is trying to put laws in place
without the ability to know what the future will hold. Today, radio and
audio broadcasting are very prevalent on the Internet because current
technology allows for acceptable performance levels. Copyright laws
are again creating a confusing mess of technical regulations. In 1995,
Congress granted the recording industry the right to control the public
performances of a sound recording when used in some instances in a
digital format.3 These provisions were amended in 1998 with the
Digital Millenium Copyright Act.39 Through strained statutory
reconstruction, these new provisions were adapted to protect the record
industry from Internet webcasters in much the same way the 1909 Act
was designed to protect the music publisher from the piano roll
536. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
537. Paul Talacko, Web Gets a Slice ofLights, Camera, Action, FiN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 23, 1999, at 8.
538. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRSA), Pub. L.
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, 336-49 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000)).
539. Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830,
2830-34.
2002] 665
TULANE LA WREVIEW
manufacturers (the record companies' predecessors). " ° The early cases
are only now making their way through the courts, and the meaning of
the oft-modified statutory provisions are only beginning to take
shape."
Whichever are the choices to be made by Congress and which by
the courts, the path has been shown before. The new technology will
undoubtedly create entirely new economic opportunities for the music
and recordings. At first, as with the piano roll and record companies,
they will try to avoid paying any fees for their services. Eventually, as
the income grows, it will become strategically appropriate to share the
revenue with the musicians, music publishers, and others involved in
the creative process. Napster, the peer-to-peer music sharing system
and website, has recently reinvigorated this model. During its first
phase, it boldly encouraged musical computer files be swapped among
the public without regard to copyright ownership. 42 Having been
enjoined from copyright violations, it now seeks to accommodate the
copyright holder."3
Even these steps are transitionary, No one has yet to record
music for the Internet. Today, the music industry remains where it was
when piano rolls were being recast onto 78 rpm records and sold in
cardboard albums. When a musical format is marketed successfully
without the participation of the present-day recording company, then
the model will necessarily change. For better or worse, the rights
negotiated will be those based on the laws now being adapted to the
recording industry's involvement in the Internet.
The same transition will be true for motion pictures and new
forms of entertainment made possible through the changing
technologies.' The current copyright laws will continue to be
reformed as necessary to stay only one or two steps behind technology
and business practices. The economic model of the entertainment
540. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000); see David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, PartL" On
theAbsurd Complexity oftheDigtaAudio Transmission R4gh 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189,
191-92 (2000).
541. E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 E3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 E3d 1072 (9th Cir.
1999); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D.
Wash. 2000).
542. SeeA&MRecords, 239 E3d. at 1011.
543. David Streitfeld, Napster Will End Trades of Some Music Files: Site Acts in
Anticipafton of Coming Court Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 03,2001, at El.
544. E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 E Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (barring de-encryption of protective codes on DVD disks).
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industry, however, will remain paramount. As these industries grow,
the economic interests continue to expand. As those interests expand,
the desire to protect them grows concomitantly. If the courts
eventually determine that the Constitution requires some limited time
for copyrights to run,' then Congress will probably enact some form
of historical preservation legislation to protect those works over a
century old from being mistreated in the public domain. These
valuable assets will not be wasted.
C Privacy' New Clothes
The demand for privacy protection has peaked once again, just as
it did a century ago when new communications technologies
threatened to invade the home. Today, the focus of the danger is the
ability to collect and to correlate personal data. While the town
grocery clerk could always know something of a person's shopping
habits, that information was not terribly valuable to the clerk and the
anonymity of most larger stores meant that the information could do
no harm. Nineteenth-century urbanization created the phenomena of
privacy because the details of one's daily life were dispersed among
thousands of people. Warren and Brandeis focused primarily on one
particular intrusion into this seclusion, the exploitation of one's
personal life in the public eye. Using Prosser's categories, this would
include both the right of publicity and the right to avoid the public
disclosure of private facts."
These concerns again grip the nation.' New technology used on
the Internet, in grocery stores, and by financial services companies
undoes the protection of anonymity. Instead of the grocery store clerk
remembering, that data is scanned into a database from the checkout
counter, correlated with credit and debit card information, and at least
545. SeeEldred v. Reno, 239 E3d 372,374-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub. nom
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002) (upholding constitutionality of copyright term
extension, by stating that "limited times" was not a substantive limitation on Congress' power
to legislate).
546. See Prosser, supra note 75, at 389. Prosser describes the categories as "[p]ublic
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff" and "[a]ppropriation, for the
defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness:' Id
547. See Federal Trade Commission, Pkivacy Online: A Report to Congress (June
1998), available at htpp:/lvwv.f c.govlreportslprivacy3/toc.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001)
(reviewing manner of collecting data and impact on consumer confidence); see also Joel R.
Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting Intematonal Data PrivacyRules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN.
L. REv. 1315 (2000) (focusing on comparative international treatment for data privacy);
Pamela Samuelson, A New Kind ofPvacy? Regulating Uses ofPersonal Data in the Global
Information Economy, 87 CAL. L. REv. 751 (1999) (book review) (same).
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potentially, tracked against the activities of the person when visiting
Web sites on-line."4 Just as the commercial forces shaped the
development of privacy law, the commercial interests are again
shaping the law.
This is best illustrated in the range of statutes and regulations that
Congress has already adopted regarding online or Internet privacy. In
addition to protections that predate the Internet under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act 49 and student privacy,"' Congress has adopted privacy
measures in new regulations for financial services"' and health care. 52
Congress has also provided general privacy laws regulated by the
Federal Trade Commission for protection of children under thirteen."
In each of these disparate areas of the law, Congress and the
federal regulatory agencies are extending rules on data security and
privacy. As industry learns to comply with the rules for a particular
sector, it develops the capability and facility for compliance in other
areas as well. Conversely, the areas where protection is gaining
momentum are those areas where Prosser's "public disclosure of
private facts" is at issue rather than the publication torts emphasized by
Warren and Brandeis.
Again, the entertainment effect is at work. In those areas where
there is a public consensus that any publication is an intrusion,
Congress or federal regulators can confidently develop standards that
approximate the public's interest in being left alone. Where, however,
548. Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United
States Pivacy Law and the Inteme4 16 SANTA CLARA COMPurER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357,
375 & n.85 (2000) (describing the storm of protest regarding DoubleClick's purchase of
Abacus and the decision to combine the databases of on-line and credit card consumer
information).
549. SeeConsumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2000) (restricting
reporting of consumer credit).
550. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(2000).
551. SeeGramm-Leach-BlileyAct, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501-527, 113 Stat. 1338,
1436-50 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000)).
552. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub.
L. No. 104-191, §§ 701-702, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-46 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1182
(Supp. V 1999)); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Standards for Electronic
Transaction, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,312-72 (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 162
(2001)) (privacy regulations adopted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services)); Basic
HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.ER pt. 46 (2001) (biomedical
research).
553. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681, 2681-728 to 2681-735 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000)) (requiring
verifiable parental consent for data collection); FTC Children's Online Privacy Protection
Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,901-02 (1999) (codified at 16 C.ER. pt. 312 (2001)).
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the privacy interest focuses on publication torts, the publisher's First
Amendment concerns reappear, and the economic interests of the
publisher must be more adequately balanced against the privacy
interest. A general example will illustrate the point: when health
information is used to terminate an employee, such a termination is
generally considered immoral. That same information when used to
ensure that the congregants of a church send get well cards is
laudatory, if not morally required. Similarly, because no parents want
anyone to contact their small children without the parents approving in
advance, Congress had no problems rallying the public to support
privacy protection for children. Because children under thirteen
generally do not have access to credit cards, the business community
saw far less risk in the law than the risk of public reaction had they
opposed the protections.
The health care standards go further than most of the other
federal regulations. These require that not only the health care
provider, but every company in the chain of custody of the protected
private data, be subject to the regulations. " These companies must
also agree to work with the health care provider to implement internal
and external privacy and security measures."55 As such, these
regulations will percolate through many areas of Internet commerce,
including softvare developers, data storage facilities, Internet service
providers, and other intermediaries, creating a culture of data
protection.
For example, once a company is obligated to identify a privacy
officer for one aspect of its business, it may prove difficult not to let
that privacy officer be responsible for all data matters. Similarly,
security clearances for access to sensitive data will generally not be
segregable into health care information and other proprietary
information. The net effect will be to expand the framework for
privacy and security selected by the federal regulators.
Publicity rights still fit nicely into any privacy regime. Unique
among privacy rights, publicity rights require the permission of the
identified person as a condition of the information's publication. For
many Internet activities, treating information provided to a website
company as limited by publicity rights would simply mean that the
privacy policy would need to detail explicitly the purpose for which the
information was being collected and to whom the information was
554. 45 C.ER. § 164.530 (2001).
555. Id
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being published. Of course, a general release could also be sought, but
the sellers of publicity rights have learned that more limited releases
are far more appropriate in virtually every situation.
Only when the framework selected by the federal agencies
collides with the First Amendment do these rights come into conflict,
and this conflict is not new. Publicity rights and First Amendment
rights have been contrasted by the courts for fifty years.5" Perhaps,
rather than creating novel difficulties, these cases might provide some
guidance or at least a starting point for courts dealing with these
potential conflicts. Whether or not this model is adopted,
entertainment law's impact has been felt. The growth of privacy has
inevitably been caused by the development of technology capable of
destroying it, technologies that generally serve as part of the
entertainment landscape.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEW ENTERTAINMENT WORLD
This Article began as an exploration of the impact of
entertainment law and practice on three of the many legal doctrines
that entertainment lawyers regularly use. Privacy (including Publicity),
Copyright, and First Amendment law are all key components of the
regular work in an entertainment lawyer's office as a typical play, film,
television pilot, or CD is being developed. Occasionally, two or three
of these worlds intersect as publicity rights and copyrights are tested
against the rights of free speech.55'
Perhaps the ultimate lesson was provided by Hugo Zacchini, the
human cannonball. In his complaint against the local television
station, he merely wished to be paid for its broadcast of his life's work,
his fifteen seconds of air travel from the mouth of the cannon. The
television station claimed First Amendment rights to air what it
desired, but the rights to Mr. Zacchini's livelihood were at stake. No
one knew for certain what damage would be done to the professional
career of M. Zacchini, but undoubtedly if there was a such a threat it
was Mr. Zacchini's alone to risk, not the station. The property rights
were that of Mr. Zacchii-author and performer in his life story.
556. SeeZacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,578 (1977) ("There is
no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also
true that entertainment can itself be important news.'); Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns.,
Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (N.Y. 1984).
557. See, e.g., N.Y. Magazine v. Metro Transit Auth., 987 E Supp. 254,257 (S.D.N.Y
1997) (denying relief to Mayor Rudolph Giuliani for a New York Magazine bus
advertisement that said the magazine was "[plossibly the only good thing in New York Rudy
hasn't taken credit for?').
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Whether he was a human cannonball or the next Shakespeare, the
property rights vere economic interests entertainment law had
endeavored to protect.
In each of the three areas discussed, change wrought by
technology led to new entertainment, which in turn led to new
conceptualizations of the general law. Without the new technologies
invented in the nineteenth century, electricity, light bulbs,
phonographs, piano rolls, film, and movie projectors, the law could
have stayed untouched because the social conventions would have
changed at a more leisurely pace.
In discussing the new landscape, Warren and Brandeis correctly
pointed to the new media as the culprit for a need for privacy rights.
They could have said the same things about the need for new copyright
protections and a renewed commitment to the fundamentals of the
First Amendment.
Professor Goldstein has commented that "copyright owners
suffer and consumer electronics companies benefit any time Congress
postpones a decision on home copying.""' The statement may reflect a
very short-term analysis of costs and benefits. Musicians ultimately
reaped the rewards of the piano roll and phonograph. The tape
recorder popularized in the 1960s gave rise to the inclusion of
copyright protections for sound recordings in 1971.
Just as society entered the last century on the cusp of a
technological revolution, we may be in the first stages of the next
wave. As new technologies are developed, the same tensions will
again be felt in the common law, statutory law, and constitutional law
as society gropes forward to understand how to regulate the current
changes without knowing the new world that is forming just over the
horizon.
Although generally considered a sideshow in the legal arena,
entertainment law has deeply shaped the political, legal, and economic
reality that supports the development of the law. Through the
traditions of governmental and self-censorship that have accompanied
theatre and film throughout history, the notion that some regulation is
a necessary part of the entertainment landscape has left an indelible
mark on all aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence. Through its
slow adoption into the exalted realm of copyright protection, mere
entertainment transformed the central scope and purpose of copyright
from the useful maps and productive books to the frivolous, but highly
558. SeCGOLDSTEIN, supmanote 140, at 134.
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lucrative world of music, plays, and films. So too in the common law
itself, where notions of privacy were driven by the demand that
commercial exploitation of photographs be compensated. License
could not be taken, but it could be bought and sold.
Warren and Brandeis truly knew us best: "Political, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society."559 The world of entertainment keeps us young at heart.
559. Warren &,Brandeis, supranote 13, at 193.
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